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Abstract
In this dissertation, I explore how power and governance in Nashville is related to
economic and institutional change on a national and global scale-the transition from
Fordism to post-Fordism. By investigating the political and social institutions of the city,
it is my objective to understand how the elites are operating to control and direct
development. The study is an in-depth look at the activities of local business and how
they decide to respond in a situation of change and uncertainty. Here I stress the
importance of collective action among the business elite, which is equally meaningful to
explore as the notion of capitalism driven by competition. The period of analysis
stretches from the 1980s to the late 1990s: but the early 1990s was a particularly crucial
time period in Nashville when a new local regime emerged as a catalyst for the local
post-Fordist mode of regulation. New forms of governance, which reached maturation
stage during the 1990s, have evolved in Nashville affecting both political and business
institutions. Governance is increasingly based on power diffusion, transparency and
inclusiveness in decision-making, yet dominated by business-friendly policies, which
should be viewed in the context of urban competition and the need to position the city to
take advantage of economic restructuring. To comprehend the interaction between local
development and the national regime, I have studied three relevant policy areas that can
exemplify the nature of competitive governance: image and city promotion� airport
development� and emerging engagement of business interests in social policy as
exemplified by education. The first two areas conform to the idea of the city driven by
entrepreneurial considerations, while the latter concerns social reproduction. All cases,
however, depend on the capacity of business to pursue its goals through collective action.
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t. INTRODUCTION
t. t Statement of the problem
Most everyone in Nashville agrees that the city today is a very different place than it was
just 10 to 15 years ago. There are some directly observable signs of this change: a reborn
downtown, increased economic and spatial growth, the presence of major league sports,
and demographic changes. A dynamic mayor has played a vital role, but on a more
fundamental level, a transformation of local governance has allowed these changes to
take place. My aim is to explore how this new configuration of power and governance in
Nashville is related to paradigmatic changes in the economic and institutional
organization of the United States, and even globally. Some of the interrelated local trends
include the organization and activities of business interests, the nature of city politics and
power distribution, the changing economic character and industrial base, demographic
trends, and the influx of new people in an increasingly integrated economy. These trends
are reflective of the city's efforts to take advantage of Sunbelt growth and the
opportunities of a post-industrial economy. The goal is to investigate how economic
development strategies are formed in this context. The remaking of Nashville as a
business-friendly, nationally competitive location has been initiated and led by a local
business elite, although this elite by no means holds absolute power. Therefore, its
activities and influence in the policy-making process receive the most attention in my
analysis. Some have even praised these changes in Nashville as a model development of
sorts and a microcosm of contemporary urban America. Recently, the neo-conservative

The American f,'nterprise (1998, March/April) dedicated an entire issue to Nashville as a
successful city of the 1990s that embodied many of the values they touted: an

entrepreneurial spirit, a business approach to government, and, ostensibly, family and
religion-oriented. Regardless of whether the report entirely reflected local realities, the
central ideological message in this portrayal of Nashville is that local communities are
better off guiding their own fates rather than following centralized edicts from the federal
government (Casse, 1998, March 19).
This local independence occurs at a time when, most observers concede, the
world economy has entered a new era in which service production is increasingly
dominant in the developed world, while manufacturing has been reorganized along the
lines of flexible specialization, producing new economic spaces. Economic integration is
taking place on a global scale, and many cities are shedding their old function while
searching for a new role, regionally as well as globally. New economic trends will
inevitably affect the path of localities and there is a necessary dynamic between
economic and political restructuring on a local and a global scale. Clearly, non-local
events have a profound impact on urban change. Even if much has been said about the
diminishing importance-the ''hollowing out"-of the nation-state, it should be noted
that local development in the U.S. is still strongly affected by federal policy.
On a theoretical level, my understanding of local change is inspired by the
regulation school's conceptualization of societal change-the transition from Fordism to
post-Fordism. In an effort to comprehend the dynamic relationship between the two
geographic scales, several writers have investigated the commensurability of regulation
theory and various approaches grounded in local experiences, especially urban regime
theory. Urban regime theory describes political coalition-building in the local arena,
while regulation theory outlines ways of organizing the economy on the national level
2

and the supportive institutional framework that must be in place for a successful
macroeconomic performance (see Chapters 2 and 3 for an in-depth discussion of the
theories). Some suggestions on this theoretical merger have been made, especially in
Lauria's Reco11structi11g urban regime theory (1997), but the empirical work to support it
is still accumulating, and far from all aspects of the theories' interrelatedness have been
empirically investigated. In this study I will focus on the idea that regulation plays out
differently at different geographical levels, and to what extent local strategies are
complementary to those enacted on the federal level (rather than simply being followers
of decisions taken on a higher level). Essentially, the dismantling of the activist liberal
state model that was triggered by globalization and the hyperaccumulation needs of U.S.
corporations has left cities in a situation where they must form an appropriate response.
This response may include not only policies that directly promote economic growth, but
also encourage the investment of social capital; and even, to some extent, social stability
enhancing redistributive policies.
The Nashville economy has been a success story in the 1990s as the city joined
the ranks of rapidly growing Sunbelt cities. Economic growth has been accompanied by
population increase, and the Nashville metropolitan area now has over 1.2 million
inhabitants. As Figure 1.1 indicates, Nashville is among the top 15 growing major cities
in the country, all located in the South and the West. Important growth industries of the
new Nashville economy include health care, music and tourism, as well as traditional
sectors of the local economy such as finance and higher education. The service sector is
now the dominant part of the local economy, employing over 40 percent of the workforce
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1996).
3

1. Las Vegas
2. Austin
3. Phoenix
4. Atlanta
5. Raleigh-Durham

6. Orlando
7. West Palm Beach
8. Denver
9. Dallas
10. Charlotte

11. Portland
12. Houston
13. Nash ville
14. Salt Lake City
15. Miami

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2001 ). *MSAs over 1 million.
Figure 1.1 Top 15 fastest growing (by percentage) large* MSAs in the U.S. 1990-2000.

Nashville follows urbanization patterns observed in other places with a renewed
vitality of the central city, as well as continued and even accelerating urban sprawl.
Accompanying spatial changes include a newly dynamic downtown and rapid peripheral
growth in the metropolitan area, especially in the suburbs to the south and the east where
both population and employment have boomed. The 2000 Census data indicate a
population growth of 11.6 percent in Nashville-Davidson County to approximately
570,000. As expected, the suburban ring counties surpass Nashville in growth, ranging
from 23 to 56 percent, with the most rapid pace to the south in Williamson and
Rutherford counties. Most new development in Williamson County is contiguous with
Nashville's urbanized area, and the county's residents depend to a great extent on
employment in Nashville. Urban development is not limited to these counties; a growing
ring of small cities and exurbanization in middle Tennessee has created an increasingly
dispersed urban region (Figure 1.2). Nashville knows it cannot compete with suburban
counties for population growth, but it has been able to maintain and strengthen the city's
role as a dynamic employment center.

4
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Kentucky

Tennessee

Figure 1.2 Growth patterns in the eight-county Nashville metropolitan area.

Demographically, the city is increasingly diverse. The white population dropped
from 75 to 67 percent in the 1990s. Not only has the black population increased, but a
wide range of ethnicities and immigrant groups are now represented. The Hispanic
population, for example, is officially 26,000 in the 2000 census, but may actually be 50
percent higher than that (Moody, 2001).
Even if Nashville is more ethnically diverse than ever, it has not developed as a
poverty-afflicted core surrounded by affluent suburbs. Nashville has grown more affluent
in both absolute and relative terms. Compared to several peer cities 1, the Nashville MSA

1

Throughout the study, I will compare the socio-economic development of Nashville with ten "peer
cities"-Binningham, Charlotte, Columbus (OH), Indianapolis, Jacksonville, Louisville, Memphis, New
Orleans, Oklahoma City, and Raleigh-Durham. They have been selected on basis of proximity (mostly in
the Southeast) and size (MSAs of similar size to Nashville).

5

is relatively affluent. Figure 1.3 indicates that Nashville is currently second to high-tech
Raleigh-Durham in personal income among the peer group. Income in Nashville did not
compare favorably in the 1970s, improved considerably in the 1980s, and after a slump in
the late 1980s, the 1990s were an outstanding period of rapid growth for Nashville. In
fact, during the 1990s the city's boosters reached the goal of increasing personal income
by $1,200-1,300 annually (Harris, 2000). This growth in affluence is especially
noticeable compared to the national average income. Also when adjusted for geographic
differences in cost of living, Nashville retains its position as one of the most affluent
cities in the region (Partnership 2000, 1996) 2.
There are several reasons why I will use Nashville as the case study to investigate
the impact of broad economic change as outlined by the regulation theory on the local
political economy. The current growth in Nashville has resulted in changes, not only in
the city's economy and spatial structure, but also its political decision-making process,
which makes Nashville a good research object using the regime/regulationist perspective.
Unlike many cities studied in the literature, Nashville is not the prototypical industrial
city transforming itself into a service economy. Industrial data reveal, however, that
Nashville also has experienced a significant shift from 33 percent of the workforce
employed in manufacturing in 1966 to only 11 percent in 1996 (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1966; 1996). Quantitative decline is also accompanied with qualitative change:
apparel and shoe manufacturing are declining in favor of high-tech employment, as

2

As measured by Effective Buying Income (EBI). Using a different, but similar, pool of cities, the
Nashville Chamber of Commerce reports that Nashville's EBI is second in a group of 12, only surpassed by
Dallas.
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Figure 1.3 Per capita income in Nashville and peer cities 1969-1998. (Adjusted for
inflation in 1998 dollars. In the legend, cities are listed in order of affluence, from the top,
in 1998. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, various years.)
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exemplified by Dell Computer's new manufacturing plant in Nashville. However, with a
history of a diverse manufacturing sector with only some locally headquartered
corporations, the post-industrial shift in Nashville is distinctly different than industrial
cities in the Northeast. Nashville is also relatively unstudied, and the city's recent urban
change has so far attracted scant attention from researchers. But, as a growing Southern
city, I believe its changes are not entirely unique, and the conclusions of this work are, it
is hoped, valid beyond the immediate case study.
Before elaborating on the major theories in the next chapters, a few comments on
the philosophical basis of the dissertation are in order. Throughout the dissertation, urban
politics will be emphasized as the arena where urban space is shaped. Using a dichotomy
from political science, I will employ an elite perspective rather than a pluralistic
perspective on urban politics3• A local elite, by definition, is a powerful minority group
whose control predominantly emanates from financial, corporate or private resources, and
is generally accompanied by a group-consciousness of social superiority. If cities are
shaped by powerful groups of people operating in a capitalist economy, political action
and its outcome in the urban environment can benefit from an analysis using a political
economy perspective4 • Politics and economy cannot be treated as belonging to separate
spheres; rather, the two are inextricably linked. The economy is not a neutral system for
the allocation of resources; conversely, political decisions and their consequences are not

3

My view of the American city as elite-dominated has undoubtedly emerged from my experience with
Scandinavian cities and their strong party-system, corporatist local state organization, and financial
dependency on the central government.
4 In contemporary human geography, political economy often denotes a neo-Marxist approach; however, I
use the term in a more general sense. On the other hand, that does not mean that I reject Marxian ideas
outright, but rather aim to incorporate some of their insights into a broader theoretical framework.
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simply direct outcomes of majority votes in popular elections and city councils. Instead, a
small group of people can muster a disproportional amount of influence on decision
making. Particularly business interests hold extraordinary powers over public policy
simply because any city's dependency on private capital for its economic well-being is
strong and the rational self-interest of the local state is, therefore, likely to result in policy
concessions to business interests (Lindblom, 1977). The acknowledgment of power
outside traditional political institutions has led to the broad concept of governance
replacing the narrower focus on government in urban studies. By exploring the political
and social institutions of the city, it is my objective to understand how the elites are
operating to control and direct development. The interest of business is often construed as
homogenous and conforming to the "logic of capitalism," or simple agents of capitalism.
While not dismissive of the power of economic structures on societal development, my
contribution is an in-depth look at the behavior of local business, individually and
collectively, and how they decide to respond in situations of change and uncertainty.
Here I stress the importance of collective action among the business elite, which is
equally meaningful to explore as the standard conceptualization of capitalism as driven
by competition. For example, the loosening of ties of corporations to local places is now
almost taken for granted. General assumptions of what this means are usually embedded
in the idea of global power holding authority over local places. I will look into the
mechanics of this process, the changing relationship of corporations and industries with
places, even if the dependency of capital mobility on most U.S. cities and their economic
development strategies might be limited to national flows rather than international.

9

The emphasis on Nashville's business elite in the dissertation is taking place at
the expense of other social groups, such as the working class and minorities. This is
indeed a limitation, but perhaps a necessary one to keep the scope of the study reasonably
narrow. But the research cannot be said to capture all aspects of Nashville, and it is very
possible that important social and economic trends have eluded me given these
parameters. On the other hand, the elite emphasis does not imply that other groups are
powerless or that their impact will be omitted completely. As will be evident later,
working class neighborhoods have played important roles in Nashville's local politics,
and, as in virtually all Souhern cities, the precence of a substantial African-American
population has influenced the development process in several important ways. Especially
the politics of education will receive substantial treatment.
How then exactly is Nashville affected by the ongoing national and global
reorganization of the economy? What institutions and decision-makers constitute the new
Nashville regime, making the city distinctly post-Fordist? Building on earlier theoretical
and empirical work, Figure I .4 shows how I envision the interaction between the abstract,
general level and how it takes specific shape in Nashville. The most important connection
in my analysis is the intensification of urban competition, which has initiated a local
process of change resulting in new policies, institutions, and strategies. The period of
analysis stretches from the I 980s to the late 1990s5, but I hypothesize that particularly the
early 1990s was a crucial time period in Nashville when a new local regime emerged as a

5

A logical endpoint is the conclusion of Phil Bredesen 's mayoral tenure in 1999, although relevant
developments beyond that point will he discussed.
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An era of indeterminacy
Competition as an ideological imperative
Taking advantage of restructuring

Geogra hical interdependence

------------------------,

,--______
I
I
I
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Local politics
Real estate crisi
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l__ _ _

New poHcies ________ _

Regulating and improving the work force

I
I
I

Changing political culture-----;•-:

The politics of image creation

Changing business elite

Banking

Chamber of Commerce
Partnership 2000

Theoretical connections
Empirical connections

Figure 1.4 A theoretical framework developed for Nashville to show local/non-local
interaction.
catalyst for the local post-Fordist mode of regulation. The central issues that must be
addressed are summarized in the following hypothesis:
•A new form of governance has evolved in Nashville, affecting both political and
business institutions, which reached matura�ion stage during the 1990s. Governance is
increasingly based on power diffusion, transparency and inclusiveness in decision
making, yet systematically biased towards business-friendly policies, which should be
viewed in the context of urban competition and increased awareness, positioning the city
to take advantage of economic restructuring.
• This shift is strongly influenced by outside political and economic forces
"post-Fordism." Analytically, I distinguish between catalytic factors and underlying,
structural factors. The former includes the economic recession around 1990 and the
11

mayoral period of Bill Boner, which discredited old-style machine politics. These
catalytic factors can be unique events resulting from local particularities, but are usually
embedded in non-local trends. The blend between catalytic and structural factors
produces a path of development that is both place-based and universal. The latter include:
1. A decline of dominant industries in Nashville; 2. New geographic organization and
integration of the economy, in part triggered by deregulation; 3. Migration of people and
capital to the Sunbelt, which together with the increasingly interconnected economy,
rendered the old local power structure obsolete; and 4. State devolution. These issues,
outlined as the "new governance" box in Figure 1.4, are discussed in Chapter 4, a review
of some of the implications of post-Fordism on cities; Chapter 5, a history of Nashville,
as any recent changes must be understood as a response, not only to external forces, but
also to local historically contingent structures; Chapter 6, a focus on the business cycle
and economic recession circa 1990 as catalytic factors triggering changes in local
governance; and Chapter 7, the cultural and institutional transformation of the business
elite.
• The strategies that have emerged can be situated in an intra-urban competitive
context. To fully comprehend the outcome of the interaction between local development
and national regimes is a formidable task that requires in-depth knowledge not only of a
particular city, but also exhaustive comprehension of U.S. urban development over a long
time period. I will therefore limit myself to study only a few relevant examples (the "new
policies" box in Figure 1.4). Three areas can exemplify the nature of competitive
governance: image and city promotion (Chapter 8); airport development as a competitive
tool (Chapter 9); and a new type of engagement of business interests in social policy as
12

exemplified by education (Chapter I 0). The first two areas conform to the idea of the city
as driven by entrepreneurial considerations, while the latter concerns social reproduction.
All cases, however, depend on the capacity of business to pursue its goals through
collective action, and I will try to resolve the fundamental question of how these
divergent strategies relate to each other.

t .2 A note on research methods

The methodological approach of this study corresponds to what textbooks call a
historical/comparative analysis (Babbie, 1995). As the unit of analysis is the city, the
research is context-based and must acknowledge that a particular city's development is
path dependent. The events influencing the new local regime of the 1990s are described
using a narrative structure, but more theoretically focused, where the strategies and
policies are treated in an analytical fashion, and less idiographically than traditional
historical research.
My research was conducted in two distinct phases: the exploratory phase and the
field phase. The exploratory phase involved a close reading of written sources.
Newspapers and local periodicals are invaluable for recapturing the pattern of events that
shaped the city's political and urban discourse over the last decade. The goal is to identify
key events and developments that are relevant to my arguments. The role of the theories
underpinning the research is to guide my interpretation of local events and make sense of
innumerable occurrences, distilling a complex process to a few manageable ideas. This
procedure is necessary as the theories can only suggest some areas of research, and a
specific set of research objectives must be developed for each case study. The exploratory
13

research will build a framework of knowledge that is not comprehensive, but will provide
a foundation from which it is possible to continue. The goal of the subsequent field phase
is to add data to the constructed framework and to corroborate and expand on the general
ideas that have emerged during the exploratory phase-to fill in missing facts. Two
research activities are dominant here: collecting and analyzing secondary data (including
policy documents, statistical material, and news articles) and conducting interviews with
key actors, an essential research tool to interpret the factual events.
There are certain problems to be aware of when conducting predominantly
interview-based qualitative research. Each informant will provide a personal
interpretation of historical or ongoing events and processes. Assuming that the informants
are truthful, statements are still limited by memory. An answer should also be interpreted
based on the question asked and the context in which it was presented. While a question
is often posed so the answer will illuminate the validity of the researcher's hypothesis, it
must be remembered that the person interviewed is not necessary familiar with these
assumptions. Therefore, as a researcher I must be wary of assigning a meaning beyond
the immediate, concrete event discussed. When logical deductions from the material are
made, they should be identifiable as the researcher's own. Moreover, interview material
does not only constitute a personal response. In most cases, the individual interviewed
also represents a particular group or interest in society. Thus, interviewees' answers
naturally conform to a certain viewpoint or to a more-or-less identifiable agenda. The
goal has been to accumulate enough information, qualitative or quantitative, that can
contextualize and balance the offered viewpoint, so that all accumulated statements can
be adequately analyzed within the theoretical framework that is used.
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2. THE POST-FORDIST SOCIETY
2.1 Introduction to the theory

Current societal trends, although confusing and contradictory at times, can be interpreted
as following a particular model. Government policy and decision-making finnly embrace
a handful of broad propositions: national and urban policy operate under the axiom that
the era of big government is over, decentralization brings responsive government closer
to the people, and competition and free market principles should be applied as often as
possible. At the same time, it is sometimes assumed that policy formation on the local
level is guided by practical concerns far removed from ideological considerations. While
it is certainly true that many mundane activities of governing a city have no broader
implications, the strategies and decision-making arrangements that guide the path of
individual cities are not conceived in a vacuum, but are indeed influenced by non-local
forces. The term post-Fordism is often used to describe the current urban condition, as
well as society in general. Although the term originated as a label of industrial
organization, it is now widely used in a variety of contexts and each author appears to
ascribe his or her own meaning to the term. Therefore, it would then be wise to retreat for
a minute and reflect on the intellectual roots of the post-Fordist idea, in order to
comprehend its broad contemporary framing and geographical implications.
The French regulation school of the 1970s grew out of a critique of orthodox
Marxist political economy and is based on ideas developed in Michel Aglietta's seminal
book, A Theory qfCapitalist Regulation ( 1979). Regulation theory also differs from
neoclassical equilibrium models in its interest to understand fundamental economic
changes in a proper historical context (Jessop, 1995). After the tumultuous end of the
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1960s with social upheaval and growing economic uncertainties, the capitalist economy
appeared weaker than at any point since the Great Depression. Corporate productivity
and profitability had eroded� unemployment skyrocketed in the core industries of the
Western economies, which were facing stiffer global competition than before. However,
a decade later it was clear that capitalism would not disintegrate due to its inherent
contradictions as Marxist dogma insisted; in fact, it proved to be quite resilient. Facing an
economic and political crisis, capitalism was capable of "reinventing" itself relying on
new industrial organization, new global strategies and a rethinking of state economic
policies. This reinvention process involved a change in the regime ofaccumulation-the
transition from Fordism to post-Fordism. A regime of accumulation represents a stable
relationship between consumption and production. It outlines the basic economic
relationships in society, such as the conditions of production, private and public
consumption, savings and investment, and the general scope and proper role of
government. The regime is then "materialized in the shape of norms, habits, laws and
regulating networks...which guarantee that its agents conform more or less to the schema
of reproduction in their day-to-day behavior" (Lipietz, 1987, p. 14). These social and
economic institutions, cultural norms, and major government policies that must be in
place and work together in a coherent fashion to support the regime are collectively
referred to as a mode ofregulation (Lauria, 1997). The mode of regulation "establishes a
set of procedures and individual and collective behaviour patterns which must
simultaneously reproduce social relations" (Boyer & Saillard, 2002, p. 41) within a
particular regime and its institutional forms. These ideas in regulation theory draw, at
least implicitly, on the concept of a social contract that emphasizes the idea of underlying
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informal agreements in society, providing common rules for cooperative behavior
between groups and individuals. As a mode of regulation is an outcome of collective
action, political decisions, and various semi-independent variables, such as technological
change, it therefore involves constant adjustment of the procedures and institutions.
Regulation theory thus allows for individual action and the uncertainty of history to
influence societal development, making it, in a broad epistemological sense, compatible
with a variety of approaches that aim at integrating and overcoming the division of
structure and agency (Giddens, 1984; Collier, 1994). With that said, one must also be
wary of attempts to seek full explanatory power of all events in one grand theory.

2.2 Fordism and its demise

Regulation theory developed from an understanding of how capitalism was organized
after World War II and how large societal institutions were crucial for the particular.
regime of accumulation called Fordism. On the production side, the Fordist regime was
associated with assembly-line style mass production. During the early 20th century, the
increasing output of productive forces was not matched by a corresponding rise in
consumptive capacity. This imbalance is generally considered one of the causes for the
Great Depression. Just as Henry Ford's story tells us that his company paid his workers
above the industrial wage at the time so that they could purchase the automobiles they
produced, it became the goal of the state to institute a consumption norm for the good of
the overall economy. Raising the wages and living standard for the working classes
became not only a moral, but also an economic, imperative. The consumption nonn that
developed during the Fordist regime was mainly a demand-led approach to generate a
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market for new products and services. During Fordism, consumption was underpinned by
a mode of regulation that included high union-negotiated wages, the welfare state, Social
Security, and government loan guarantees, all ensuring high levels of consumption
(Lipietz, 1992).
The intellectual basis for these policies was Keynesian economic theory, which
allowed for increasing government activities to intervene and stabilize the economy. Not
only did it preach demand-side management through minimum wages and the welfare
programs of the redistributive state, which supported the mass consumption imperative,
but also controlled the cyclical swings endemic to capitalism, a goal that could not be
over-emphasized in the post-Depression economy. The government, it was felt, must
spend during downturns in order to balance the opposing forces of unemployment and
inflation. Spending was enhanced by progressive taxation, which was not only defended
by the equity argument, but also as rational as low-income individuals have a higher level
of marginal consumption of income. Moreover, in a system where stable and predictable
growth was the goal, competition had to take a step back in favor of planned management
of the economy. The profit level was a function of wage increases and inflation, which
led to an important role for the predictive capacities of economic experts. Keynesian
stabilization policy was merely fine-tuning of economic growth, amounting to little more
that a technical problem of how to manipulate demand to smooth out business cycles and
achieve predicable, stable growth. Productivity increases, consumption, and corporate
profits were, if not determined a priori, at least planned, by institutions such as the wage
negotiation system. Even if disagreements between management and labor occurred
frequently, a relatively peaceful labor market translated into stable profits and growth.
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This economic system elevated labor unions to an unprecedented role in society. A grand
compromise existed in a tripartite power structure: business, labor, and the government.
These tendencies of the Fordist regime did, to some extent, depoliticize society.
The prevailing belief at the time was that ideology was a concept of the past and did not
play a role in modern society. The continuous prosperity of working-class Americans
through "comfortable proletarianization" would in itself defeat communism, the only
ideologically-based model of society still remaining. The United States had become a
society of jobholders (Bazelon, 1969). The mysteries of economic progress had more or
less been solved and the "tweaking" was to be left in the hands of experts. This optimism
and predictability of the economy resulted in a forward-looking society with a modernist
mindset. Similar trends emerged in the private sector. Corporate managerialism where the
notions of classic capitalism-free enterprise, ownership and private property-had to be
rethought. The goal of corporation was to grow bigger as much as maximizing profits.
Business planning emphasized long-term stability and growth (Schonfield, 1965).
Extending the reasoning from macroeconomic stability to social stability, Galbraith
(1976) argued that individuals tend to undervalue public goods; and if society fails to
supply public services at the same rate as private production capacity grows, the result is
social disorder. Such arguments provided the necessary intellectual support for an
expansive state in the social sector.
The model and its ideological underpinnings as described here were, of course,
not identical in all countries or even regions. The mass consumption model was best
developed in the United States, while the labor relations model was taken further in
Western Europe. The Fordist social contact in most European countries was deeper and
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more comprehensive than in the United States. The role of labor unions was more
institutionalized into a corporative political system where wages were determined by
negotiations on a national level. Even the political decision-making system integrated the
different participants of the labor market. Although under pressure, the model remains
important in much of Western Europe today. In the United States, the right to unionize
was established by federal law in the 1930s, but the U.S. labor movement was content
with acquiring purchasing power increases. rather than amassing political power. By
moving labor negotiations up the geographical scale to the national level, labor gained
negotiating power, while capital gained a higher degree of labor market tranquility. While
these relations were formalized with the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act in the
193Os and 1940s, it also al1 owed for the development of "peripheral Fordism" through
right-to-work provisions adopted by some. mostly Southern, states. The term peripheral
Fordism originally referred to the labor intensive economies of southern Europe, but has
similarly been used to describe the American South as a region not quite ready,
politically and economically, to fully embrace the emerging mass consumption model
and accompanying social relations. The institutions of Fordism were national in scope.
which increased the role of the federal government and its involvement in shaping local
development. This created not only a new relationship between cities and the federal state
(see Chapter 3), but also had implications for regional development. Regional policy in
the United States is in the strict sense of the term almost non-existent. Instead, allocations
are made to regions through the political system where, for example, military spending
has become important (Markusen et al., 1999). Logically, government programs had the
greatest relative impact in poor regions. Infrastructure development such as the interstate
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system and military expenditure, which brought a federal wage norm to new places,
attracted investment and increased living standards in many places. The income level in
the South moved closer to the national average during this period (Figure 2.1). The
expanding Fordist government became a geographic equalizer.
In the late 1960s, the economies of the Westem world suffered a slowdown. The
profit margin for the large corporations was rapidly shrinking, and the system suddenly
no longer seemed effective. Productivity was a problem as corporations faced dynamic
competition in the emerging world economy. Compared to the onset of the Great
Depression, which was a crisis of over-production, this was a crisis of profitability
(Lipietz, 1987). It was not a simple economic crisis caused by the latest business cycle or
other dynamics solely within the economic realm. The relationship between political
regulation and accumulation was out of sync, leading to a more fundamental, or "secular"
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Figure 2.1 Per capita income convergence of U.S. regions.
Note: Measured as median income until 1960, and mean income from 1970. Midwest
region called North Central until 1990. Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Characteristics of the population (various years), except 2000 data taken from Summary
File 3 from Census online FactFinder.
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in the words of Esser and Hirsch ( 1989), crisis. The contradictions of the Fordist model
became more and more evident. The rigidly negotiated wages accepted in the name of
expanded consumption became counterproductive, creating a major rift in the labor
management compromise. As gains in wages and influence are not easily surrendered,
labor conflicts compounded existing problems. Stagflation triggered economic
rethinking, as did the external shock of the oil crisis. Economic decline created a search
for new forms of institutions and policies best exemplified by the conservative
revolutions of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.

2.3 The nature of post-Fordism

Fordism is generally considered to have been replaced by a new emerging regime most
commonly referred to as post-Fordism, which was set in place to create and sustain
increasing profits. Its nature is not fully realized and researchers often stress the
unpredictability of regime formation. Some prefer not to proclaim it a regime, only
"disorganized capitalism" that has emerged after Fordism and is guided by few principles
other than the market-led development of neo-liberalism (Peck & Tickell, 1994).
Nevertheless, some common threads can be identified that are relevant to the discussion
of post-Fordism in the context of urban development.
Although fundamental changes in the way production is organized have occurred,
one single coherent system has not emerged in the industrial sector. Flexible
specialization provides a clear alternative to Fordism with its craft style, small batch
production localized in certain industrial districts; northern Italy is a ubiquitous example
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in the literature (Sabel, 1994). However, it has not become the all-encompassing principle
of industrial organization. Neither has the Japanese system of just-in-time lean
production, nor European industrial organization, which has retained much of its
character with strong collective agreements. The European system has instead moved
towards workgroups and reskilling of workers, which represents a move away from
Taylorism more than Fordism. No single trend has emerged, which has led to valid
concerns about the viability of post-Fordism as a concept in industrial geography. Large
companies remain important, albeit in a new form; they are more flexible and
decentralized with a renewed focus on their core business (Belussi & Garibaldo, 1996).
With the fast pace of change in technology and new products, producers have moved to a
network system where larger companies remain in the center, while smaller companies
supply cutting-edge technology and know-how in a system of vertical disintegration and
subcontractor-based production networks. Production is emphasizing product
differentiation and price competition, while economies of scale play a lesser role than in
the past. Demand is more unstable in a differentiated, fluid market. There is, therefore, a
need for production to be more flexible and responsive to those changes.
Where innovation thrives, new industrial districts emerge, placing an emphasis on
regional economies (Storper, 1997). If competitiveness is based on local or regional
conditions, economic regulation must also be local. From this dynamic perspective on
spatial development under capitalism, Post-Fordism brings good times to some regions,
possibly leading to new types of geographic unevenness. In any case, if a process of
economic nationalization took place under Fordism, the reemergence of regional
economies is now underway, leaving more power in the hands of local or regional actors.
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On the other hand, equilibrium models of mainstream economics logically assume
diminishing regional differences in a market-based, open economy with powerful global
forces, which may diminish the capacity for local action.
Economic globalization is that force which undermines the de facto sovereignty
and regulating power of states. Production is more oriented towards worldwide demand.
This integration has been enabled by advances in technology, of both the production
oriented and communication type, and by expanding free trade governed and enforced by
global institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary
Fund. The new international division of labor leaves routinized, labor-intensive
production to developing countries, while advanced capitalist countries must shift their
emphasis to R&D and knowledge-based production and services. In an era of global,
dynamic capitalism, the old national Fordist institutions are less appropriate. It is instead
in the interest of capital to promote the virtues of neo-liberal free trade, thus reinforcing
the idea of flexibility to discipline workers with the relocation threat. State and local·
action is restricted as globalization functions as a giant prisoner's dilemma: if you do not
know how others will act regarding wages, work rules, and other regulatory mechanisms,
implementing change is difficult. But the caricature of globalization as a process that
allows capital to locate anywhere does not provide a comprehensive picture. Producer
networks, just-in-time, and local skills are precisely the factors that make capital less
footloose and responsive to more than the lowest bidder of labor cost. For example, a
significant share of U.S. foreign investment is directed at Europe with its high wages,
strong unions, long vacations, and "cumbersome" labor regulations (Dicken, 2003). In
the United States, spatial differences in labor relations have influenced the post-Fordist
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geography, e.g. the Sunbelt shift. Overall, the demise of unionism is both a product of
economic restructuring and public and corporate policy. Industrial decline, capital
mobility and globalization, and reorganization of work places with increasing flexibility
and instability have chipped away the ability of unions to maintain power. At the same
time, unions have failed to make significant inroads in the growing service-economy.
The role of unions has weakened along with the shift in the role of government to
encourage supply rather than demand. This includes less provision of welfare services, as
the ideal of universal rights is less widely held. On the supply side, the state has
responded with economic policies that include the retraction of the public sector through
privatization and deregulation. The result is a "Schumpeterian6 workfare state" where
social policy is subordinated to economic growth incentives based on competitiveness
and innovation that requires a flexible workforce (Jessop, 1994). The transition to post
Fordism has found support in monetarist/supply-side policies in the wake of an economic
crisis that the old macro-economic model-Keynesianism--could not predict, explain, or
cope with. The new economic thinking stated that increasing demand will only create
inflation. The role of fiscal policy is solely to combat inflation by limiting money supply.
High levels of wealth accumulation (savings) instead of consumption lead to investment
and growth in the economy. Adjusting the deficiencies of the market should be done by
encouraging supply instead of demand by lowering taxes, decreasing regulation, reducing
inflation, and curbing government spending. These things combined also encouraged
globalization of the economy. A tight monetary policy led to fluctuating interest rates,

6

From the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who viewed the economy driven hy technological
paradigms that occasionally arc transfonned by periods of "creative destruction...
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volatility in exchange rates and investment flows between countries. The tax cut, on the
other hand, induced a deficit that necessitated borrowing and drove up interest rates,
which in tum attracted foreign capital to the United States. Economic policy thus became
increasingly aligned with the new emerging logic of capitalism.
The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act played an especially important part of the
shift towards stimulating supply and investment as opposed to Keynesian taxation
encouraging consumption. It was nothing less than a paradigmatic change in the
accumulation strategy of the state, a drastic shift in the burden of taxation away from
corporate taxes. Earlier tax structures had benefited capital-intensive production, but
taxation policy now also turned towards encouragement of human resource development.
Hence, with capital mobility increasing, taxation was shifted towards less mobile factors,
such as labor and fixed assets (Martin, 1991 ).
Economic policies had the intended effect of increasing profits. Corporate
management views it as their overwhelming responsibility to accumulate profit for their
shareholders, and not necessarily to adhere to a pattern of sustainable growth. The new
capitalism of hyper-accumulation may then, at first glance, be less concerned with long
term goals, and more interested in instant monetary gratification. Moderating effects
must, however, exist to soi:ne extent (some that I will investigate further in the Nashville
case study). Boyer (2000) suggests that new financial norms-especially the preeminence
of shareholder value--may be the most important mechanism to influence trends in
corporate strategies, labor markets, and government policy. As rates of return converge
and competition shifts from production to finance markets, similar management
techniques and labor arrangements are adopted. While the short-term drive for profit
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must be accompanied by labor market flexibility at the expense of workers, Boyer argues
that as households gain influence as pension fund investors/stock-owners, their objectives
are more long-term, and some regime-like stability may be achieved.
Not all individuals are stockholders of course. One effect of the post-Fordist
society, and maybe the most derided, is the drift towards social polarization, including the
stagnation of wages and the retreat from poverty reduction. A clear shift from the income
compression between rich and poor during the Fordist days has taken place in the post
Fordist era. Since 1970, median family income has been stagnant, the gap between rich
and poor has been growing, and those without a college education have an increasingly
hard time finding good jobs (O'Loughlin, 1997). Adjusted for inflation, the average
American household has only seen an income increase of five percent from 1973-1997,
and the poor have seen even less (Henwood, 1999, March 29). The reasons are multiple
and include: globalization, the decline of manufacturing, growth in low-end service jobs,
immigration, low minimum wages, weak unions, strong gains in investment income
(dividends, capital gains), changing family structure, deregulation, weakening social
safety net, less progressive taxation. Public policy has played its role, shifting the tax
burden towards lower corporate taxes to combat the profitability squeeze. Moreover, the
real minimum wage is the same as 30 years ago, while virtually all wealth created in the
post-Fordist era has accrued to the affiuent half of the population. To increase the
consumption potential of the poor is no longer an objective; in fact, from a crude macro
economic perspective of a predominantly affiuent society, it might not be strictly
necessary, and perhaps even counterproductive. Rather than the economy at large
following the lead of key industries, wages and consumption are more fragmented. The
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conclusion is that working-class consumption does not have to be as actively supported
as during Fordism. Despite the strong economy, income disparities continued to increase
during the l 990s7 (Bernstein et al., 2000). Worker productivity is increasing, but it is not
showing up in the wallets of a large segment of the population. Instead, post-Fordism has
been successful in its main objective--to increase corporate profits. The informational
economy rewards a new, well-educated workforce, while deindustrialization and
deunionization under globalization apply wage pressure downward on manufacturing
jobs. The income disparities also have a geographical dimension on the urban level.
Nashville, for example, has experienced a post-Fordist income divergence between
neighborhoods. The coefficient of variation that measures the inequality of income by
census tract in Davidson County increased from 0.39 in 1970 to 0.47 in 2000 (based on
my calculation of census data).
The rethinking of the role of government also includes a change in the scope of
the state. The so-called "hollowing out" of the state on the national level leaves, relatively
speaking at least, more power in global, regional, and local hands, which are sometimes
prone to find new territorial modes of regulation that may take a local, international, or
interregional character (Church & Reid, 1995). The responsibility for accum�lation
supporting functions (ideological, reproductive, or production-oriented) is particularly
divested to the local level. The process of devolution tilts power, more often than not,
7

Regionally, the South continues to be one of the most unequal areas in the country, although to a lesser
degree than in the past. Tennessee, however, is in a slightly different position with average income
inequalities, and only one of three states in the U.S.--the other two being oi) dependent Alaska and
Louisiana-where income inequalities showed a statistically significant decrease during the 1990s
(Bernstein ct al., 2()(X)). However, this pre-tax analysis does not incorporate Tennessee's regressive tax
system.
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toward business interests. Capital operates on a geographical scale that rarely can be
matched by other local interests. Devolution is therefore a process that has the capacity to
diminish other interests' use of the state as an instrument to increase their political
leverage. If power devolves, the federal government has less capacity to implement the
policies that characterized the Fordist regime. From an urban perspective, federal support
to cities for social programs is not an imperative of the post-Fordist state, and
consequently federal funds for urban problems have diminished. Instead, there is a role
for the state in building new institutions to support education, infrastructure, and public
private policy interaction that, perhaps, represent emerging local modes of regulation.
With these socio-economic trends prevailing, will the regime be stable? Will not
an unregulated economy lead to crisis due to the "inherent contradictions" of post
Fordism? It appears, however, that macroeconomic policies, an accompanying mode of
regulation, and an ideology to support it have been in place for a longer period of time,
and the regime appears to be performing well in terms of overall growth rates and
corporate profits during most of the 1990s. So far, social disorder has not been
overwhelming or even increasing despite the documented tendencies toward polarization.
National politics, and what has been seen as a Democratic adoption of many Republican
positions, exemplifies possible long-term stability in the national regime.

2.4 Critique of the theory

Over time, empirical and theoretical work based on the regulation school has altered and
extended the original propositions. Aglietta's hypothesis of what comes after Fordism
was perhaps as good as anyone's at the time, but in retrospect, was not particularl y
29

accurate. In the light of 25 years of economic change, a series of valid concerns regarding
the approach has emerged. Many have rightfully pointed out that the theory was too
focused on the manufacturing economy, and especially workplace relations. This is, of
course, not peculiar considering the theory's intellectual and temporal origin. The
emerging post-industrial economy makes it necessary to rethink the mode of regulation
concept. The central tenants of the regime argument can be, and has been, detached from
the manufacturing floor.
One of the most important critiques highlights the tendency to compartmentalize
economic development into discrete time periods. Regimes are processes constantly
challenged and undergoing change, which means that they are not necessarily coherent
with sharp, detectable breaks as regulation theory might imply. It has been suggested that
a stable mode of regulation is the exception rather than the rule; and instead, regulatory
failure and crisis is the norm (Goodwin & Painter, 1996). Moreover, assuming
temporally distinct regimes may have a tendency to reify the theory. Should, then, recent
developments perhaps be interpreted as an uncoordinated system, rather than as a new,
stable regime of accumulation? Lake (1997) views restructuring and deregulation in favor
of business interests as stopgap, short-term fixes that are contradictory and unsustainable.
This interpretation touches on an important issue regarding periodization, but elicits some
additional comments. First, it is doubtful whether the current and the old societal
paradigms should be judged by the same yardstick. It might be irrelevant that post
Fordism does not conform to the standards handed down by the earlier regime (if, indeed,
Fordism was, in hindsight, as monolithic and stable as a societal paradigm as portrayed).
As Martin (1991, p. 17) states, regimes should "be considered ideal types rather than
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empirical absolutes" as policy is always complex, incoherent, and fragmented. If more
power is placed in the "invisible hand" of the market, the same level of coordination is
simply not possible. In fact, change itself is a fundamental part in contemporary society.
Society has embraced, even institutionalized perpetual change, which is fundamentally
different that the Fordist preoccupation with stability (Rubin, 1996). Moreover, the neo
Marxist perspective has a natural tendency to over-emphasize crisis, and to stress the
problems and contradictions of any capitalist regime. Even if the critique on the sharp
periodization of economic history is relevant, I am inclined to view current society as
distinctly different from the past to render post-Fordism a useful concept.
An additional critical comment issued by geographers is that the spatial scale of
analysis is neglected. This criticism is pertinent to the original proposition, but much
work has emerged recently. Whereas the nation-state was originally stressed as the locus
for formation of various modes of regulation, place-sensitive analysis has been growing.
Lipietz's (1987) notion of peripheral Fordism added a necessary international dimension
to the theory, but for the purpose of this research, the most important debate concerns the
effect on localities after deindustrialization and inter-regional shifts within United States.
It has been acknowledged that each region has its own regime that is based on particular
conflicts and compromises (Boyer & Saillard, 2002). While orthodox regulation theory
has begun to incorporate a local dimension, it remains a production-oriented
macroeconomic theory where the actor perspective, so fundamental in understanding
localities and even geographic differences in regulation, is still subordinate (Gilly &
Pecqueur, 2002). On the other hand, scholars from disciplines other than economics, as
we will see in Chapter 3, have been more active in exploring local implications of the
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theory. Here, geography has a lot to offer as the problems of post-Fordist development,
such as social polarization tendencies, are increasingly mediated on the local level.
Therefore, these criticisms point out opportunities in furthering the research agenda.
Applying the theory on the local level can tie my research to current endeavors of
broadening the work influenced by regulation theory.

32

3. URBAN POLITICS: FROM MACHINE TO REG'IME (AND BEYOND)

In order to understand the implications. of the current societal regime on the local level, it
is first necessary to discuss urban political dynamics. Strategies of urban development are
affected by the local context; every city is a unique place, and forces operate in the local
environment that must be accounted for and they do not immediately correspond to an
evolving national regime. Scholars of urban politics have created several concepts that
aim to explain how cities are governed. In this chapter, I will discuss the findings in the
literature and connect local politics to the changing imperative of the national political
economy.
The origin of modem city politics can be traced back to the emergence of an
active and service-providing city from 1870-1920 (Monkkonen, 1988). In the progressive
spirit, the city began to provide services beyond the absolute minimum, resulting in
investment in infrastructure, schools and beautification projects both to support and to
counteract the haphazard urban development of laissez-faire industrialism. This business
activism was tied to the emergence of a corporate class that exercised direct personal
control and ownership of its companies and civic power through its own fraternal clubs
(e.g., the country club, Freemasons, Rotary), which emerged as vehicles for social,
political, and economic control. The corporate leaders also developed strong ties to
commercial and banking interests locally (Roy, 1991). Cities also adopted ideas from the
business world. Debt financing became a necessary tool for financing expanded
government services for growing cities. The nature of local politics has in many ways
been determined by progressivism, and on the other hand, coalitions and power
arrangements such as urban machines. Although usually understood as opposing forces,
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Monkkonen stresses the similarities between machines and the progressives. In his view,
machine politics expanded the role ofgovernment and were a necessity for the new active
city that professionalized local politics. Although mostly associated with large urban
centers in the Northeast, machine politics thrived in the stable environment ofsmall and
medium-sized cities elsewhere as well, Nashville included.
At the center ofthe political struggle between these two forces was the structure
oflocal government. The non-partisan, at-large elections and the council-manager
government generally encourage a political process supportive of the growth agenda of
the business elite. It does not foster a strong political leadership that can present
alternative visions to the elite's agenda. It is often idealized as a "clean" machine; an
efficient, non-corrupt government that is attractive for new investment. The existence of
at-large systems in cities today is often a remnant from the progressive era. Dallas is
generally regarded as an archetype ofa city with such a system (Elkin, 1987b). The
power ofbusiness-led progressivism, as well as machines, depends to no small extent on
voter apathy and dismal voter turnout often characteristic oflocal elections. The spatial
expansion ofcities has historically been another strategy for progressive business
interests to dilute the power ofother groups, for example ward-based politicians whose
natural constituency was race- or class-based. Unified government between city and
county is the ultimate strategy ofthis kind. While it provides efficiency gains and
equitable distribution ofresources, it can have adverse effects on the political process.
This can make it possible to build a more top-down style ofgovernment where public
private coalitions actively manage its growth agenda (see for example McNulty [1996] on
Indianapolis).
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In the South, conventional wisdom suggests that commercial-civic elites
established hegemony during the progressive era and have dominated since. The local
electoral structure tends to be based on non-partisan elections, at-large districts, and city
manager form of government. Often smaller in size than their Northern counterparts,
Southern cities were easier to assert control over. Moreover, the lack of the ethnic
diversity and labor unions provided for few other alternative power arrangements. The
disenfranchisement of the black population resulted in a fragmented working-class
population, further solidifying business dominance. The traditional culture in social as
well as economic relations promoted business relations based on personal and family
connections. This social structure coexisted uneasily with entrepreneurial capitalism,
which in its ideal form is transparent, merit-based, and inclusive. A restrictive vision of
the government's role in society has led to a limited commitment to expenditure on social
programs, and an individualistic philosophy has led to a lower level of citizen activism
and organization to push for such measures. Taxation per capital in Southern cities also
tends to be among the lowest in the nation. In part, the low level of public spending is a
remnant of segregation, race relations, and unwillingness to support services for the
African-American population. Although this rationale may be gone, low funding levels,
for example for public schools, still persists in many places. Although probably a
reasonable generalization, some scholars object to this description of Sunbelt urban
politics and contend that it was always more conflictual and pluralistic that the
characterization above would lead us to believe (Kerstein, I 995). Furthermore, post
WWII regional convergence with entrepreneurial governance and increasing minority
and neighborhood participation in the political system where political and economic
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elites must take more time to build coalitions has further eroded Southern exceptionalism
in city politics.

3.1 Urban regime theory

The dominant current approach to local politics stresses the durability of governing
coalitions on the local level. It also emphasizes governance, i.e. the inclusion of various
civic groups, especially business elites, in these governing coalitions. Governance is the
coordinated effort, situated between the state and the market, to manage political and
economic issues.
The concept of urban regimes postulates that certain goals and policies dominate
in a city over a long period of time. At this point, it should be stressed that urban regimes
are not directly related to either regulation theory or regimes of accumulation. Some
commonalties will be discussed later in this chapter, however. The urban regime idea was
proposed by political scientist Clarence Stone and developed in his 1989 book Regime
Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988. Regimes can remain in place largely unaffected
by changes in the local political administration and go beyond mere ad hoc coalition
formation. A power balance between major actors, such as business interests, politicians,
labor representatives, public authorities, planning commissions, and grassroots and
neighborhood interests, can be maintained over time. Summarized by Dowding et al.
( 1999), a regime's core characteristics are: 1. The existence of a distinctive policy

agenda, 2. Longevity, 3. A coalition of interests not specified in formal institutional
structures, 4. Broad-based and boundary crossing between sectors or institutions. In
addition, the policies of a regime generally: I. Transcend changes in leadership make-up
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and political successions, reflecting an ideological agreement over fundamental values of
regime members 2. Involve mobilization of external resources with synergistic effects 3.
Is led by strong, entrepreneurial leadership with a singular political vision 4. Operate
through public-private partnerships, which may bridge diverse local institutions and
community interests. To this, I would also add that the motivations of the actors involved
lies in the fact that they are tied to place through fixed assets and unique local social
relations.
In the tradition of political science, several efforts have been made to create urban
regime typologies. Feinstein and Feinstein (1983) see three general urban regimes in the
post-war United States. The directive regime involves a coalition focused on government
sponsored large-scale development. The concessionary regime was extended to
participants stressing social justice. The third, and currently predominant, conserving
regime is again focused on business interests, but without large-scale direct involvement
of the government. Elkin (1987a) also identifies three similar regimes: federal, pluralist
and entrepreneurial. Elkin's types are not only temporal but also geographical. The
currently dominating regime-the entrepreneurial-is highly associated with the South
and the West, but has also penetrated most regions of the United States. Some critics
have seen the division of regimes into discrete time periods as an oversimplification. For
example, Stone ( I 987) prefers three non-temporal regimes: the corporate, the
progressive, and the caretaker regime. However, typological distinctions like temporal
urban regimes can be useful generalizations. In the context of the post-Fordist
transfonnation, the evolution from a federal to an entrepreneurial-using Elkin's
labels-regime situates urban change in a wider context, which makes temporal regimes
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a relevant concept. The conserving or entrepreneurial urban regimes with their public
private partnerships, pro-business policies, and reliance on local resources are a logical
response to broader post-Fordist developments.
A smoothly running political regime, such as Stone observed in Atlanta, is far
from always the case. Regime theory is less equipped to deal with unstable and changing
conditions (DiGaetano, 1997). There are several studies showing cities with fragmented
elites (Perry, 1990), or elites unable to create a regime (Keil, 1988). Common interests
may not always exist, and protecting the interests of its members and attempts to create a
local economy with higher paying jobs may at times be contradictory. Cities with a low
skilled manufacturing base may struggle whether to take the factor cost-driven or
innovation-driven approach to local competitiveness (Wu, 1996). The fonner contains
relatively crude strategies that can easily be copied, such as tax breaks, while the latter
involves the establishment of creative environments, a process that is harder to achieve.
Innovation relies on social mobilization and local productive environments-the opposite
of Fordist scale economics (Jessop, 1998). Stress from outside forces related to the global
economy can also be detrimental to stable regime fonnation. A declining local economy
and corporate exodus can lead to increased dependency of outside forces, or conversely,
trigger an economic restructuring process paving the way for a "rebirth" of an old,
declining city. Perry (1990) asserts that elites are more visible and organized today, while
Kantor ( 1995) and Ross and Levine (1996) conclude that there is a trend toward
pluralism in American cities, thus implying decreasing elite power. Even if those
conclusions appear to be contradictory, what we might see today can be a struggle over
regime fonnation where business elites have to be more active to ensure their dominance,
38

even by mobilizing other sectors of local society for their own agenda. The generalization
of local politics as moving from elite domination to pluralism, I believe, is missing some
subtle points about the transformation of power. A power shift is not a transfer of a set
number of capacities. The devolutionary trend allows for local power as a reaction
against the diffusion of the global marketplace. At the same time, this diffusion enhances
the position of business elites without them controlling power nominally.
Recent paths of urban regime work have attempted to connect the politics of
urban regimes with the sweeping changes of the economy. DiGaetano (1997) and Leo
(1995) explore the global-local connection in different urban settings from an urban
regime perspective, but they do not directly address the theoretical connection between
general economic restructuring and local change where the regulationist framework can
offer some insight. In a more comprehensive manner, DiGaetano and Klemanski (1999)
add the restructuring of the state and post-industrial economy to an analytical framework
that allows for coalitions and strategies not as strong as the regime model. The city's
position in the larger political economy, the local political culture, and individual
leadership are three levels that together form what they dub a local mode of governance.
But even if they tie urban regime theory closer to non-local matters, DiGaetano and
Klemanski's emphasis is still on local politics, and their connection between the two
geographical levels is not theoretically deep; instead, they treat outside forces as a
background to city affairs.
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3.2 The position of business and the imperative of growth

There are good reasons why the role oflocal capital remains strong in U.S. cities. The
cooperation between business and government exists because government cannot
accumulate capital on its own, and business needs public goods that only a government
can provide. Despite pluralist tendencies, business interests often maintain a privileged
position in their relationship with governments, whether on national or local levels
(Lindblom, 1977). Several features ofthe political economy explain the dominance of
business in local politics. First, most ofthe population is dependent on private industry
for its income and prosperity, which gives business a certain clout in local affairs. The
city also relies on private investment for its financial well-being. Revenues for most cities
are financed by property taxes, so the city is dependent on local sources for their revenue
and local economic growth, as increasing property values follow economic growth. Local
government is therefore eager to cooperate with business interests and promote policies
beneficial for growth. In the U.S. system, the separation between business and
government on the local leve_l is not always distinct. In many cities there is a flow of
individuals between the political realm and the local business elite, which reinforces the
idea that city affairs are most efficiently handled as a business enterprise.
The imperative for economic growth has led some scholars to talk about cities as
"growth machines" where local government and business are the two main allies
(Molotch, l 976� Logan & Molotch, 1987). It should be noted, however, that the pressure
from a "growth machine" is not a universal phenomenon. In states where land use is
regulated nationally and local economic dependency on the national government is
stronger, the necessary political structure for growth machine development does not exist.
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Vicari and Molotch (1990) found scant evidence of a local growth machine in Italy,
which probably holds true for the rest of Europe as well. Moreover, major institutions in
American cities, such as banks and utilities, have been dependent on the local markets
instead of being publicly owned or part of a national network with less dependency on
their local base. In Europe, local government is perceived more as an independent and
powerful actor embodying the public interest. Capital often forges relationships at a
higher geographical level, and provincial elites are less important. The planning
framework is tighter and allows local planners less control, which can reduce the
influence of local capital.
Returning to the U.S. city, it is in the interest of place-based capital to make
substantial investments in the human and physical infrastructure of the locality. Place
based capital includes traditional elements identified as the growth machine: any activity
associated with real estate or capital that is dependent on local markets, but also interests
that have forged complex cultural and personal connections to localities which may be
less obvious from rational self-interest perspective. They often support subsidies like
relocation tax breaks that are positive for the "business climate," and public investment in
professional sports to enhance the local image, while for example welfare payments are
perceived as an additional tax burden without public benefits. However, business
interests may at times promote socially responsible policies. The reproduction of the local
labor force is often a main concern and the importance of education can serve as a useful
example here. Leading business groups, such as the local Chamber of Commerce, are
often ardent supporters of public education. Sometimes their willingness to be taxed for
the common good of education is greater than the general electorate's. Similarly, this is
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often true concerning other taxes designed to improve a community's livability, such as
those levied to support parks and recreation. These leading business groups can even be
in the forefront as policymakers and legislative supporters for an increase in the local tax
rate. This is especially true if a strong institutional structure is in place to promote a
general business agenda. As individuals, the members of the elite may have their children
in private schools and oppose such tax increases, while their collective behavior can
result in another outcome if sufficient structures permit it.

3.3 Local dependency or local autonomy: The city's place in the economy

As discussed earlier, there are different perspectives on the degree of independence for
cities in the post-Fordist era. At one end of the opinion scale there is the notion of the
autonomous city, and at the other there is the dependent city. In the dichotomy of the
global and the local, it is implicit that the researcher stresses one explanation over another
to understand urban processes when choosing one of the two levels of analysis. If the
global level is stressed, macroeconomic or macrocultural forces are assigned the most
explanatory power. Peterson (19_81) argues that the economic realities of a globalized
economy determine local political action regardless of ideological convictions of the
city's decision-makers. Esser and Hirsch (1989) doubt that an independent local
economic policy can emerge under post-Fordism, as cities must passively adapt
themselves to world market conditions. Of importance locally, they predict, is an increase
in political conflict and social movements, especially the reproductive sphere. After
globalization accelerated during the 1980s, the tendency was to assume helplessness on
the part of localities. Now a local response has emerged, and from a theoretical
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perspective, a more balanced picture on the autonomy of cities where the power over
development has been localized, but mediated by a national context (Ettlinger, 1994). In
contrast to the dependency argument, localists stress structures internal to the city as the
major determinants of urban change. The urban regime approach has in the past been
overwhelmingly concerned with local politics. Both views, which are not really
contradictory but rather two opinions at different sides of a spectrum, have their strengths
and drawbacks. Staking out a middle ground, it is often the interplay between
macroeconomic developments and local decision-making that shapes the urban
environment. We cannot a priori make the assumption that one scale dominates over the
other, and sometimes even the two levels can not be adequately distinguished from each
other. Capital is dependent on local social relations such as knowledge, labor skills, and
proximity to supplier and markets. These factors (which can be influenced by local
policy) are "spatially nonsubstitutable" for many, maybe a majority, of corporations
(Cox, 1993). The question of mobility versus immobility is reformulated by Cox as one
in which dependency is occurring at a certain scale that may be local, regional, or
national for different companies or industries. Local actors in a city can have economic
interests and connection on levels above the city, and they can also have non-local
ideological reference points that influence their behavior locally. This dependency can be
changed, and change scale, if the regulatory environment changes.
Not only are there problems and possibilities of combining approaches of
different philosophical origin, but also spatial scale interaction must be taken into
account. Some considerations must be addressed when an attempt is made to work
simultaneously with dual or even multiple geographical levels. Beauregard (1995)
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challenges the assumption that the global and the local are two separate spheres, and that
local outcome is only a matter of different degrees of resistance towards more powerful
global actors. Instead, he proposes a theory where actors on the local level have different
geographical reach, thus blurring the rigid distinction between the global and the local.
Not only is there a mix of spatial levels operating in the same place where actors have
multi-leveled interests, but a constant flux of the actors in place gives us a dynamic
picture of the global-local relationship. In essence, Beauregard challenges the "purity" of
global and local forces and points out that "after mediation the local is no longer purely
local" ( 1995, p. 241). Beauregard's insights are important to keep in mind when
conducting locality studies and can fill an important function bridging regulation and
urban regime theory.
If we assume that cities have some autonomy, "it is by securing its institutional
base that the city gains power and control over its own destiny" (Knight, 1989, p. 328).
Or expressed slightly differently, the local capacity to develop within the global economy
is linked to its institutional "thickness" (Amin & Thrift, 1995). Institutional capacity
takes time to build and may lag behind rapid economic shifts and tendencies toward new
national regime formation. Nevertheless, institutional reform is important to the survival
of a regime. The necessity for this reform is often economic restructuring on a scale that
is beyond the scope of local institutions. With fewer cities tied to their natural resource
base and constricted by their relative geographical location, it has been argued that cities
have a greater chance of controlling their own destiny. Naturally, in a post-industrial
economy, it is human skills, and therefore the social structures that promote them, that
override the importance of natural resource endowments of places. Cities have a chance
44

to affect emerging locational factors such as amenities, information flows, and education
level to improve the city's position in the urban system. Many ofthese factors are labeled
quality oflife issues and ofgrowing importance in local economic development (Segedy,
1997).
But the global economy can also leave cities with a fractured economy. Ifless
local linkage exists, local power might be less coherent, which leaves the city in a
position as described by the dependency hypothesis. The dependence on global capital
and less on local resources has shattered the urban system and the traditional core and
peripheries within it (Kantor, 1995). However, as I use urban regime theory as an integral
part of my theoretical base, the assumption is that local politics and their capacity to
influence local development indeed matters. Conversely, by applying the post-Fordist
term to the urban condition, I also set the limits for local autonomy. Here it should be
noted that American cities may be less integrated in the global economy than their
European counterparts, or most large cities around the world for that matter. The
increasingly important service economy has less global linkages in U.S. cities, which
may be related to concentration in New York and a handful ofother large U.S. cities, and
the large domestic market, which discourages global strategies (Taylor, 2003, March).
Stone's work, as well as most urban regime theories originating in political
science, is heavily focused on the internal dynamics ofregime construction. Some ofthe
factors not accounted for in regime theory are technological changes, ideology, local
industrial history, and the locality's place in the spatial division oflabor (Feldman, 1997).
Today there is a growing body ofresearch that accentuates the influence ofnon-local
forces on regime formation. The appeal ofregulation theory lies in its conceptual overlap
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with urban regimes; both use institutionally oriented politico-economic systems as
models of societal progress. The scope of the regulation approach is broad, as it examines
not only traditional economic, but also extra-economic mechanisms, including a variety
of institutional factors and social forces (Jessop, 1997). A major difference is that urban
regime theory is rational choice-based (Lauria & Whelan, 1995), while regulationists
reject a narrow focus on individual action governed by self-interest, which it deems
inadequate to explain complex socio-economic relations. There is also the difference in
geographic emphasis. Feldman ( 1997) points out that "regime theory inadequately
theorizes connections between local agents and their wider institutional context, whereas
regulation theory underestimates the importance of local actors and institutions" (p. 31).
Regulation theory originally neglected agency, but a concern with local regulation has
necessitated connections with other theories, such as Bourdieu's habitus and Stone's
regimes (Painter, 1997). As a classic structure-agency problem, these differences can be
bridged by treating urban regimes as socially created entities that amount to more than
the sum of their parts.
A spatially infonned regulation theory could then be the complementary theory
that holds the capacity to not only contextualize local politics within a larger political
economic framework, but also aid in the development of a theory that treats local
development as an integral part of a national, albeit increasingly decentralized, regulatory
system. The post-Fordist shift has only been contextualized on a local level; so far, no
explanations of the development of the local state have been offered, says Jessop (1995),
who calls for investigations into how governance failures are perceived by local actors
and how those perceptions are translated into new policies and regulation. It is therefore
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important to investigate how local governance and regulation interplay, and how they
become coupled and intertwined. From this perspective, public-private partnerships,
institutional changes, and entrepreneurial governance are expressions of a re-regulation in
a period of crisis. Some argue that even if institutional innovation takes place locally, the
power of the local is seriously circumscribed in a globalizing world, making an emerging
local mode of regulation toothless (Peck & Tickell, 1994), while others see a coherent
framework of urban governance as an integral part of a new societal model (Mayer,
1994). In the local post-Fordist economy, there is still a role for government to play, as
well as other types of private or non-profit institutions beyond the market itself. Cities
"are more significant as nodes and vectors in organizing economic, political and social
life than they were during the period of Atlantic Fordism" (Jessop, 1998, p. 79).
However, Jessop also adds that no particular spatial scale is favored in the current regime
as the nation-state was during Fordism.

3.4 The Fordist urban experience

In order to comprehend the impact of the current national regime on cities, it can be
valuable to first revisit Fordist urban development as a geographic expression of a
societal paradigm. During that period, the dominant and interrelated spatial trends were
suburbanization and urban renewal. Suburbanization and housing were closely connected
to Fordism as a new form of mass consumption that could absorb the productivity
increases in industry (Walker, 1981). The spatial expansion of suburbs was facilitated by
housing and road construction and extended consumption opportunities (Florida &
Feldman, 1988). Initially, consumption was held back by the lack of credit availability for
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the consumers due to prohibitive interest rates in a high-risk environment. One of the
most important innovations in the credit system was insurance for lending institutions in
the housing markets. With federal home mortgage insurance in 1934, the government
created conditions for a credit market that enabled large segments of the population to
obtain home mortgages. The "GI Bill" created demand by putting enough purchasing
power in the hands of new households so they could buy new, inexpensive homes in
mass-produced Levittowns across America. Federal funding for the interstate system also
spurred suburbanization. Transportation became financially favored with gasoline taxes
earmarked for highway construction and improvement (Ibid.).
The reverse side of suburbanization was of course the deterioration of the central
city. Urban policy became more and more important as a response to some of the
weaknesses of this particular path of urban development. Urban revitalization attempts
started in the 1940s when cities attempted to be more like suburbs through accessibility
(interstates) and physical modernization (urban renewal) (Teaford, 1990). A fundamental
part of urban renewal was public housing, which intervened in an area where private
investment had failed. It co-existed somewhat uneasily with the suburbanization push
created by the mortgage availability and found only limited political support. The Public
Housing Act passed in 193 7, but only a portion of housing demolished during urban
renewal was replaced with new units. Instead, more emphasis was placed on the necessity
of redeveloping centrally located business property, which was achieved by the Urban
Renewal Acts of 1949 and 1954 (Bauman, 1988). In both cases, city building was one
component of Keynesian consumption (Justement, 1946). The economic paradigm
supported the planning ideas of the time: to impose rational order on the urban landscape
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that speculative capitalism was incapable of through rational planning, regulation, social
engineering, and even to control the entire urban hierarchy by creating new cities and
regional development. The old laissez-faire city was viewed as inappropriate for modem
needs. These ideas underpinned the positions of utopians (Gutkind, 1962) as well as
political pragmatists (Udall, 1962).
One question that emerged was who should be in charge of urban development.
Intervention from the federal government posed a great challenge to the local power elite.
This challenge came in various ways: federal New Deal work programs diminished the
role of existing local modes of regulation, disrupted local hiring practices, usurped city
and state authority, and drove wage standards higher than the old system was willing to
pay. At the same time, federal credits challenged the role of local financial capital. On the
other hand, when faced with resistance by local political and economic elites, federal
agencies often adjusted their practices, and compromised and incorporated the entrenched
local system so as not to upset the status quo. Nevertheless, it was the beginning of a new
role for the federal government and local institutions eventually had to adjust to be
economically successful. During the 1950s and 1960s, urban political machines
incorporated federal financial aid to gain support from a variety of local interests
(Wilson, 2000b).
Persistently favorable economic conditions in the nation during the 1950s and
1960s did not eliminate poverty. This realization created an incentive to direct funds to
the most needy, triggering a shift away from the comprehensive "social democratic"
tendencies in the New Deal, to targeted programs such as the Community Action
Programs and the Model Cities program (Florida & Jonas, 1991). Federal aid empowered
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marginalized groups, while sometimes alienating other constituents and political players.
As an example, early federal anti-poverty support was designed to bypass Southern urban
leadership that would actively work against black empowennent. However, the federal
government also accommodated critique from local leaders, and Jess power was left in
the hands of neighborhood groups and more at the mayor's office in later programs.
Even if compromises were reached and regimes were formed on the national
1eve1, 1oca1 adoption was not automatic. Not everybody embraced the new social
paradigm in the early post-war period at the same rate. Here, a brief case study can be
i1lustrative. Beauregard ( 1997) shows that in Philadelphia, it was not until financial
problems and an image of incompetence, corruption and outdated machine politics
plagued the old system that change occurred. Instrumental in the eventual victory of the
progressive reformers were the local institutions, especially the planning commission
with the power to propose and regulate, and the redevelopment authority in charge of
implementation. With the operation of these agencies, "a new mode of social regulation
was solidified locally" (Beauregard, 1997, p. 172). The regime was not formed as a
governing strategy per se, but to eradicate corruption and urban decline. The logic behind
this goal was economic� to compete for prosperity with the suburbs, the city center must
be rejuvenated. Not surprisingly, the system declined in the 1970s with less federal
support, opposition to large-scale urban renewal, and a new mayor supporting "law and
order" in the increasingly racially polarized city. With the system's demise, the local
regime in Philadelphia also declined. Urban regimes follow in the footsteps of the
national regulatory system, and Beauregard also suggests that this local solidification
around the country was necessary for the existence of the national regime.
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES: NEW STRATEGIES, NEW GOVERNANCE
A wide range of researchers who are not necessarily associated directly with regulation
theory have also used the notion of a post-Fordist city to situate economic change, urban
exclusion, and new socio-spatial patterns (e.g. Marcuse, 1997); however, it is not always
clear how these urban trends are associated with a new post-Fordist regime. The
segmentation and polarization in the city-gated communities, homelessness, and so
on-may be interpreted as a spatial expression of fragmentation beyond mass
consumption, but I believe it is important to distinguish between, on one hand,
implications for cities that are spatial expressions of post-Fordism, and the mechanisms
and structures that are regime-supporting in a more fundamental way.
Urban patterns of growth and decline can be sorted in the spatial patterns
category. During an era of economic reconstruction, such as the transition of Fordism to
post-Fordism, it is logical that also the urban hierarchy would be in flux. The emergence
of new industries is a spatially uneven process. The consequence for cities is also uneven�
some experience rapid population growth, while others find themselves in decline.
Currently, a set of second-tier cities are the most expansive growth poles at the moment,
resulting in a "flattening" of the U.S. urban system (Markusen et al., 1999). Successful
cities usually have one or more of the following economic characteristics: a cluster of
innovative industries (especially high-tech); strong government investments; an
abundance of headquarters and control centers; strong educational institutions (especially
with a research focus); a favorable position in the spatial division of labor; or a
diversified economy with a favorable mix of growth industries.
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Cities successfully following the transition pattern from an industrial to a post
industrial economy often have a non-industrial base to build on. Perhaps the best example
is Pittsburgh, where non-profit sectors such as health care and higher education have been
the growth industries and bridge builders to a post-industrial economy together with
emerging high-tech industries (Sbragia, 1990). The ability to draw research grants,
government contracts, patients and students has become a "city forming" activity for the
city's economic base. Pittsburgh also had the institutional thickness that could shape its
successful economic development strategy (Lubove, 1996).
Flourishing cities are also attracting people, not just industries (Wolf, 1999).
Growing urban regions are often perceived as having a good quality of life.
Contemporary urban development, therefore, emphasizes a range of improvements aimed
at enhancing the livability of cities. Major components include pedestrianism, new
urbanist-inspired planning, historic preservation, museums and the arts, waterfront
development, festival marketplaces, sport stadiums, and entertainment districts
(Robertson, 1995; Miranda & Rosdil, 1995; Frieden & Sagalyn, 1989). The
contemporary style of urban redevelopment is a spatial expression of post-Fordism, not
only via middle and upper-class consumption (although consumption not being
fundamentally regime-defining as under Fordism), but also through the changing
economy. With deindustrialization and increasing mobility, urban redevelopment is
supporting a more flexible economic system with livability and quality of life, which is
crucial in both attracting business and a well-educated workforce.
It is in this context that the post-Fordist paradigm must be understood on the
urban level. Basically, all cities and local governments respond to similar forces� they
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operate in the same economy, experience the same need to be perceived as livable, and
obey the rules of the same national state. As a new set of policies, institutions and
conventions should be at the core of the study of a post-Fordist city. In this chapter, I will
outline several interrelated elements of urban governance that are of particular
significance for the following empirical study and also crucial elements of a local mode
of regulation.

4.1 Competition, entrepreneurialism, and selling the city

The booster spirit has always been a defining attribute of the American city. Since the
frontier days, luring investors and residents through image-making or substantial
incentives has been the imperative of local independence. Likewise, the incentive for
growth has existed since the formation of the earliest American cities. For example, the
westward expansion was largely a real estate venture promoted by land speculators with
local interests aided by embryonic local governments. The urban system of the 19th
century, developed in conjunction with the westward movement of people and the
railroads, was inherently speculative� growth was a leitmotif among the local boosters at
least as much as today. Einhorn (1991) argues that city interests were unified in the early
commercial city, but with continued growth and expansion, interests became increasingly
fragmented and the "modem" conflicts arose. Today, a reaction against this
fragmentation is evident among the elite, who operate as neo-boosters in a new era of
indeterminacy.
After a period of federal involvement in urban development, the tide has again
shifted in favor of localism. It is embedded in the logic of post-Fordist ideology to let
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cities compete, much like capitalist enterprises, for private as well as public funds.
Competition is intensified by the growth of new industries that have not yet developed a
strong attachment to the places in which they operate, and by the free flow of capital that
makes them unable to do so. The inescapable outcome of urban competition is then to
emulate corporate strategies and intensify marketing strategies of cities to attract capital
and people (Gold & Ward, l 994� Philo & Kearns, 1993). Cities engage in urban
marketing not only through direct advertising but a wide variety of image-making
policies. Nevertheless, one should not view this as a wide-open field of competition.
Cities progress differently based on historical circumstances; they are path-dependent, i.e.
products of irreversible historical processes that make decisions at any point in time
constrained by social and economic structures emerging from past decisions. Different
places, despite similar educational and socio-economic characteristics, have specialized
economies, and future trajectories must always be understood and observed from a
particular point of departure.
The increase in inter-urban competition affects cities' development strategies and
even the nature of governance. This has forced cities into a new style of governance,
which Harvey ( 1989b) recognizes as a shift from a managerial to an entrepreneurial form
of urban governance. The tenn "New Urban Politics" has also been used to capture a
local policy that is growth-oriented, business-friendly, and entrepreneurial in character
and that tries to create an environment of local embeddedness. Although first noticeable
in Rustbelt cities, there is now "an edgy insecurity at all levels of the urban hierarchy"
(Hubbard & Hall, 1998, p. 6) that leads most cities into a similar policy path. This
rapprochement of local government and business has often undermined the foundation
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for working-class influence in local politics, through political machines or other means.
Cities have to negotiate with controllers of capital and provide them with the best
locational deal; at the same time, the money flow from the central government to the
cities has largely disappeared. The resulting intra-urban competition is largely national in
scope. Because of the enormous domestic U.S. market and the fact that global capital
(omitting cost-sensitive manufacturing, which tends to be small-town and rural in its
locational preference) is mainly investing in a few high-profile American cities, capital
flows in the service industries of most U.S. cities is domestic in origin. Entrepreneurial
cities, however, should not be viewed as passive players in the contemporary space
economy, but the cogs that make it work (Wood, 1998). Urban entrepreneurialism has
had a facilitative role in the transformation away from Fordism by making capital more
mobile (Harvey, 1989b).
The dictionary definition (The Oxford American college dictionary, 2002) of an
entrepreneur is a person who assumes the financial risk of organizing and operating
business or enterprise. If the enterprise is the city, the risk involved in urban development
has shifted towards local government. Common development projects that have private
benefits and public multiplier effects include stadiums and convention centers. Such
projects become city forming; they attract visitors and act as image-makers. These
undertakings are especially potent if they entail competing for a limited good due to
regulation and monopolies; two relevant examples, as we will encounter later, are
international flights and professional sports teams.
The philosophy behind the logic of urban entrepreneurialism is the idea of
market-like competition transposed onto the urban system. This approach has its
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problems and limitations. Cities are not equivalent to firms, because resources, human
and otherwise, are place-based. A city does not have shareholders with clearly defined,
quantifiable stakes, but citizens engaged in a social process. Even if local government
can, on rare occasions, go bankrupt, cities cannot cease to exist. What people can do,
however, is to migrate. America is a country of movers as a result of the dynamic
geographic patterns of growth and decline that are, in essence, encouraged by a laissez
faire approach to urban and regional development.
The emphasis on competition increases the flexibility of competitive places, while
the opposite is true for the less competitive. The usual solution for the latter is to be more
competitive, conform to market demands. Because of the strong bargaining position of
business, cities are forced into a policy of appeasement when there is a widespread fear,
justified or not, among the population that jobs are about to leave town. But cities have
developed distinct local conditions that are not easily altered. When structures that fit the
local social order also must be made compatible with the needs of global capital, it is not
unusual that conflicts over development strategies occur. To further reinforce the idea
that competition does not automatically lead to one policy, Painter (1998) argues that
entrepreneurial governance is heterogeneous and complex in its nature. The resulting
policy and development are not in the hands of single individuals or even institutions.
Painter stresses the political socialization process in understanding regime formation.
Entrepreneurial regimes do not arise spontaneously, but through an "active disciplinary
process" ( 1998, p. 268). Participation in regimes is not simply rational self-interest as
assumed in traditional urban regime theory because actors have complex, multiple
rationalities for action. Some rationalities may be contradictory, and individuals are
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affected by discourses and institutions promoting entrepreneurial governance; as Painter
states-"entrepreneurs are made, not born."
One major concern is that entrepreneurial development strategies run the risk of
being a zero sum game if solely based on inter-city competition. One city's gain is
another's loss, or even detrimental to all municipalities involved if the cost involved in
attracting investment is draining city coffers and benefits are speculative at best. In the
end, the taxpayers absorb a significant financial risk. Moreover, each city is dependent on
other cities not to initiate the same strategy. When the practices of entrepreneurial polices
diffuse and are adopted by most cities alike, the marginal benefit of such behavior is
diminishing (Leitner & Sheppard, 1998). It is the leaders and not the followers of new
urban policy that will reap the benefits.
It has been argued that harmful inter-city competition should be discouraged
because it drains local resources and systematically de-emphasizes social equity
concerns. Even from a market-based perspective there are imperfections in the
entrepreneurial model. Potential success of local growth machines and inter-urban
competition leads to a distortion of the spatial economy with investment not being
optimally located. Ways to diminish the competition incentive could include national
standards on education and welfare spending combined with federal tax equalization.
However, such policies would violate the growing localist agenda, which promotes self
control, and implicitly, inter-urban competition.

57

4.2 State devolution

With the national Fordist institutions less important, local institutions gain relative
importance. A changing relationship between the national and local level of regulation is
taking place through the processes of state devolution-the transfer of government
functions and capacities from a higher to a lower geographical level (Kodras, 1997). An
argument for devolution is that power should be located as close to the citizens as
possible. Higher-level government functions are considered less responsive.
There are several direct and indirect forms of devolution. First, the size of the
federal government itself is reduced in relation to state and local government. Programs
that target the local level are reduced or eliminated. The share of municipal revenue from
federal sources has dropped from 15. 9 percent in 1977 to 4. 7 percent in 1992 (Eisinger,
1998). Second, the powers of the federal government are also circumvented by the
dismantling of regulations. Market-oriented policies enacted on the federal level can then
heighten the tendency towards competition. For example, a little-explored connection
exists between deregulation and local urban governance. Third, devolutionary trends
between the national government and cities in practice include an emphasis on flexibility.
The proper level of government control is increasingly on a lower level. Since the New
Deal era, cities have received aid from the federal government, often in the form of
grants, that come with various degree of strings attached to bypass state legislatures,
which are perceived by cities as rural-biased and indifferent to urban problems. Earlier
programs were redistributive in nature and supportive of an expanding consumption
norm. Starting in the early 1970s under the Nixon administration, cities were to a greater
extent free to use federal aid as they saw fit (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1999). Community
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Development Block Grants became a major instrument in this so-called New Federalism
program allowing for more control by local political decision-makers, thus making the
local regime more important. The New Federalism aimed at increasing local control with
the intent that funds would be redirected from redistributive to economic development
activities (Kantor, 1995). This policy was continued under the Reagan and George H. W.
Bush administrations and coupled with less federal spending-the withdrawal period of
federal government. If the initial trend under Nixon was devolutionary, later
administrations, especially Reagan expanded the trend by decreasing funding levels.
During the 1980s, federal grants as a share of GDP declined from 3.6 to 2.5 percent
(Kantor, 1995). Eisinger (1998) sees a connection between fiscal devolution and the
changing emphasis on urban politics away from social reform and redistribution and
towards fiscal conservatism and privatization.
Not all places have the financial resources to actively meet the challenge. The
stress on low-income municipalities is obvious. Even relatively wealthy, low-tax
localities could face fiscal problems and subsequent political turmoil as pressure to
finance entrepreneurial development necessitates new regulation on the local level, along
with a need to rethink taxation and spending priorities. Government programs are ideally
complemented by efforts made by private or non-profit organizations, which are
invariably less comprehensive than their government counterparts. As the state
withdraws, civic resources should then emerge. Volunteerism is the favored redistributive
mechanism and rests on the assumption that local community is real and substantive and
adequate resources can be readily mobilized. In order for local institutions to be effective,
they must have the capacity to mobilize monetary, political, infrastructural, and
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knowledge-based resources. Non-profit organizations are especially important, but such
groups are, taken together, rather fragmented and lack the capacity for planning that goes
beyond their own institutions. Furthermore, they are non-comprehensive, susceptible to
economic swings, geographically uneven, and financially limited (Wolpert, 1997).
Beyond different devolutionary categories, Staehli et al. ( 1997) see three broader
themes in state devolution. The first one related to the relationship between state, capital,
and civil society. National policy is realigned with the ideologies of states' rights,
government non-intervention, and the preeminence of private property over the public
good. The second element is discursive. Lake ( I 997) contends that business interests
have been particularly successful in imposing their policy agenda as the solution to
economic problems and "discursively manipulate the meaning of structural crisis to their
political advantage" (p. 5). Because the U.S. government only has a moderate influence
on citizens' daily lives, its legitimacy is more easily challenged in a time of change. The
political right has effectively portrayed the state as the root of societal problems to the
extent that such a presumption is commonly accepted in public discourse. Crisis is a
condition for debate and realignment, often creating the notion of interest convergence on
the local level. Competition pits places against each other, and inevitably local interests
will search for commonalties that persist beyond crises. A third and final theme is that the
local context becomes paramount in policy formation. Devolving regulation enables
policy to take shape on the local level, which has created a new type of high-profile
mayor that operates under these circumstances, including Indianapolis' Stephen
Goldsmith and Milwaukee's John Norquist. Ostensibly, they make decisions based on
efficiency and not ideology with the rationalism of a municipal CEO. Nashville's Phil
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Bredesen fits the mold very well-he was even a CEO before elected mayor. When The

Wall Street Journal (1995, December 8) editorialized on the advantages of devolution,
Bredesen was its selection for quotation. Although noted, the impact of charismatic
individuals on the development of entrepreneurial cities is, so far,_under-researched in
scholarly studies (Hall, 1998).
Policies shaped in individual cities can even affect national policy, albeit
incrementally. Goldsmith ( 1999) developed policies as city mayor from a local level
pragmatic-conservative perspective-"what works." His ideas were also shaped by
interactions with other city leaders who were confronted with similar problems and
developed similar solutions. Goldsmith is a good example of policy transmission between
geographic scales: he has acted as an advisor to President George W. Bush on urban
issues, particularly developing a national policy on so-called faith-based solutions to
reform replace public welfare, which took shape from his local experience.
Even if there is a need for new mayors and local government in general to
develop closer ties with local business interests, grassroots initiatives become more
important as a counterveiling force. Despite the tendency toward fragmentation and elite
dominance, the American political system holds opportunities for grassroots political
participation because it is less rigid than countries with strong central governments,
which tend to discourage local citizen involvement (Leo, 1997). These groups are using
place-based strategies to advance the interests of workers, neighborhoods, and other
social movements. The new emphasis on locality and neighborhood power appeals to
both the anti-statist right and postmodern left, each trying to fashion this local
participation into their version of the post-Fordist city. Giving power to micro-local
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interests is part of creating regime balance, much like the labor-business accord during
the Fordist period. Localism and less government involvement serve the regime and the
economic growth objective of the business elite, but at the same time, this philosophy
gives rise to another source of power-the neighborhood movement. Political struggles
are now taking place in new arenas and locations. While modernism relied on experts, i.e.
the professionalization of planning, the trend today is to involve local residents and
neighborhood organizations in the process. Process, dialogue, and action combined make
up a new model for planning where planners interact with the public and interest groups
and negotiate solutions, rather than implementing a traditional top-down approach
(Wilson, 2000b). Citizen participation in local politics has expanded from a few cities,
such as San Francisco (DeLeon, 1991) and Seattle (Gordon et al., 1991) to those
classified as having an entrepreneurial regime. Grassroots groups are especially important
political actors in cities that have experienced diminishing elite involvement, a
corresponding presence of other types of community leadership, and favorable economic
local conditions that have diminished the growth policy imperative but nevertheless result
in uneven local development and social equity concerns. Nickel (1995), for example,
views Minneapolis as such a city.

4.3 The private-public partnership

Even if citizen participation is increasing, the relationship between government and
business is as intimate as ever. However, their interaction is taking new shapes, primarily
through the public-private partnership. Partnerships emerged as early as the immediate
post-World War II period, but at that time seeking federal money for redevelopment as a
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response to urban disinvestment caused by suburbanization (Teaford, 1990). The post
Fordist partnership is a more self-reliant coalition for economic growth or social reform.
These partnerships address a wide spectrum of issues that to various degrees are part of a
local growth agenda, including housing, neighborhood improvement, waterfront
development, the construction of stadiums and arenas, and school reform.
The mutual interest and interdependency between public institutions and other
interests in local society must be strong for a partnership to be formed. Each participant
must bring unique capacities to the new organization, which will create synergistic
effects otherwise unobtainable. The institutional approach to urban development stresses
that structural and organizatorial aspects of society are as least as influential over
decision-making as individuals (Peters, 1998). Similarly, Stone (1989) was also
rethinking power when he posed the question of who has the capacity to act, focusing on
the structures that enable agents with the power to do something.
Broadly, a partnership offers legitimacy for business actors and flexibility to the
public. The local government can use its financial resources flexibly outside its normal
obligations and professional expertise can more easily be sought outside the public
sphere. Partnerships are less coercive, which is important in a place or time when
government intervention is politically difficult. Also, it is in the interests of local
governments to "localize" mobile capital by making it more place-bound through
partnerships. Business, on the other hand, can benefit from the regulatory powers of
government. In redevelopment partnerships, eminent domain is especially valuable. In a
partnership, business can also more easily extract favorable treatment from local
government in taxation or other policy fields. As a general rule, the business elite is more
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often than not the initiator of a partnership in expanding cities, while government has to
play a more active part in declining cities (Keating, 1998). As an example, Sbragia
(1990) argues that part of Pittsburgh's success lies in its ability to build a strong public
sector in its partnerships with private interests.
As such, Pittsburgh might be an exception rather than the rule for development in
American cities. Following the argument made earlier by Lindblom (1977), the
partnership is part of the favoritism of business locally. The ideological underpinning is
the belief that privatism, the preeminance of private capital accumulation, is central in
urban development (Squires, 1991). This explains the junior status of the public
component in the partnership and the continued ability of corporations to sustain public
subsidies. It also suggests that public policy should serve private interests. This is
justified with the assumption that cities are internally undifferentiated and everybody
reaps the benefits of growth in a more or less equal manner. When the reality of
fragmented interests is strong, the solution, from the perspective of the elite, to overcome
fragmentation is to manipulate symbols to create cohesiveness among public and private
actors as well as the electorate. Civic pride becomes a vehicle for consensus.
Development is portrayed as a technical rather than a political issue and is therefore best
handled by the private sector. Cox and Mair (1988) stress the discourse of economic
development directed towards the local populace in order to entice favorable growth
policies. This also moderates entrepreneurialism and opens up possibilities for local
compromise between different interests. For growth advocates, a balance must be struck
between pursuing the strongest possible entrepreneurial strategy or aiming for credible
arguments that keep possible policy opponents inactive, which projects favorable local
64

relations to the outside world. This can be termed many things: civic pride, community
spirit, local patriotism, but it is in essence an ideological device and can be situated as a
part of a larger post-Fordist value system.
There is an ongoing debate in the literature to what extent low-income people also
benefit from contemporary urban redevelopment. Economic growth does not
automatically mean increased welfare for a majority of the citizens (Logan & Molotch.
1987). Some argue that downtown development has a positive impact on surrounding
neighborhoods. Successful rebuilding of low-income neighborhoods in the public-private
partnership mold in cities like Savannah, Chattanooga and Cleveland (Gratz, I 989�
Johnson, 1995; Suchman et al. 1990) provides some positive examples. But despite some
success with non-profit housing networks, a way out of inner-city poverty has not
generally been forthcoming. The uneven development between downtown and urban
neighborhoods puts the focus on the limited positive spread effects of downtown
investment (Keating, 1997). Even if the causes of poverty many times are economic
forces and policies beyond the control of individual cities, the role of local actors is
increasingly to take some level of responsibility for them. As social policy is becoming
localized. the question is what kind of capacities will emerge. Critical voices have
suggested that serious social issues, such as democracy, linkage policies, housing for the
poor, and neighborhood concerns, are too low on the partnership agendas. Nevertheless,
post-Fordist devolution allows business elites to act collectively both out of benevolence
and self-interest as they are dependent on social tranquility and reproduction. In
conclusion, therefore, the partnership is both a vehicle for the post-Fordist local mode of
regulation as well as a central part of many urban regimes.
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4.4 Changing elites in the post-Fordist city
So far I have largely treated local business interests as both homogenous and static. That
is rarely the case. It is inevitable that leadership changes from time to time. For historic
reasons, the members of a power elite are often part of the same generation. If nothing
else, retirement and mortality will always take its toll. Such a shift may not, in itself,
result in any fundamental changes·of the power structure, but simply an intergenerational
transference of elite privilege and power that preserves the status quo. More drastic
changes are likely if individual member changes are compounded by the rise and fall of
industries, a change of the very economic base of a city that ultimately is inevitable in
entrepreneurial capitalism. This may be especially dramatic when it happens in
conjunction with a broader societal regime shift. The result is likely to be a struggle to
reshape governance, rejuvenate the local economy, and a rethinking of the means and
objectives of economic development and, from a larger philosophical perspective, the
city's relationship with the world around it. New industries and new elites, or at least old
elites reformulating their own role in the local economic-political structure, are key
features in the local post-Fordist economy.
What is the nature of contemporary elite involvement? A newly diversified
economy could potentiaHy lead to segmentation of interests, supporting the argument that
urban elite strategies are generally less coherent now. In Buffalo, a city plagued by
industrial decline, a more coherent corporate effort to achieve redevelopment took place
with the creation of the "Group of 18," which was informal. A vote was never taken, nor
a political candidate endorsed (Koritz, 1991; Perry 1990). This was a response to a
traditionally fragmented structure without clear corporate leadership, as the city only had
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few corporate headquarters and relied on ties to outside instead of local financial capital.
This type of business group-more or less official, but often with substantial local
power--1s frequently cited in the literature. Such institutions include: the Citizen's
Charter Association in Dallas, the Phoenix 40 in Phoenix, the Suite 8F crowd in Houston,
and the Good Government League in San Antonio (Kantor, 1995; Parker & Feagin,
1990). While these groups represent status quo, business agendas may also demand a top
down approach with direct involvement on the top CEO level where resources can be
committed directly. An example would be the 1980s Cleveland Tomorrow, which was
made up of the city's top 50 CEOs and played a part in the city's revival (Magnet, 1989,
March 27).
In a comparative perspective, a highly concentrated elite group can more easily
direct redevelopment efforts. This is one reason why Pittsburgh has been more successful
than other old industrial cities with its Allegheny Conference, organized in 1943 under
the leadership of Richard Mellon, which spearheaded Renaissance projects and
neighborhood efforts (Lubove, 1996). A coherent development strategy can be tied to
one-industry dependence, which ironically presents a formidable economic restructuring
challenge, but at the same time might provide a solid institutional structure on which to
build. The existence of corporate headquarters correlates with the possibilities of elite
power over development issues. Industrial ownership regulations, especially important
for headquarters development in the financial realm, placed limits on geographical
expansion of many corporations, which forced Pittsburgh's Mellon empire, essentially a
financial one, to stay in Pittsburgh and invest in the city's future (Koritz, 1991). While
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historically important economic development institutions in Pittsburgh were dominated
by a few industrialists, today's elite is more heterogeneous.
This change is very much evident more recently in Philadelphia where a relatively
small, homogenous clique constituted both the social and economic elite. The business of
the city operated with personal ties, and the local financial institutions were squarely
placed in the economic center and the elite neighborhoods, boards and institutions as
social centers. In Lemann's (2000, June 5) view, it is not an economic bust forcing social
change, but instead "the good times are killing off America's local elites" (p. 42). While
still prosperous, the power of Philadelphia's elite is severely circumscribed in a time of
mergers and diffusion of financial control. Lemann also suggests that coherent elites are
only emerging in a few new centers-such as information technology-dense Austin and
Seattle-but not in most places. Post-Fordist business leadership is culturally and
ideologically different with less attachment to corporate liberalism, which has been
reported in places like Boston and Silicon Valley (Jonas, 1996a). High-tech industries
with many small firms may be less inclined to form participatory institutions, but that
may change as those clusters mature over time.
Finally, the internal spatial structure of cities must be taken into account in this
context. Rapid expansion is taking place in the urban periphery, in edge cities and
growing suburbs, where commercial development as well as new housing is constructed.
Governance and coherent strategies are increasingly difficult in the multi-centered, multi
powered metropolis (Lewis, 1996). In some cases, the region has supplanted the city as
the main local territorial unit with expanding infrastructure, fast-paced suburbanization,
and the relocation of some important economic activities, including manufacturing, to the
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hinterland. Decision-making institutions, both in the political and business realm, are
trying to adapt to this regionalization. Local governments are, however, reluctant to give
up existing powers, while urban chambers of commerce are often suffering from a
legitimacy problem in expansion efforts, as they traditionally represent downtown
interests. Regional governance bodies are also hampered by resistance to new levels of
government action. If no new, more geographically diverse institutions emerge, power
will indeed be more diffuse than in the past.
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5. A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN NASHVILLE

Post-Fordism is situated and understood in direct relation to the earlier.regime of
accumulation, so as an introduction to the empirical study I will present a history of
Nashville with a particular focus on its relationship with the national regime and
development of local politics. As with all places, the city's political culture and economic
development is a result of both socio-economic practices of the times and historical
circumstances that are particular to Nashville. Here, I will cover events and trends that
have bearing on the issues discussed in later chapters: the emergence of local institutions�
political structures of the city, both formal and informal; and an overview of recent
economic trends. The chapter ends with an analysis of a crucial period during the late
1980s when Bill Boner was mayo�he "catalytic" factor of change in the analytical
framework introduced in Chapter 1. As such it ties directly to Chapter 6, which expands
on another similar element-the business cycle; and also to Chapter 7, which in more
detail elaborates on the process of governance change in Nashville with a particular
emphasis on the business elite. Figure 5.1 is a reference map of Nashville to which the
reader is encouraged to refer during all the subsequent chapters.

5. 1 The formative stage: Nashville's place in the South

Two hundred years ago Nashville was a small town, almost frontier-like in character. On
the banks of the Cumberland River, it was an outpost economically dominated by land
speculators and merchants, as in many other places in the westward expanding nation.
The Nashville Basin was well situated with regards to water transportation, and the
Cumberland was easily navigable to the Ohio-Mississippi system, which together with
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Figure 5.1 Reference map of Davidson County and its surroundings. Basemap: Mapquest
(http://www.mapquest.com).
the Natchez Trace and trading rights with New Orleans in 1795, established linkages
southward (Corlew, 1990). Around 1800, the region was agricultural, with industry
limited to products such as flour milling, lumber and other hardwood products.
The good location made it the eighth largest city in the South by 1860, but the
population was only 17,000, an indication of the underdeveloped urban system in the
South; Nashville was not among the 50 largest cities in the country (Figure 5.2). The
agricultural system of Tennessee and the South in the second half of the 19th century did
not spur the development of industrial cities. The South was operating under a different
regime than the national model (Wilson, 2000a, 2000b). Wages were suppressed, in part
because of the use of black labor, which made the regime less "intense" and
mechanizedthan northern industrialization. The planters' support for industrialization was
limited, yet overlapping interests in preserving the racially stratified society existed. In
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Nashville's population rank in the U.S. urban system 1860-1999*
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Figure 5.2 Nashville in the national urban system 1860-1999. * Measured by city size
1860-1940 and metropolitan area 1950-1999. Sources: Gibson (1998) and U.S. Bureau of
the Census (1950-2000).
this system, consumption was low and sharecropping and yeoman farming were
relatively self-sufficient. The result was a lack of a proper urban rank-size hierarchy;
instead, many similarly sized cities emerged, each with its own hinterland.
Nashville was such a regional center. New enterprises flourished that would later
fonn the basis of local industry and society. The formation of the Bank of Nashville was
the beginning of the city's financial importance in the late 19th century. The Southern
Methodist Publishing House spurred an industry that became an important segment of the
local economy. Nashville became a wholesale city serving an area from northern
Alabama up to southern Kentucky, and early manufacturing produced various consumer
goods that mostly served the population in the mid-South region. Agricultural and forest
products were refined for local or regional consumption.
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While the Nashville Basin originally encompassed both plantations and small
fanning, after the Civil War the region was less attached to the cotton economy of the
South. Pro-union sentiment was not uncommon among the elite in Nashville (Doyle,
1990) and this relatively neutral attitude during the Civil War made contacts with
Northern capital immediate and enthusiastic after the war. In the spirit of the New South,
Nashville was eager to attract outside capital, industrial development and people.
By 1880, the city was in a midst of a prosperous period and population had almost
tripled in 20 years (Figure 5.2). One-fifth of the city's population was foreign-born, with
Irish and German as the dominant ethnic minorities. Most of the Irish population worked
as manual labor and remained an underclass for a long time, while the Germans were
assimilated faster into the middle class, although they retained their separate institutions,
such as churches and neighborhoods. Northern industrialists took advantage of cheap
labor and a favorable location and established manufacturing plants, often in the textile
and apparel business, and distribution facilities in the city. Even if textile production
played an important role in the emerging branch plant economy, Nashville never became
a one-industry town, and its role as an industrial center always remained moderate.
Parallel with outside investment, a local elite emerged in control of the city's financial
and political institutions. An investigation into the post-Civil War elite in Nashville
(1860-1880) portrays it as more open to newcomers and made up of younger individuals
whose residence in the city was of recent vintage compared to more traditional Southern
cities, such as Charleston and Mobile. In that respect, Nashville was more similar to
Atlanta. The Nashville elite boasted to be self-made men from humble origin. Pedigree
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was not as highly valued as in Deep South cities, and business associations rather than
exclusive social clubs were at the civic core of the city (Doyle, 1982).
The growth of the city led to some problems. The public finances of the city were
extraordinarily bad, both as a result of the Civil War and the issuing of railroad bonds.
The city actually went bankrupt on one occasion. Stubbornly low taxes compounded the
problem, and city services remained very rudimentary. First Avenue facing the river was
dominated by cargo traffic and warehouses, while Second Avenue was commercial.
Industrial, residential, and commercial development took place in a haphazard way
around the civic core. Rings of slums emerged around downtown; the area south of
downtown was known as Black Bottom, and Hell's Half Acre grew to the north,
embarrassingly near the state capitol. Affiuent Nashvillians were suburbanizing already
in the 1870s as a response to the squalid conditions in the center. Both political life and
retail trade were originally focused around Public Square and Second Avenue, but with
growing suburbanization. mainly westward, commerce was pulled in that direction. East
west oriented Church Street eventually became the main commercial street (Marshall,
1975). Westward expansion produced high-end residential areas centered along West End
Avenue.
Perhaps the first serious entrepreneurial effort on the part of the local government
was to invest in a private railroad enterprise that connected the city with Chattanooga. It
was clear that this new mode of transportation had the power to shape the emerging urban
system in the United States, and Nashville was eventually well endowed with connecting
railroads, including the Louisville and Nashville (L&N) railroad. The railroad
connections helped develop Nashville as an expanding wholesale, distribution, and
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manufacturing center. The city continued to grow with the railroad in the 1880s. The
L&N, one the most important railroad companies in the South, held a commanding
presence in Nashville, both as the monopoly operator of several railroad lines, but also as
a political actor with significant clout in the era when railroads were a driving force of the
economy (Carey, 2000). Although the L&N was originally a Louisville-owned company,
control of the company dispersed after the economic crisis of 1873. By the 1880s, it was
in the hands of Northern financiers, as investment capita) for railroad expansion was not
available in the South.
After a few decades of solid growth, Nashville was struggling to keep up. During
the industrial expansion of the 1890s, Nashville's overall position was slipping (Figure
5.2). Its early foundries were not in a position to expand because of the lack of raw
materials. Other types of production, such as the hardwood lumber that dominated the
east side waterfront, was not enough. Nashville's emphasis on publishing, education,
government, food production and distribution was good, but not in sync with the main
growth engine of the time. The city did not have natural resource-based heavy industry
like Birmingham� neither did it have outstanding river and rail communication like
Memphis and Louisville. As the Nashville elite focused on other endeavors-many of the
city's banking and finance institutions were established then-heavy manufacturing was
not pursued with full force. It has been suggested that the Nashville elite did not focus on
industrialization as it was a threat to their hegemony (Hanson, 1960).
When the industrial New South failed to live up to its promise, the city turned to
self-promotion-the 1897 Tennessee centennial celebration. Successful expositions had
been held in other cities, most notably Chicago, and Nashville was eager to show itself
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off as an ambitious Southern city. The centennial exposition was largely an attempt to
keep up with competing cities such as Atlanta (Doyle, 1982). The celebration was largely
financed by the Louisville & Nashville railroad, which was wrestling with a problematic
local image as an arrogant monopolist, creating a need for a favorable public opinion
climate to ensure regulatory favors from local policymakers (Coleman, 1990; Egerton,
1979). The Centennial was successful and drew more than one million people. The
exhibition centerpiece was a replica of the Parthenon of ancient Greece; the last thing the
city wanted to project was a folk theme with "log cabins and coon hats" (Davis, 1967).
It is doubtful that the Centennial itself left a lasting impact beyond a nice city
park; however, several institutions had been established that ensured Nashville regional
primacy. Nashville in 1900 was an economically diverse city, featuring finance, railroads,
manufacturing, and wholesale. This, over time, solidified into one coherent elite drawn
from different sectors of the economy. Nashville's elite struggled to live up to the image
as the "Athens of the South," which had been firmly rooted in the public imagination at
least since the Centennial 8• By the 1920s, the local elite led by Maxwell House coffee
mogul Joel Cheek had achieved a position strong enough to establish the Nashville
symphony orchestra and a new music conservatory (Doyle, 1985b). Nashville
experienced a cultural renaissance of sorts in the 1920s, much of it tied to its universities.
Next to prominent Vanderbilt University, several medical, teacher, and black schools

8

Nashville's claim to be the "Athens of the South" was more a reflection of the collection of colleges in the
city rather than an outstanding cultural-civic life, although some variations on the origin of the slogan exist.
The phrase has been attributed to the president of the University of Nashville (or possibly his biographer),
although in the 1820s it was actually coined as Athens of the West (Davis, 1967). It may even go back to
native Andrew Jackson who brought some notoriety to the city, and according to some interpretations,
"Athens of the South" is a reference to Jacksonian democratic ideals.
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existed, including Peabody College, Fisk University, Belmont College, Meharry Medical
College, David Lipscomb University, and Tennessee A&I, most of which still exist as
relatively small institutions. In two cases, the intellectual environment at Vanderbilt
University in the 1920s did have a nationwide impact. The so-called Fugitives
championed a style of literary analysis that became known as New Criticism, which made
an impression far beyond Nashville and the South. Equally famous, but perhaps less
influential, were the Agrarians, an anti-modernist reaction against the societal changes of
industrialism and urbanization. The booster culture of the economic elite and the grim
urban conditions of Nashville were lambasted9, idealizing instead the old Southern rural
lifestyle. However, both movements had little support in Nashville society or even at
Vanderbilt outside a small circle of group members, even if one Fugitive was a member
of the owning family of the National Life Insurance Company (Howell, 1988).
Part of the 1920s success was financial: Nashville firms controlled capital
throughout the region. Two insurance companies, National Life and Life & Casualty,
were established in the first years of the 20th century and later moved on to control assets
far beyond Nashville into the Deep South, as well as in Texas and the Midwest (Carey,
2000). The local insurance industry reached its peak after World War II, and the most
important institution was probably the financial firm Caldwell and Company. The
company's fortune was based on issuing bonds at a time when such financing was rare in

9

Nashville's widespread slums, especially near the Capitol, and social disorder gave Nashville the third
highest murder rate in the country in the mid-1920s (Wolfe, 1999). Poor living conditions were obviously a
long-standing trend in Nashville, which had the highest mortality rate of any city in the United States
already in the late 19th century (Summerville, 1996).
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the South and owed its success to the unwillingness of Northern corporations to penetrate
the region. Caldwell's bond business exploded as urbanization and government
infrastructure, Florida real estate, and agriculture expanded in the 1920s (Carey, 2000).
The owner, Roger Caldwell, was allied with the Tennessean's 10 editor Luke Lea both in
business and politics, usually against the city's machine Mayor Hilary Howse and the
Nashville Hanner 's editor Jimmy Stahlman. Caldwell largely financed the local building

boom of the 1920s, including the first skyscrapers in Nashville. The downfall of the
Caldwell empire was one of the most spectacular in the South; it left Roger Caldwell
ruined and his companion Luke Lea in jail for financial irregularities, and brought the
Depression to Nashville, which took its toll on the elite. Both the symphony and the
music conservatory folded.
After the collapse of Caldwell and Company, which spread to other financial
firms in the city, three banks came to dominate the local financial scene in the post
Depression era: American National (later First American), Third National, and
Commerce Union. The city's leading financial institutions were intertwined. Third
National, especially, had close ties with National Life, including a joint president and
largely overlapping board membership. Caldwell's business as a leading bond house was
continued locally by Equitable. With a diverse economy, the city came out of the
Depression in decent shape. After the New Deal, Nashville's political and economic
structures had molded into a power structure with a small group of individuals that

10

Called the Nashville Tenne:,sean until 1972, when the name was simplified to the Tennes:,ean.
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controlled local capital and reigned unchallenged for decades, as Nashville's economy
was characterized by industrial stability and relatively slow growth well into the 1970s.

5.2 Goo-Goos v. the machine: The politics of urban development in a one-party
town

The political history of NashviJle is best described as a struggle between two opposing
types of forces: the populist-machine and the business-progressive movement. The city's
early political leadership grew out of the wealthy segment of the community, yet it was
also always dependent on ward-based politics, much like in other cities. But power had
its limits-you had to be white, male, and Protestant. Informal organizations, like the
American Protective Association, made sure that Catholics and foreigners were excluded
from political power (Waller, 1970). Modest industrialization and immigration did not
radicalize the local political culture. However, the Irish, with a preference for clannish
politics, laid the foundation for the importance of the political machine. The traditionally
ward-based politics with Republican control of Nashville that governed with the support
of the black population was challenged by a business-led effort in the 1890s (Doyle,
1985a). With at-large districts and voting laws and a poll tax that discouraged both blacks
and poor whites from voting, Republican power fizzled. Eventually Nashville got its own
"boss:" Hilary Howse, mayor from 1909-1915 and again from 1923-1938. Like many
machines, it was based on neighborhood wards that received favors in exchange for
votes. Howse controlled a "welfare fund" that could be dispensed to acquire support from
key groups in the city. The machine coalition included working-class whites, city
employees, blacks, and the important bootleggers and speakeasy owners, as Howse was
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first elected on a anti-prohibition platform (Ibid.). Even if political decision-making was
not always guided by public interests, public services such as health, schools, and parks
expanded for the first time. In the absence of unions with political aspirations, working
class participation in a governing coalition was solicited through, and limited by, machine
politics.
Opposing Howse was the white middle-class and parts of the business elite.
Inspired by the progressive ideal of the era, they wanted good, "clean" government run
by professionals and businessmen that could offer better public services, including
education, but that could also deal with social problems 11• Most of the time, however, the
business elite could usually forge a coalition with the machine to ensure that policies did
not threaten its economic power. Reformists managed to reintroduce an at-large
commission system of government in 1913 to break Howse's ward-based political base.
Even though the plan backfired as Howse-supporters won and occupied the majority of
the commission seats, the machine collapsed shortly thereafter in the wake of a scandal
involving the city's bookkeeping (Doyle, 1985a). The following years were characterized
by several administrations, which despite the promises of progress, did not manage to
control the political system and run the city efficiently. The fledgling reform movement
stalled as inefficient city administrations quickly succeeded each other, and political
fragmentation resulted from commissioners guarding their own territory, and an inability
to fulfill the promise to control bootlegging and vice. This enabled Howse to come back
as mayor in 1923, a position he held for 15 more years. The West End elite was still his

11

As in other places, good government proponents in Nashville are often referred to as "'g<x.>-goos." Unlike
some locals believe, the term is not connected to Nashville's sweet treat with the same name.
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main opponent, but many business people viewed favorably his capacity to govern after
the failed reform years. One indication of the emerging coalition between Howse and the
forces of business progressivism was the establishment of comprehensive planning and
zoning regulations under a commission influenced by both Howse and business leaders.
The last five years of Howse's mayoral period experienced a new radical outside
component in local politics-the New Deal. The Work Progress Administration (WPA)
was greeted with political suspicion as it could potentially upset the existing patronage
system. It did not help either that the Crump machine of Memphis was the main ally of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and WPA in Tennessee (Burran, 1975). A famous
incident was the building of useless malaria preventive storm drainage systems, because
under WPA control, money could not be spent as political favors and no worthwhile
project could be found that benefited the patronage system. But soon, "WPA learned to
work within the existing political structure rather than reform it, and local politicians
learned that the flow of federal dollars could bolster rather than erode their political
power" (Doyle, 1985b, p. 89). The emerging Fordist state also affected the relationship
between business and labor. National legislation strengthened collective bargaining, and
the intervention in local affairs by the New Deal state brought a heightened importance to
unions in Nashville. National labor policies forced wages up in the South, integrating it in
the national economy.
The response to the New Deal from Nashville business interests was mixed. Some
within the Chamber of Commerce accepted the new order and praised uniform wage
setting and consistent hiring practices, while others, especially local manufacturing
interests, were strongly opposed to any expanded labor rights. Good connections in
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Congress and the Roosevelt administration made Tennessee a recipient of New Deal
funds. The Chamber of Commerce managed to get funding for a new airport and was
generally quite supportive of New Deal policies. Franklin D. Roosevelt won
overwhelming victories in Davidson County during his presidential races, which also
indicates general public support of his policies. The New Deal had further imprints on the
Nashville landscape: public parks were improved, especially in wealthy suburban
southwest Nashville, which included a new steeplechase track; new high school buildings
were partially financed with federal money, something that was necessary as Nashville
ranked 16 out of 17 Southern cities in expenditure per pupil (Summerville, 1996); the
Public Works Administration built a series of new government buildings downtown
Nashville to accommodate the increasing number of public officials; and Tennessee
Valley Authority power improved the economy and the local environment as the coal
smog in Nashville subsided.
If the New Deal changed the relationship between the local and federal
government, World War II brought continued cooperation. Spinney (1998) argues that
World War II was a watershed moment for the South. Government military investment
and homogenization of the population transformed Southern culture and economy. The
Vultee aircraft manufacturer, which was located in Nashville during the war, was a major
boost to the local economy. In Nashville, the elite also started to embrace government
action when it could improve conditions in the city without eroding its power. The latter
was possible as neither blacks or unions were in a position to use government to
challenge local elite hegemony. Spinney argues that the 1940s were more fundamental in
this regard than the New Deal period. Urban boosterism could continue hand in hand
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with expanded local government. Mayor Thomas Cummings, a lawyer and believer in
business progressivism, had replaced the Howse machine. Initially backed by the
Chamber and the Tennessean, he pledged to bring efficiency to local government. In a
fragmented government organization, Cummings tried to amass more power in the
mayor's office, which earned him the ire of good government forces. These types of
realignments and shifts on the machine-progressive scale have been common in Nashville
politics throughout much of the 20th century.
The following decades of urban growth and need for services legitimized
progressive, efficient government, especially as the belief in scale economics pointed
towards the positive aspects of metropolitan government. Like all cities, Nashville
changed rapidly after World War II. Development began to occur outside the city limits
as infrastructure hitherto only available to urban residents became readily available. The
leadership of Nashville began to discuss consolidation of city and county government to
better control development. The risk was that local government would become
increasingly fragmented, as in the more urbanized Northeast. Wealthy Belle Meade had
incorporated in 1938, and in the 1950s a couple other small Davidson County middle
class suburbs did the same. A city commission, including professional planners and
Vanderbilt public policy experts, produced a detailed plan for unification in 1956 that
called for two taxing districts: the general services district, which covered the county
outside existing city limits, and the urban services district with additional services, like
fire protection and garbage collection. The entire civic establishment was in favor of the
proposal: Mayor Ben West, the county judge (the highest executive officer at the county
level), the sheriff, both newspapers, the Chamber of Commerce, the teachers, the League
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of Women Voters, and the unions. The 1958 referendum passed in the city, but failed in
the county. County voters disapproved for the usual reasons: fear of domination of the
city's political structure and tax increases, and rural areas did not perceive consolidation
as necessary. Especially middle-income suburbs and rural parts of the county voted
heavily against the proposal. Belle Meade and the city of Nashville voted for the
proposal, even if some resistance existed in the black community.
The black population had increased in the city of Nashville from 28 percent in
1940 to 43

percent in 1960, and a countywide government would undoubtedly dilute

power of the black community. Municipal boundary-making in the South often takes
racial overtones (Aiken, 1987), and unification movements and liberal annexation
policies in the South may be interpreted as a way to disenfranchise the black voter. Racial
politics was rarely part of the public discourse during the unification period in Nashville.
But the prospect of a black-majority city was probably a consideration among the white
power elite, especially as emerging civil rights legislation would enable the black
community to seize the political influence to which they were entitled. (Local census
geography has changed since 1960. However, an overlay of census tracts indicates that in
1990, the area defined as Nashville in the pre-unification era would have a black
population of approximately 51 percent and a white population of 47 percent.)
After the failed referendum, Mayor West pushed to annex a large area, 80,000
people and 42 square miles, at one time. But the city did not have a plan to provide new
services, and suburbs would pay higher taxes with no additional services in the
foreseeable future. Furthennore, the city also imposed a tax on suburban motorists using
the city street system. These unpopular measures directly influenced a second referendum
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for a new consolidated charter almost identical to the failed one. The Banner and Mayor
West, a sure loser in a countywide election, decided to oppose the plan. This policy pitted
West against unification forces in the second referendum, where he tried to rally
machine-style support from government workers and blacks, but pro-unification forces
were better organized the second time. The driving forces behind the winning Metro
campaign were the Tennessean and its editor Silliman Evans, and the middle-class
dominated Citizen's Committee for Better Government. Unification passed both inside
and outside the city limits with the least support in poor city wards, but new district
redrawing assured some black influence in the future. As a bait to suburban voters,
property in the general services district was taxed lower than property in the urban
services district, but both areas shared the same fire and police departments, zoning, and
school system. The new consolidated government is controlled by a council of 35
districts and five at-large elected members.
Nashvi1le was one of the first cities to vote for a consolidated form of
government, along with Jacksonville and Indianapolis. Unified government brought
Nashville to national attention as a model for efficient government. The elite feels that it
enhanced the city's reputation, aided in corporate recruitment, and the ability to organize
growth and provide services as efficiently as possible. Future mayor Richard Fulton
(2000) says he "would not have come back from Congress ... had it not been for the
consolidated form of government. It a11owed the mayor to have a very strong position in
helping economic development." However, Hawkins (1966) concludes that the election
outcome was the result of several place-specific events more than a progressive spirit.
Consolidation passed because suburbanites were unhappy with current services and
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because they did not anticipate tax increases in a consolidated city. The annexation threat,
however, may have been the determining factor in the consolidation vote (Coomer &
Tyer, 1974). Post consolidation surveys indicate that citizens had a relatively positive
opinion of the performance of the new form of government (Rogers & Lipsey, 1974).
In the politics of unification, the rival newspapers were very important opinion
makers. Nashville had a vigorous public debate between its two newspapers, with the
Tennessean regarded as more liberal than the now-defunct Nashville Banner. After the

Coldwell collapse and former Tennessean editor Luke Lea's prison sentence, the outsider
Silliman Evans bought the bankrupt paper with federal financial support-a common
practice during the New Deal. Not surprisingly then, the Tennessean became a supporter
of the New Deal, TVA, public planning and progress. The Tennessean supported good
government candidates, but complex interpersonal alliances made counterintuitive
endorsements and positions common. One thing was certain though-the antagonistic
relationship between the newspapers led to opposing positions on virtually all social and
political issues, as when the ultra-conservative Banner supported Mayor Ben West, one
of the proponents of desegregation. Evans was succeeded as editor by John Seigenthaler,
who despite the newspaper's progressive stance became an ally of the dominant figure in
local politics-Sheriff Fate Thomas, the consummate machine politician. Coming from
the U.S. justice department under attorney general Robert Kennedy at the height of the
civil rights era, Seigenthaler served as editor, publisher and CEO of the Tennessean until
1992.

With an increasingly active black student body, Nashville became a center for the
sit-in movement during the early 1960s. Resistance occurred from some of the downtown
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merchants supported by reactionary, but powerful publisher Jimmy Stahlman of the
Banner, who provided the wanted media attention (Halberstam, 1998). But black political
rights at that point had progressed faster in Nashville than in many other parts of the
South with the election of black city councilmen, a mayor sympathetic to reform (Ben
West) and a newspaper actively advocating civil rights (The Tennessean). Nashville
gained a reputation as a city with reasonable race relations by Southern standards,
especially after Mayor West embraced the black students' demands. Even if segregation
was of a milder form than in the Deep South, Nashville was and remained distinctly
racially, socially, and geographically segregated. There have been other high-profile
disturbances over the years including the bombing of an integrated school and a
controversial busing program (see Chapter 10).
Politically, Nashville voters are now willing to elect black candidates
occasionally. Nashville has recently had both a black chief of police and an at-large
councilman elected countywide. The white elite stress this as proof of healthy local race
relations. The black educational institutions are also highlighted as contributors to
opportunities for blacks to advance in society. They say the average black Nashvillian is
more affluent than the average black in other cities. A comparison with Memphis has
been especially common during interviews with the elite. Memphis and some other peer
cities like Birmingham are characterized as having an "Old South mentality." The
interviewed make the direct connection between economic growth, a local
entrepreneurial pro-business spirit, and racial harmony. It is true that growth politics have
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not been intertwined and hampered by overt racial politics, at least since the coming of
the interstate, which carved up the heart of black North Nashville

12

.

The elite is probably correct on the importance of good race relations. During the
civil rights era, investment avoided places of racial antagonism. Cities like New Orleans
and Birmingham became synonymous with racial strife, and it has been documented that
Montgomery and Little Rock lost investments due to a negative image (Larsen, 1990).
The civil rights movement was helped by geographical extension of Fordism, which
triggered a filtering down of regime change from the national to the local level. Finding a
compromise is in the interest of the local regime. The civil rights forced business interests
to choose between segregation and economic progress (Jacoway & Colburn, 1982). The
degree to which they did choose reform varied, but over time they all had to. Business
leadership could become a driving force for less racially discriminatory practices, as
noted by Wilson (2000b) in the case of Birmingham, even if business leaders did not
necessarily harbor strong personal convictions of racial equality. Instead, it lies in the
nature of a regime to transcend the personal preferences of the individuals involved. The
support for the segregated system was intact within the business elite before the civil
rights movement, but eroding support for segregation was caused by worldwide negative

12

Census data paint a slightly different picture than the elite does. First of all, the income gap between
hlack and white is still cn01mous. The hlack Nashvillian's income is only 53 percent of his white
counterpart and poverty rates arc more than three times as high. True, the black population in Nashville is
heller off than the hlack citizens of Memphis in many categories-income, income equality, poverty, and
poverty equality-but how does Nashville compare to the peer city group? Nashville ranks as number four
out of ten (data for Columbus, OH missing) in black income, sixth in income equality between black and
white, third lowest in poverty rates for blacks, and fifth lowest in poverty ratio between black and white.
Thus, Nashville appears to be only average in its peer group regarding racial economic equality. Source:
Summary File 3 in FactFinder (income data for 2000) and Social and Economic Characteristics (povt-'lty
data for 1990). All data are for entire counties.
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reaction to the events in the American South (Ibid.). Commercial and industrial leaders
were the first ones willing to forge a compromise with civil rights organizations, and
eventually were successful in creating a more inclusive local political system. A
reasonable parallel is the political machine in Nashville, which encouraged black voter
participation, not because of a moral sense of what was right, but as a tool to control
power.
After World War II, Nashville was ready to accept the new relationship between
local and federal government in other ways as well. Nashville was an early participant of
federally supported urban renewal programs. The redevelopment of the Capitol Hill area
once known as Hell's Half Acre was the first grant to be submitted after the passage of
the Housing Act of 1949. The Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority
(MDHA), a quasi-independent authority that operates with federal funding for most of its

$50 million annual budget and is responsible for public housing and urban renewal
projects, oversaw the cleaning up of the shanties and the development of a parkway
encircling the northern edge of downtown using public and private money.
The first mayor in the unified Nashville-Davidson County, Beverly Briley, took
office with the support of the Tennessean. Briley became a champion of expanding
government services, downtown redevelopment, and good relations with the federal
Fordist government. Nashville congressman Richard Fulton was a young Kennedy liberal
that supported these urban improvement efforts, and John Seigenthaler was a behind-the
scenes member of the Kennedy family's Camelot political circle. Nashville received
federal funds at a level well above larger cities (Doyle, 1985b). During the Great Society
era, Nashville continued aggressively to seek federal grants and was a first-round Model
90

City, although the process between courthouse, HUD, and citizen committees of black
North Nashville was not smooth (Gates et al., 1975). Downtown was reshaped during the
1960s and 1970s with new skyscrapers. The local financial institutions wielded strong
influence in the urban renewal reshaping of downtown Nashville (Nelson, 2001). With
the help of the city's condemnation powers, private interests could consolidate entire city
blocks to build hotels, office buildings, and bank headquarters, such as First American
(1971) and Commerce Union (1979). The corporate headquarters built during the era of
urban renewal were often financed by the insurance companies, who also spent
extravagantly for themselves; the Life & Casualty tower was the tallest building in the
South.
The electoral system sets the parameters for development policies in a city.
Nashville has a strong mayor system with significant budget and appointment powers.
The mayor appoints most committees and commissions. Metro government has a civil
service tradition where eight executive department heads are ostensibly appointed on a
non-political basis. Only the finance director and legal director are automatically
reappointed when a new mayor is elected. In addition, there are semi-independent boards,
such as the Board of Education, the MDHA, and the Metropolitan Nashville Airport
Authority (MNAA). The mayor proposes a budget and the council responds to it. If the
council cannot agree on a different budget within a month, the mayor's proposal
automatically goes into effect as the budget. However, the 40-member council that
governs Metropolitan Nashville-Davidson County, one of the largest in United States, is
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seen by many as too big and unwieldy 13. It takes strong parliamentary skills on the
mayor's side to maneuver such a large political body. Different mayors have shown
varying degrees of aptitude for doing so. Neither can the mayor rely on stable coalitions
in the council to simplify negotiations. Coalitions tend to be ad hoc, and they have been
shaped and reshaped constantly. Alignments on issues arise, but no black caucus or
steady affiliations with business or unions beyond individual council members have
existed (Scobey, 2000). Recent term limits have also reduced the capacity for durable
legislative coalitions. There have been no significant moves to reduce the size of the
council. A Chamber-sponsored study reviewed the charter to see if a reduction would
enhance efficiency, but the consensus was that the advantages of small districts--door-to
door campaigning and the closeness between the citizens and their government
officials--outweighed the negative aspects (Cate, 2001 ). District councilmen are
interested in their own constituency, so they trade support for pet projects. This type of
informal trading has been institutionalized to the extent that the council defers to the
wishes of the councilman whose district is affected by a certain development proposal.
This is referred to "councilmanic courtesy" and under that system, councilmen introduce
zoning changes themselves, which are virtually guaranteed to pass. Obviously, such an
arrangement makes proper urban planning problematic and the system prone to
corruption, which has been alleged from time to time (Scobey, 2000). Real estate and
construction interests can especially benefit from having individual councilmen on their
side. Outside the council, there are various political organizations that endorse and

Mayor Beverly Briley, in a politically incorrect manner, once described the council as "forty jealous
whores" (Dobie, 1990c).
13
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sponsor candidates: the black community (Davidson Independent Political Council),
business (Chamber of Commerce), labor (various unions, among which the Metropolitan
Nashville Education Association has a reputation as a power broker), to name but a few.
The mayor and council are elected to four-year terms in nonpartisan elections, as the
metro government was established without primaries and party alignments. Nevertheless,
most leading politicians are affiliated with the Democratic Party. The string of
Democratic mayors exemplifies this better than anything else (Table 5.1). Nashville has
also retained its Democratic leanings in national politics. Davidson County has tended to
vote more Democratic than the U.S. average in all presidential elections since 1972.
Aspiring local politicians align themselves with the Democratic party to be
electable, but they do not have to commit themselves strongly to partisan politics, which
enables them to solicit support from conservative, well-moneyed, Republican groups
(Cate, 2001). The one-party system originally designed to exclude blacks from the
political process has outlived its original purpose. Yet it persists� partly because of

Table 5.1 Important Nashville mayors in the twentieth century.
Mayor

Mayoral period

Hilary Howse (D)
Thomas Cummings (D)
Ben West (D)
Beverly Briley (D)
Richard Fulton (D)
Bill Boner (D)
Phil Bredesen (D)
Bill Purcell (D)

1909-1915, 1923-1938
1938-1951
1951-1963
1963-1975
1975-1987
1987-1991
1991-1999
1999- present
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institutional inertia, but also because Nashville leans towards the Democratic Party
demographically (a combination of minorities, urban white middle-class liberals, young
singles, union employees, and public employees). Encouraging Democratic Party
dominance is also the fact that Nashville has become a one-newspaper city, which is,
generally speaking, liberal-Democratic. The accommodation between the Republican
business elite and the Democratic political establishment has been made rather well
without much hostility or open disputes 14.
Nobody exemplifies the balance of local politics better than Richard Fulton. As
one of only three Southern Congressmen to vote for the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he
formed a strong relationship with the black community in Nashville. Fulton also took
other un-Southernlike stances when he opposed the Vietnam War and voted for
Medicare. As a pragmatic politician the Chamber made him an ex officio member of the
board when he became mayor, with a representative from the Mayor's Office attending.
His close ties with the union movement helped maintain a three-part political balance: the
"silk-stockings" of West Nashville, his natural East Nashville working-class
constituency, and the city's black population. Fulton could be a "Kennedy liberal" in
Congress and then a more centrist mayor because of the different roles, rather than
changes in personal ideology (Fulton, 2000). This balance represented the state of being

14

The confessions of a pragmatic Nashville politician, George Cate: "I ran as a vice-mayor with the
support of the Tennessean. I would regard myself as rather middle-of-the-road politically. It has helped me
to campaign pretty aggressively wtthin Republican circles although they knew I voted in the Democratic
primary. But I have not held an office as a Democrat. But they probably felt reasonably comfortable with
me and I with them, and I preferred it that way. For example, my campaign manager was openly active in
the Republican Party. So you sec, alignments like that arc taking place in campaign committees and
organizations. But I always voted in the Democratic primary, partially because if I wanted to have a voice
in local government� and in those elections that arc governed politically, I vote where my vote matters"
(Cate, 2<X) 1 ).
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in Nashville for a long time, where West Nashville has not been very successful in
electing their own candidates, not that they have tried very often. Until Northern-born
Phil Bredesen was elected in 1991, all mayors in the Metro era had been native
Nashvill ians with East Nashville roots.

5.3 The post-industrial local economy

Nashville is often characterized as a commercial rather than industrial city. This
perception is common as Nashville is not dominated by any large industry, and it is not a
city with large industrial headquarters. Furthermore, Nashville's manufacturing sector is
not based on steel and metals industry. Instead, some of its prominent 20th century
manufacturers include: Genesco (shoes), DuPont (chemicals), Vultee (aircraft), May's
(hosiery), Aladdin (thermos), and Werthan (packaging). As an industrial cluster, printing
and publishing was probably the most important aspect of Nashville manufacturing. Most
of these companies grew during the 1920s manufacturing boom, and some were
established by northern management and capital bringing unionization and higher pay,
which moved the city closer to the national norm. Before the post-industrial transition, a
third of the Nashville workforce was employed in manufacturing, down to approximately
one in ten today (Table 5.2). Instead, business services, health care, and retail have
become major employers. The post-industrial shift is mirrored in most of Nashville's peer
cities, as County Business Patterns data indicate. Louisville and Indianapolis have been
the most manufacturing-oriented cities in the group for several decades, but even so, their
employment in manufacturing is only 15-16 percent today. New Orleans has consistently
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Table 5.2 Employment trends in Nashville-Davidson County 1966-1996.

Construction
Manufacturing
Printing & Publishing
Transportation
Wholesale
Retail
FIRE
Insurance
Banking
Services
Business services
Health care: hospital
Health care: other
Education: college
Education: non-college

1966

1976

1986

1996

8.2
33.0
4.5
5.7
8.5
16.7
7.9

7.0
23.8
3.9
7.6
9.6
18.6
7.9
2.6
2.0
25.0

7.2
17.0
3.7
6.1
8.6
18.8
9.0
2.0
1. 7
31.8
6.0

5.1
11.0
2.8
7.3
7.8
20.5
7.3

3.6
2. l

19.2

1.6
2.3
1.2

4.2
0.6

4.3
3.7
3.9
2. 7
0.7

4.9

3.4
2.3
0.6

1.8
1.9

40.5

7.1
6.4
4.8
3.0
0.8

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. County Business Patterns (various years).
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been least dependent on manufacturing, while a couple of cities, Oklahoma City and
Raleigh-Durham, are not distinctly less industrial than they were in the 1960s.
Many of Nashville's old manufacturing companies still exist, even if their
contribution to the local economy is modest. Instead, a new group of corporations has
emerged since the 1980s. Bridgestone/Firestone, the world's largest manufacturer of
tires, has its U.S. headquarters in Nashville, lured from Akron, Ohio in 1992. Nashville's
central location with respect to other company operations-two Tennessee manufacturing
plants-as well as a new airline hub were cited as reasons for Bridgestone/Firestone to
choose Nashville. MagneTek, a Fortune 500 manufacturing corporation of electrical
equipment, relocated its corporate headquarters to Nashville from Los Angeles (one of
the few choosing a downtown location instead of a suburban "corporate campus"). Dell
computers took advantage of a tax subsidy offered by Nashville and the state to establish
a major manufacturing plant in Davidson County in the late 1990s. The automotive
industry is important in the MSA with a Nissan plant in Smyrna, Saturn in Spring Hill,
and truck manufacturer Peterbilt in Dickson. Several auto suppliers exist in and around
Nashville. The recent trend has been that Davidson County is the leading job creator in
the MSA, but several surrounding counties attract more new manufacturing industries
than Nashville both in absolute and relative employment tenns.
Traditionally, banking and insurance has occupied a powerful position locally, but
the number of employees in those industries has diminished. The presence of locally
owned banks, insurance companies and investment banking houses helped finance many
growing local companies. The 1960s saw the birth of important companies, including
Kentucky Fried Chicken, Service Merchandise, Shoney's, Ingram Books, and Hospital
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Corporation of America (HCA), the largest private hospital management company in the
world. As these companies matured (and in some cases declined or relocated) they
contributed to Nashville's growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Especially the size and scope
of HCA (about 200,000 employees worldwide in mid-l 990s) is unparalleled in
Nashville's corporate history. HCA and Vanderbilt's medical school have been
instrumental in the emergence of an important and innovative health care cluster in
Nashville. More recently, money from venture capitalists Massey-Burch started
Correction Corporation of America (CCA), another Nashville enterprise that, like HCA,
is pursuing profits in an area previously controlled by non-profits or the government.
Other large corporations of recent prominence include Dollar General Stores and Central
Parking (the latter has gone international, like HCA and CCA, with 17,000 employees
worldwide). The CEOs Cal Turner and Monroe Carell are leading corporate givers today,
and Dollar General is developing a training center near a housing project in a black South
Nashville neighborhood.
One of the corporations that has benefited from ample financing opportunities in
Nashville is Ingram Industries, a conglomerate with a traditional emphasis on wholesale
book distribution. The Ingram Book Group division is the world's largest distributor of
general interest books. If Ingram is secular in nature, most of the printing and publishing
business in Nashville is not. Nashville can claim to be the "buckle of the Bible belt" as a
center of religious publishing, including the world's leading Bible publisher Thomas
Nelson Publishers (Longino, 1984), and the wide range of religious organizations
headquartered in the city. LifeWay (formerly The Baptist Sunday School Board), the
Gideons, and the United Methodists Publishing House offer a wide range of Christian
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books and publishing material. Denominational headquarters include the United
Methodists Church, Southern Baptist Convention, and Presbyterian Board of World
Missions. Church-sponsored colleges, including the prestigious Vanderbilt Divinity
School, and smaller colleges, including Belmont College, also contribute to Nashville's
role as a religious center. The Chamber likes to portray Nashville as a strong university
region with over 80,000 students. Their definition of the Nashville region is rather liberal
though, and four-year universities within the MSA have a student body of approximately
46,000.
Today, the city is widely known for its music industry. The industry cannot
readily be measured according to standardized classifications, but information from the
Chamber tells us that the entertainment industry employs 25,000 people in Nashville, of
which 5,500 are union musicians. The music industry is integrated into a music,
entertainment, and tourism complex, which is a fundamental part of Nashville's
economy. First and foremost is the Grand Ole Opry, which was developed by National
Life as a vehicle for advertising (see Chapter 8). In 1983, National Life's entertainment
properties were purchased by the Oklahoma-based Gaylord Entertainment, now a focal
point in the music industry as well as in corporate Nashville. It is not directly involved in
recording, but through ownership of the suburban Opryland complex (including shopping
mall, hotel and conference center, and the Grand Ole Opry), The Nashville Network
cable television, Country Music Television cable channel, it is the giant of the country
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music-oriented tourist industry 15. It is the second largest employer in Nashville, behind
Vanderbilt (Table 5.3). Gaylord Entertainment has added downtown investments such as
the Wildhorse Saloon and has part ownership of the National Hockey League's Nashville
Predators.
The emergent mix of industries documented above started to affect Nashville's
growth pattern in the early I 980s. Nashville employment growth shows a dramatic shift
from the 1970s to the 1980s (Table 5.4). During the period I 976-1980 Nashville's growth
ranked low in comparison to 60 other MSAs. Especially downtown had a hard time

Table 5.3 Ten largest Nashville non-government employers in 1999.
Local employment

Employer

10,417
6,602
5,199
4,943
3,203
3,12 l
3,007
2,875
2,562
2,538

1. Vanderbilt University and Medical Center•
2. Gaylord Entertainment*
3. Kroger
4. St Thomas Health Services*
5. BellSouth
6. First American Bank (now AmSouth)
7. Baptist Hospital*
8. The Aerostructures Corp. (formerly Vultce)*
9. Ingram Industries•
I 0. Bridgestone/Firestone**

Source: Nashville Business Journal (1999).

* Corporate headquarters in Nashville. ** U.S. headquarters in Nashville.
15

Gaylord Entertainment has n,--ccntly endured what can best he described as an identity crisis with
frequent buying and selling of various assets. Several of the dominant corporations in the city also had
problems of different kinds: HCA, mired in Medicare fraud allegations, had to negotiate a settlement with
the U.S. justice department� Correction Corporation of America was less profitable than expected and
charges of mismanagement also sutfaccd: and Bridge�1one/Firestonc suffered atler faulty tires caused
several accidents. Overall, Nashville ·s fast-paced development of the 1990s has recently bt..--cn severely cut
hack.
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Table 5.4 Nashville's employment growth rank of the 60 largest U. S. metropolitan areas.

Nashville MSA
Nashville-Davidson Co.
CBD
Nashville-Davidson outside CBD
Suburban counties

1976-1980 rank

1980-1986 rank

45
44
55
29
29

6
10
5
16
8

Adapted from Linneman and Summers (1993).

creating jobs and economic activity. The figures for the 1980-1986 period, which
represent a new business cycle, show a stark contrast. Now, the CBD is the driving force
of the local economy. Other areas of the metropolitan region are also performing well.
For both time periods, however, jobs were suburbanizing in Nashville at a higher ratethan
the national average (Linneman & Summers, 1993). This means that a common
geographical urban pattern was developing in Nashville: strong downtown development,
less dynamic picture for the rest of the central city, and booming suburbs.
Economic success coupled with greater cultural acceptance of country music
nationwide created a newfound confidence in Nashville. The city's optimism was
boundless. Nashville even made a bid to host the 1996 Olympics (which was later
awarded to Atlanta). With strong population and economic growth figures, Nashville was
on the threshold of becoming a major city. But as some of the problems of growth
became more apparent, a sense of urgency developed and it was assumed that decisions
that are taken now would determine the future direction of the city. Its economic success

101

aside, Atlanta was considered the anti-model. Crime, traffic, and the obliteration of
history were features of the feared Atlanta-style of development. In 1985, Bill Boner,
then Nashville's representative in Congress, said: "over the next eight or 10 years you
will see Nashville grow at a more rapid rate than it has ever grown, and that means we
are at a crossroads of whether we are another Atlanta that winds up being another
hodgepodge that has not been properly planned" (Paine, 1985, p. 21). In truth, Nashville
never made any serious attempt at controlling sprawl beyond rhetoric during the 1980s,
and only modest progress has been made since. The institutional capacity to address such
issues is low. What has happened, though, is a thorough restructuring of governance to
manage economic development. But before that could take place, there was Bill Boner.

5.4 Bill Boner: A name rarely spoken out loud

After 12 mostly successful years, Richard Fulton left the mayor's office in 1987. His
successor Bill Boner was typical mayoral material-from humble East Nashville
background and with a populist approach to politics. And like Fulton, Boner came from
the U.S. House of Representatives to the mayor's office. Many of his aides also came
with him from Washington. Boner's mayoral run was largely supported by the old
business establishment, as he represented continuity and status quo within the local
political system. His opponent, Phil Bredesen, was not only an outsider, but also
independently wealthy, without any direct connection with the local establishment, and
considered a "wild card," a potential disruption who might purse his own strategy
independent of the existing political structures. One anonymous prominent Belle Meader
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was quoted as saying: "we decided to vote for [Boner] because he would be easier to
control than someone with money" (Rogers, 1990b, p. 50).
Boner arrived as mayor with a questionable ethical reputation after his time in
Congress. His four mayoral years came to be characterized by political impasse and
tainted by personal controversy. In his defense, he came into the mayor's position exactly
at the wrong moment; real estate hit crisis mode and the overall economy was shaky after
Wall Street took a dive in October 1987, only months after Boner's electoral victory. The
Metro government's finances-dependent on sales taxes and property taxes-were
vulnerable to recessions and faced sudden problems in tax collection and budget
balancing. The 1988-1989 budget saw a deficit of $4.3 million. The citizenry was upset
as the necessary property tax increase was 89 cents, the largest in Metro history. It is also
common practice for a mayor to engage in frivolous spending towards the end of the last
term, so it did not help that Mayor Fulton's last budget was in part financed by a reserve
fund (Rylan, 1989). Fulton also gave a significant pay increase to city employees phased
in over three years, leaving his successor with the question how to finance most of it. If
faulty revenue predictions 16 were not Boner's doing, his expansion of the public
sector-the number of city employees increased 6.5 percent during Boner's first
year-was probably timed poorly.
At the same time, the nature of local politics started to change. The citizens
became more emboldened and capable of asserting their views in local decision-making.
16

The city's Board of Equalization oversees property tax assessments and negotiates with property owners
who want to adjust property value. The board makes a projection about tax revenue and reports it to the
budget committee. Especially in a time of economic decline, the hoard is under pressure to lower the
assessed value, which was one cause of the fiscal deficit of 1988-1989.

103

The conflicts of growth that became obvious during the 1980s fragmented the council
and city politics. Especially the antagonism among neighborhoods and development
interests became more politicized than in the past, and the once obscure councilmanic
courtesy was suddenly derided as the leading obstacle to proper growth control (Smith,
1989, March 7). These conflicts thrived as Boner was unable to maintain control in the
relatively open political system where the balance between the large council and the
mayor is not automatically given. The city council's newly expressed preference for
independent-mindedness meant that "the members are more interested ...in getting their
way and having empires and little fiefdoms than it used to be" (Honick, 1990, p. 36).
Political insiders noted that Boner was not as good as earlier mayors in dealing with the
council and forging compromises with individuals or small groups of council members as
necessary in the existing political system (Cate, 2001 ). As various political issues
remained unsolved, most people grew restless with Boner and local politics. In a citizens
survey, the Metro government's performance decreased from a 2.2 rating (on a four-point
scale) in 1989 to 1.5 in 1990. The inability of the mayor and the city council to cooperate
was frequently cited. Those who gave Mayor Boner a "poor" rating increased from 16.7
percent in 1988 to 37.5 percent in 1990 (Saponar, 1990, July 16).
Boner had allies within the economic elite whose idea of governance was shaped
by decades of political practice. But, eventually, the business community en masse came
to perceive Boner as a liability. The concerns of business interests in Nashville are listed
in Figure 5.3, which is based on a 1990 survey of more than 100 business leaders. In
addition to local political leadership as the number one problem for the city, 50 percent
also agreed that the lack of leadership extended into the business realm. As discussed in
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1. Local political leadership
2. Banking environment*
3. General economic slump
4. Availability of qualified labor
5. Education
6. Environment**
7. Rising cost of doing business
8. Depressed real estate market
9. Need for better attitude and image for city
10. Growth planning/attracting business

Figure 5.3 Most pressing issues facing Nashville businesses in 1990.
Source: Nashville Business and Lifestyles (1990a).
* Including tight credit, high interest rates, instability and uncertainty, and difficult
relationships with banks. ** Mostly referring to a landfill issue, controversial at the time.
the next chapters, Nashville was experiencing a fundamental crisis of governance. Figure
5 .3 is a good guide to the issues that converged at the time and produced a response from
the business elite.
Politics was not the only source of dissatisfaction with Boner. After tax increases,
landfill problems, real estate crisis, and a national recession, Boner's approval ratings
were already abysmal when the mayor's personal life became an all too public topic17 •
When Bill Boner decided not to run for a second term, a collective sigh of relief could be
heard from the business elite. The fact that the city was going to have a new mayor

17

The following story has to be retold to understand the reaction that followed. Boner, who was still
married to his third wife, announced his engagement to nightclub singer Traci Peel, who subsequently in an
interview with the Banner discussed the couple's sex life in detail. The highlight was the October 16, 1990
episode of the nationally syndicated Phil Donahue Show, where the couple debated Nashville media
representatives. As a grand finale to the show, Boner accompanied Peel on the harmonica as she sang
"Rocky Top." The Banner called for the mayor's resignation. The possibility of mayoral recall was raised
but, as it turned out, constitutionally impossible. National media could not resist the story, which was
dubbed a "Grand Ole Soap Opry" (Time, 1990, October 29). See Pinkston (2001) for an analysis of the
events.
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seemed more important than who it actually was. The radical break in style offered by
health care CEO Phil Bredesen, who was elected over former councilwoman and
neighborhood activist Betty Nixon, was viewed favorably, however.
In interviews with several members of the business elite, five themes emerged in
the assessment of the Boner period. First, Boner offered no leadership in a time period
when the city needed it. He was a politician whose main goal was to be elected, but when
in office, he could not clearly articulate a comprehensive political strategy. Boner had
been socialized politically in an environment where the goal was to help people in a very
direct manner, either by providing them with employment in the public sector or steering
them through the city's bureaucracy. This political style was increasingly obsolete and
resulted in a power vacuum on the public side of governance. Second, it led to discord
and fragmentation in the city. A rise in political pluralism (or divisiveness, depending on
one's perspective) was not for the good of the city, at least in the minds of business
interests. The cohesiveness of the community, as they see it, was crumbling. Different
political agendas of business, various segments of local government, neighborhood
activists, and the general public were voiced frequently in the public debate and de facto
encouraged by Boner's lack of unifying leadership. He had even driven a wedge into the
business community between Boner supporters and opponents. The general feeling of the
direction of the city was one of malaise, which was in fact the word choice of more than
one interviewee. Third, the Boner period still exerts a powerful influence on the
Nashville self-perception. What was an embarrassment at the time has become an
unfortunate episode, which yet had catalytic qualities to it. During the interviews I
conducted, interviewees generally avoided saying the Boner name, as if speaking it could
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be a curse, a jinx to the current success of Nashville and best avoided. He was instead
referred to as "the mayor at the time," or even, "the not-so-good mayor," leaving the
obvious deductive identification to the listener. Perhaps it reveals an uncertainty about
the political maturity of Nashville and the fear that a new Boner could come along. In any
case, it is the duty of the local elite to suppress anything that hints to an outsider that
Nashville is a peculiar, tacky place that cannot be taken seriously, which is the essence of
the fourth theme-image. In the competing notions of what Nashville ought to be, the
Boner experience was a clash in the intersection of political culture and economic
development: Boner "had his own style, his own way of doing things. It was not the
optimum style for projecting Nashville to the world as a competitive business center"
(Hunt, 2000). Finally, Boner had become an obstacle for the city and its economic
progress. Sometimes the political friction during the period is translated as having a
negative influence on Nashville's economic progress. Resources could not be pooled
efficiently, and urban boosters could not overcome the impression of Nashville as a
politically inept city when the imperative for local economic prosperity was public
private cooperation. Therefore, not only Bill Boner, but also the politico-economic order
that he represented, had to be discarded. The period became a break point; political praxis
that bore strong semblance to classic urban machine politics was viewed as, if not
entirely corrupt, inefficient and inappropriate for new times that demanded a new
relationship between city government and local business. The city's elite was ready to
open up culturally and embrace change; "the way we've always done it" is not
necessarily best in a changing economy. Boner represents the political side of catalyst
argument. I will continue next with the economic.
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6. BUSINESS CYCLES AND THE URBAN REGIME
6.1 Introduction
The goal of this chapter is to show how the economic downturn of the late 1980s and
early 1990s created an impulse for economic and political changes in Nashville. First I
will investigate the character of the recession and link national economic cycles with
local urban change, both in Nashville and other places. Second, I will examine the
response of the elite to economic crisis. Particular attention is paid to the involvement of
the elite in real estate, because the failed real estate economy of the 1980s was a product
of overinvestment in the emerging infrastructure of the post-Fordist service economy,
particularly office construction. I hypothesize that the entrepreneurial regime that
developed in Nashville is a response to the real estate losses that reverberated through the
Nashville economy in the post-1987 economic downturn. This suggests that Nashville
needed a long-term growth strategy and to establish an institutional framework to guide it
in the new economic environment, something that was not in place in the 1980s.
The periodical nature of the economy is a distinct feature of capitalism. With
some regularity, investme�t, profits and employment move in long cycles over several
decades and in shorter cycles spanning only years-the business cycle. The U.S.
economy expanded from 1983-1990 and then again from 1992-2000, the two latest
business cycles (Figure 6.1). In general, a local business cycle will correspond to national
trends, but sometimes significant differences between cities are detectable. Inter-urban
divergences are largely dependent on the differences in the economic base, and economic
forces specific to each industry. The time lag of the business cycle over space can be
crucial for investment patterns in specific cities.
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Figure 6.1 GDP growth(%) in the United States 1959-2001. Source: Economic Report of
the President(2003).
The spatial configuration of cities is affected by the rhythm of economic activity.
Some residential or commercial areas experience dramatic changes during a business
cycle while others are left untouched. The business cycle not only changes the overall
morphology of a city, but short-term business cycles can also have important implications
for cities and their strategies of growth and change. Pierre(1998) argues that local
partnerships between government and business keep a low profile during a recession,
because their immediate concern is beyond the scope of local authorities. The economic
pressures of a downturn can, on the other hand, provide the impetus for substantial
changes in the political economy of the city. A poor performance of the city can convince
the economic elite that "something has to be done." If problems are deemed at least
partially local, strategies for renewed growth often are formed in these times of crisis.
The institutional shape of local capitalism can take new forms as new coalitions and
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organizations are born. In a recession, the economy becomes the overriding concern in
the public discourse, and growth-promoting policies tend to dominate. If power relations
in the city can take on new dynamics during such a time period, the economic elites have
an extraordinary opportunity to shape policies to reflect their broad interests.
One core element for understanding the local political economy is real estate,
which is important for elite involvement in urban affairs. High levels of capital and
personal mobility, both on an intra- and inter-city level, coupled with permissive land
planning have made real estate a potent component of the U.S. economy and an integral
part of the urban growth machine. The swings in the performance of the general economy
are especially noticeable in real estate. However, investment in the physical infrastructure
does not necessarily exhibit the same temporal pattern as the general economy. Building
activity can continue after other economic activities decline due to the duration of the
planning and completion of construction projects. Building can even be countercyclical if
investment capital is redirected from other economic activities, or if government is
engaged in Keynesian demand practices (Whitehand, 1987). Moreover, different building
activities do not necessarily coincide; instead, the logical pattern of investment is first an
increase in office construction as a response to economic growth, followed by a home
building phase to serve new immigration, which in tum, spurs demand for expanded
retail facilities. Nationally, real estate investment rose during the late 1960s and early
1970s as investment in manufacturing declined following the decline of productivity and
rate of return throughout Western industrial economies (Figure 6.2). A downswing in the
manufacturing sector led to a search for other investment opportunities. Conversely, the
service economy was rising, and demand for office space, both in downtown and
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suburban locations, created an increase in property prices and new development (Short,
1996). Real estate could absorb large amounts of capital, but with the industry's
propensity for overproduction, the market was saturated by the mid-1970s. Empty office
space became an increasingly common feature of the urban environment.
As seen in Figure 6.2, different segments of the real estate industry have different
characteristics. Residential development fluctuates dramatically, but the general trend is
increasing. Industrial investment is more stable, but has a countercyclical tendency
compared to economic growth, and exhibits a modest decreasing trend over time. Public
investment is less predictable with a boost in the late 1990s. During the 1980s, capital
flowed into the real estate business, not necessarily because of its inherent profitability,
but rather for tax planning purposes. This is particularly noticeable in the commercial
sector. The result was an oversupply of commercial real estate that was driven by two
important public policy trends in the early 1980s: financial deregulation and supply-side
tax reform. First, savings and loan institutions (S&L) were allowed to expand their
activities from residential to commercial real estate. The S&L industry nationwide had
easy access to capital and was overextended into these real estate markets at the time of
recession and overbuilding, causing it to collapse under the weight of bad loans. The
faltering oil economy took an especially heavy toll on the S&L industry in Texas (Warf
& Cox, 1996), but the crisis was national and affected Nashville strongly as well.
Geographical differences in economic growth resulted in the shuffling of investment
capital from one region to another in search of a "spatial fix." Second, the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 made it possible to use real estate investments as a tax shelter.
This was an incentive of the Reagan administration to direct investment into the post113

industrial economy. The reversal of this taxation policy in 1986 suddenly pulled
significant investment capital from the industry and halted new construction. However,
an oversupply situation was already in effect and developers and their financiers suffered
enormous losses.

6.2 Experiences in other cities

The immobile character of real estate is a factor that gives the industry a very special
position in the fortune of cities. Some cities have experienced a trend towards non-local
property ownership. While international ownership is rare in most mid-sized American
cities, non-local owners-such as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs}-are
increasingly important actors. Yet investment in real estate is often controlled locally, so
changes also reflect the local power structure. Even if ownership lies with outsiders, local
interests such as developers and banks are dependent on local real estate. But following
this argument, one must avoid viewing the relationship between ownership, vested
interest, and social action too directly and simplistically. The strategy is to create an
attractive environment in the long run where impacts on property values take an indirect,
albeit crucial, position.
Then, what about real estate, business cycles and the elite? The forces of
recessions on local governance have been noted by several scholars. Yet that connection
has only been explored in a piecemeal fashion. I want, therefore, to focus attention on this
connection and place it in a lager context of urban change. At the end of the current
business cycle, it is appropriate to assess the durability of governance structures that were
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born out of the previous recession. First, I will consider the connections that already have
been established in earlier studies.
To begin with, the real estate crisis was global, even if not ubiquitous and uniform
in character. Development projects from London's Docklands to Nashville's Maryland
Farms were mired in financial disaster, yet they remain important parts of the urban
landscape today. These events amounted to nothing less than the biggest depression in
building and real estate in the post-World War II era (Leitner & Garner, 1993). From
interviewing developers, Feinstein (1994) comes to the conclusion that a "herd instinct"
mentality exists in the industry. Not that developers were solely to blame. Other actors,
such as the banks whose lending practices were far too liberal, also contributed to
oversupply. Depending on local market differences and political cultures, some cities,
such as San Francisco, could afford to restrict development, while most places were eager
to assist, rather than hinder, the real estate boom. With high profit rates expected, readily
available capital, a deregulated financial sector, and tax incentives, the ingredients for a
real estate collapse were assembled.
The effect on relationships between actors and interests on the local level is not
necessarily the same across space. One outcome is disruption. In London and New York,
the real estate cycle was causing "the break-up of established patterns of patronage�
business and residential communities dissolved and cannot be reconstituted" (Feinstein,
1994, p. 74). Even Atlanta, the archetype of stable urban regimes, experienced changes in
the political landscape. Rutheiser (1997) found a breakdown in the coalition between
black politicians and white businessmen during the time period. The city's growth
machine "had been driven straight into the ground" (Ibid., p. 24). Another outcome is
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continuity. New York's Mayor David Dinkins, elected in 1989 on a social reform agenda,
was severely constrained by the economic decline to pursue a political program different
than his more conservative predecessor Ed Koch (Sites, 1997). Leitner and Garner (1993)
noted similarly that ''urban entrepreneurship and private partnership have engendered
new institutional structures and staff competencies in local governments that will not be
dismantled overnight," (p. 73) but viewed the real estate crisis as a possible starting point
of more socially progressive local politics, because property-led booster politics had been
discredited. From the early post-crisis perspective, Leitner and Garner point out that local
and state governments are less eager to pursue real estate-led development and question
the viability of urban entrepreneurialism as the defining characteristic of urban politics.
In hindsight, urban entrepreneurialism survived, and even thrived, throughout the 1990s.
However, it has searched for new forms to replace the focus on real estate. The
underlying logic of entrepreneurialism has been too strong to be discarded.
On an ideological level, Leo (1995) suggests that economic circumstances can
alter the discourse in a city. Analyzing the earlier cycle around 1981-1983 in Edmonton,
Leo concluded that the late 1970s interventionist tendencies of citizens' groups involved
in the development process were halted after the cycle. A no-restrictions approach to
development urged by most, but not all, local business interests found a receptive
audience in a recession-weary general population. Leo also implies that this had long
term effects as "in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Edmonton had lapsed into a
traumatized response to the problem of dealing with developers" (1995, p. 295).
DiGaetano (1997) more explicitly connects cycles and regimes by emphasizing
the limits of Stone's regime theory, namely that it fails to explain why changes in
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governing regimes take place. He suggests changes in economic restructuring and
business cycles are factors with important explanatory powers. "The peaks and troughs of
the business cycle ... influence local strategic decision-making. That is, expansionary and
recessionary periods pose markedly different circumstances for the formulation of local
governing strategies" (Ibid., p. 849). DiGeatano's Boston example conforms to Leo's
findings in Edmonton several years earlier: a regime emphasizing social reform and
growth management with restrictions on development was in place in Boston throughout
most of the 1980s, but was replaced with a pro-growth agenda with local business elites
playing a greater, but not necessarily dominating, political role. DiGaetano concludes that
Boston in the 1990s became focused on strengthening its role as a regional capital
through a private-public partnership model that resembles a coalition rather than a
regime.
A related study takes a regional perspective discussing state level politics in
Massachusetts (Jonas, 1996a). The state's fiscal crisis precipitated a political struggle
between two business organizations: the traditional industrial association and a new
organization representing high-tech industries with a low-tax, laissez faire agenda. Jonas
stresses more the antagonistic relationship between factions of capital that open up in a
recession, rather than conflicts between business and labor/community interests. The
outcome in Massachusetts was a victory for the traditional forces in the business
community, who could present a more convincing development model to politicians and
the electorate.
In conclusion, these case studies have established a particular pattern: economic
recessions place stress on urban regimes and coalition; they may force realignments of
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interests and lead to new lasting policies and discourses. These case studies have, for the
most part, only done so in passing and without placing these events in a broader
framework.

6.3 Nashville and the 1980s boom

The building boom that lasted from 1982 to 1987 was a golden era for construction and
real estate. The high level of building activity was fueled, as discussed earlier, by
favorable legislation that promoted speculative real estate ventures. Nashville was as
active as any city during this time period. The 3,200 building permits granted in the MSA
for residential units in 1981 increased to over 18,000 in 1984. Home sales showed a
similar pattern, growing from about 4,000 annually in the early 1980s to in excess of
11,000 in 1986 (Nashville Bu.r,,·iness .Journal, 1992, July 27). Everything was selling, and
at the highest prices ever. This trend created a new local power elite. Nelson Andrews,
Ted Welch, Joe Rodgers, and R.C. Mathews were developers with not only local political
clout, but several of them occupied high level positions nationally in the Republican
Party. Nashville's construction boom drew real estate investors and contractors in search
for a profitable location. Outside developers contributed to the high amount of
construction during the period as Nashville outperformed other cities 18. Encouraged by
high-profile industrial expansions in the auto industry and a new airport hub, speculative
construction was prolonged. When some other cities appeared to suffer from a slowdown
in construction activity, real estate capital continued to congregate in Nashville. Further,

H< The level of non-local capital is hard to quantify. The Chamber, for example, could not estimate the ratio
of local vs. outside developers (Avery, 1987).
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the early decline of the markets in Houston and Dallas due to oil economy problems
fueled the concentration of capital in Nashville (Carr, 1987).
The investment activity in the built environment was geographically uneven. The
airport area, especially after the hub announcement of American Airlines, was a hot spot
for commercial and industrial real estate. The West End corridor connecting downtown
Nashvil1e with affluent West Nashville experienced a radical transformation. Older
apartment buildings and homes gave way to large new office buildings, and the area was
beginning to be referred to Midtown Nashville, neither downtown nor suburban in
character (Stribling, 1986). The Music Row area close to West End also changed
dramatically as national and international investment penetrated the music business.
Suburban settings like Brentwood also attracted real estate investors, but the urban
changes in many ways transformed Nashville's atmosphere from a provincial, town-like
feel to a denser, more urban place with significant business activities outside the limited
downtown area. It also signified the growth of two important components of the local
economy: the music industry at Music Row and the health care industry, which was a
leading tenant and developer in the West End area close to Vanderbilt University and its
medical center. Less successful was the Metro Center redevelopment project in
predominantly African-American North Nashvi11e. Metro Center was conceived as a self
contained "New Town" that began in 1972 as a partnership between R.C. Mathews, then
president of the Chamber, and Victor Johnson of Aladdin Industries. The ambitious
project failed to create significant spin-off developments and was scaled back to mostly
commercial land-use. The prq_ject had problems related to its timing during the business
cycle, but it also shows the geographically sensitive nature of development. Early signs
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of a downtown revival could also be detected-expansions include the Southern Baptist
Convention in 1985, and Life Way in 1990-but the real take-off would have to wait
until the next round of investment in the 1990s.

6.4 The collapse

On peculiar effect of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was that tax depreciation
on real estate investment proceeded at a much faster rate than true economic depreciation,
which encouraged investment as loss deductions became more important than the actual
feasibility of the project. In Nashville, two companies-Jacques Miller and Freeman
Brothers-took advantage of this perverse logic and sold limited partnerships in real
estate ventures ranging from apartment complexes and shopping centers to office
buildings. A 1986 tax reform repealed the availability of tax credits for real estate losses,
and construction plummeted to early 1980s levels. Without the tax shelter, the continuous
oversupply of the real estate market was no longer shored up by an artificial economic
rationale. With most real estate markets in the country facing deteriorating conditions,
Nashville continued to attract some investment. Market participants were still optimistic
in February 1987 despite the gloomy national outlook. As one pundit suggested:
"Nashville is still one of the best markets in the country ... The building boom isn't over
yet" (Avery, 1987, p. 38).
Leading indicators, however, showed another picture. Building permits decreased
sharply between 1985-1987, as did actual housing starts (Saponar, 1988, June 13� Lusky,
1991). As it turned out, Nashville was not immune from the real estate woes affecting the
rest of the country, but it was not until the "Black Monday" stock market crash of
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October 1987 that the Nashville market came to a dead halt. According to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Nashville was the second worst commercial real estate
market in the country at the time (Egerton et al., 2001). But even without the external
shock of new legislation, the overbuilt market would probably have suffered in the
coming lean years. The real estate crisis was geographically indiscriminant: large office
parks both in city, the inner-city MetroCenter, and suburban locations (e.g. Brentwood's
Maryland Farms) suffered equally.
By 1987, economic reports in Nashville started to appear that presented a less
than rosy picture of the local economy beyond real estate. Preliminary numbers from an
economic forecasting center at Georgia State University showed a metropolitan area
employment decline of more than 7,000 in 1987 (Saponar, 1988, June 13). Later
revisions of data showed a small employment gain, but Nashville still lagged the nation
and compared unfavorably with other Southern cities (LeDuc, 1989, April 10). The mood
was negative and real changes were taking place. Much of the growth in metropolitan
Nashville came from outside investment in the manufacturing industry, while the service
industry was lagging (Oliver, 1989, December 25). Flat consumer spending curtailed
expansion of the retail sector and also created a surplus in retail real estate (LeDuc, 1988,
October 17). At this critical juncture, the Wall Street Journal published an article in
which Nashville was described as a "boom and bust" city (Smith, 1989, March 7). The
Journal claimed that Nashville had hit hard times with "remarkable swiftness." Citing the

Georgia State study, the root of the problem was the building bust that hit with a force
"almost hard to believe." In the article, fingers were pointed at the behavior of the real
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estate industry and the lack of growth control mechanisms in the councilmanic courtesy
system.
The article was not well received locally and still spoken about in harsh language
among the business elite. It even precipitated a trip to New York by Irby Simpkins, local
booster and owner of the Nashville Banner, and a meeting with the Wall Street Journal
editor to inform him that "your story is wrong and you hurt our city" (Simpkins, 2000).
The preliminary data that were used in the .Journal article were indeed revised later, and
the decline of the local economy was not as sharp as first expected (Harper, 2001). "The

Wall Street .Journal has 'tried to depict us as a boom town that couldn't control its
growth, and as a bust town falling apart at the seams, and they were wrong both times,"'
contended the economic researcher at the Chamber of Commerce (LeDuc, 1989, April
10).
But by then, the impression of a city in trouble was broadly circulated, and to
make things worse, a front-page story in the Wall Street Journal the following year
selected Nashville as the case study of a recession city (Wysocki, 1990, August 24). The
article did not stir the blood of the business elite to the same extent perhaps, as Nashville
was described as just "a microcosm of what is happening in many cities around the U.S."
Nevertheless, the investment climate was described as weak, with lack of capital holding
back all parts of the local economy. Especially the banks, the article continues, suffered a
hangover after "excessive deal-making" which left the city over-supplied with offices,
luxury homes, and apartments alike. Slipping local control over capital and corporations
was noted as well, as a possible contributor to overbuilding.
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For a short period of time, Nashville's economy performed poorly both in
absolute and relative terms. A bank study showed that Nashville was the only
metropolitan area in Tennessee that had a negative economic growth from the third
quarter in 1987 to the third quarter of 1988 (LeDuc, 1989, January 30). By the first
quarter of 1989 Nashville's economy was growing, but at a slower rate than the state's.
During this time, Nashville's economic performance was not particularly favorable in
comparison with out-of-state cities either. Nashville ranked 14th out of 15 regional cities
in job growth (Coffey, 199C February 4). In 1990, Nashville had a net job loss of 1,000,
while peer cities had positive job creation: Birmingham 3,200; Charlotte 7,400;
Louisville 12,000; and Memphis 16,100 (Liles-Morris, 1991a). Eventually, a broader
stagnation led to a nationwide recession 19 in the last quarter of 1990 and the two first
quarters of 1991. The recession was longer for Tennessee than for the nation, extending
over a 12-month period (Nashville Business .Joumal, 1992, July 27).
Even if, as I have argued previously, real estate was a dominant factor in the
slump, several factors conspired at the same time. Insurance and health care experienced
problems in the late 1980s that were not directly associated with the stagnant economy.
The insurance industry had invested much of its profits in the real estate industry. The
trend in the local high-tech economy took a five-year downward path after 1987 (Button
et al., 1999). Even if one had not directly lost investment money, the crisis affected
ordinary citizens. Residential real estate appreciation rates dropped from as high as 9
percent annually in affiuent neighborhoods like Belle Meade to O percent in 1990 (Lusky,

19

Commonly defined by the Nationa1 Bureau of Economic Analysis as an economic contraction in at least
two consecutive quarters.
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1991). With significant drops in interest rates, the real housing cost decreased. A cost of
Jiving comparison weighted against all U.S. cities (Figure 6.3) shows how drastically
Nashville was affected. A breakdown of the data components reveals that the drop from
1990 to 1991 is mostly related to housing costs, which represents a significant loss of
accumulated wealth. The most drastic change was in housing, from 107.7 to 93.1, and the
provision of health care, from 90.1 to 73.8. Transportation cost, utilities, and household
services declined at a much more modest rate. Nashville has retained a moderate cost of
living throughout the 1990s despite high growth. The city is currently ranked six out of
nine in the peer city pool, which may be a reflection of sprawling development that limits
excessive real estate appreciation.
More than anything, the real estate crisis affected the financial industry. The local
S&L industry more or less disappeared. The dominant institution, the Metropolitan
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Figure 6.3 Cost of living index for Nashville. Measured at the first quarter every year for
mid-management standard of living. The composite index is weighted against all US
urban areas. Source: Accra Cost of Living Index (1981-1999).
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Federal Savings and Loan, a partner with Freeman on many real estate projects, was
declared insolvent and taken over by the federal government in 1991; its assets auctioned
off to outside owners. Real estate loans threatened to undermine the health of Nashville
banks like nothing experienced since the Great Depression. The largest locally owned
institution, First American National Bank, was dragged down by bad loans to the extent
that losses reached a record $68 million in 1990. The financial institutions' credit losses
halted their ability to lend money and underwrite new projects, which impacted local
growth. Before the effects of deregulation dispersed ownership (see Chapter 7), the local
dependency between financing, developers, and other agents of urban growth was strong.
And, as any banker knows, "if the institutions you serve have trouble, you have trouble."
In fact, the values declined between 20 to 50 percent for companies in the construction
industry and at least 10 percent for other industries (Oliver, 1990, September 17).
Foreclosure-related transactions became the second biggest real estate category in 1990
(Saponar et al., 1990, August 27). Tennessee led the nation in personal bankruptcies, and
real estate auctions increased 10 to 40 percent (Nashville Business and l{festyle, 1990b).
Nashville became a buyer's market without any buyers.
The question is then: did Nashville's economy behave differently than other
cities? Conventional wisdom suggests that a diversified economy, such as Nashville's,
will insulate a city against economic fluctuations. The Chamber of Commerce claims that
Nashville has a tendency to outperform the nation in hard times. The preferred belief was
that Nashville's economy is '"recession-proof;" if you have never been a boom town, you
are insulated from a bust. Empirical data cannot support that hypothesis. In fact, the
Nashville economy was unusually unstable from 1970 to 1986 and fluctuated to a higher
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degree than the overall U.S. economy (Whaley, 1989). Since 1986, Nashville has seen a
real estate crisis, a short economic depression and very high growth rates in the mid1990s, so a high degree of fluctuation can be presumed also after 1986. This is certainly
true in comparison with other Tennessee cities (for which long-ranging economic cycle
comparisons are more readily available than for the selected peer city group). Compared
to Memphis, Knoxville, Chattanooga and the Tri-Cities, there is a more drastic swing
pattern in Nashville during the 1980s with fast growth during an early period and rapid
decline in the late 1980s. In the 1990s, Nashville's growth is more similar to the rest of
the state, but nevertheless the strongest performer (Table 6.1-and Figure 6.4). Preliminary
data also suggest that Nashville's economic development in the current recession has
been weaker than other Tennessee cities', again confirming the strong cyclic tendency in
Nashville.

Table 6.1 Economic performance index of Nashvil]e and other Tennessee MSAs 1992
2000. (Index: 1992=100.)
Tennessee MSA

Index

Nashville
Memphis
Chattanooga
Knoxville
Tri-Cities

126.5
121.5
119.2
117.7
117.4

Source: Center for Business and Economic Research (2001).
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Figure 6.4 The Nashville business cycle 1981-2000 (Index: 1985 = 100). Source: Center
for Business and Economic Research (2001)2°. Used by permission.
6.5 The elite responds

The period of rapid growth and decline just described is crucial from a governance
perspective. Actions taken by the city's elite are based on the recent experiences
generated by the fluctuations of the general economy and real estate values. The context
is that after many successful years in the 1980s, Nashville suffered from slow growth and
overbuilding. Nashville also felt unfairly treated by national press and the boom and bust
reputation that was portrayed in national newspapers. Even if the truth lies somewhere in
between-the city was, and is not, as vulnerable to the problems of high tech and defense
as California or oil in Texas-Nashville still suffered from cyclical swings. The success
myth of Nashville claimed that the city would outperform other areas during a recession
20

Two separate local economic indices exist. The Chamber of Commerce's researcher values the MTSU
index of local business cycles higher than the one from University of Tennessee (Harper, 2001). However,
the UT index is temporally more extensive, which makes it more useful. It must be noted though, that
leading indices, predictive in character, must be used with some caution. Moreover, the accuracy of local
indicators is often imprecise.
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and that cycles are less pronounced in Nashville than elsewhere. When that was not the
case for the post-1987 real estate slump and the 1990-1991 recession, the business elite
was confounded and feelings of uncertainty colored the local decision-making process.
The recession affected a broad range of people. In the mid-1980s, the New York-based
financial company Equitable (formerly Nashville-based) was the largest private holder of
real estate assets in Nashville (Hrickiewicz, 1985), but real estate investment had
attracted money from affluent people all over the city. High-end retailers such as Porsche
dealers, art galleries, and horse traders had seen a significant decline in business, while
high-profile (and high-cost) society galas were less well-attended than in the past (Liles
Morris, 1991 b). The elite's pride from the Roaring 20s, the Nashville Symphony,
declared bankruptcy. It did not reflect well on Nashville when inquiring outside capital
had to be told that a leading quality of life indicator had found itself in bankruptcy court.
It took a targeted effort from the dealmakers of highest prominence-notably Martha
Ingram, Danny Bottorff and Phil Bredesen-to bring the symphony back; a symbolic
turnaround for Nashville's economic competitiveness.
With a full-blown recession underway, business leaders were thinking about
intensifying the city's recruitment efforts. As a real estate-led development path was
obviously out of the question (Arnett, 1989), a broader development agenda had to be
conceived, which paved the way for a new economic development
organization-Partnership 2000 (see Chapter 7). The imperative was experienced down
to the individual level. Jacques Miller and Freeman Brothers, who syndicated deals and
sold real estate equity, went bankrupt within a year after the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
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These syndicates drew their investments heavily from local affluent individuals
(Wysocki, 1990, August 24). A local attorney says:

"they left hundreds of people in this community with what they thought was a lot
of wealth, but it all disappeared. It was paper wealth. I represented a lot of people
and I knew what their stakes were, because I saw their estate planning. One day
they thought they had $600,000 to $700,000 wealth in these partnerships and the
next day it was zero. When you multiply that with hundreds of people, the
leadership in the community, what you found was a very gloomy attitude that
came to pass here. I remember very sane people remarking back in 1990 that
given the real estate bust that had occurred, it would take us I 0-15 years to dig out
of this. We've got to start somewhere, with this [Partnership 2000] initiative"
(Sherrard. 2000).

As explored further in Chapter 7, Nashville experienced a dramatic reorganization
in the local power structure, for which the real estate crisis and economic downturn were
catalysts. The most indicative example was the transformation of the Chamber of
Commerce and the establishment of Partnership 2000. From the perspective beyond the
inner circle of decision-makers, Partnership 2000 was founded because of the real estate
boom and bust. The architects behind Partnership 2000 agree that the connection was
indirect. It was not their expressed intent to immediately counter the economic downturn
and the real estate losses. However, the process that shaped the institutional outcome was
situated in a time of crisis. At first. the elite was mostly at a loss for how to proceed. As
one Chamber staffer put it: "a lot of 1989 was spent scratching our collective heads on
what we wanted to do and how to do it" (Harris, 2000). A clear emotional sense emerged
from the interviews I conducted with community leaders that captures the "mood" of the
city. Financial losses were intertwined with a perception of civic disarray. "There was a
lot of wealth that had been created in this community; there was a lot of collateral in the
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banks that was wrapped around the real estate industry. No doubt that it contributed to
this malaise and a sense of depression that existed about the city" (Simpkins, 2000). This
sentiment is echoed by other observers. The political and economic problems
accumulating in Nashville "created a period of malaise in the community. It was a time
when Nashvillians didn't feel very good about themselves. It was all about these larger
forces and our image projected to the world" (Hunt, 2000). Reorganizing the Chamber's
economic development strategy was a necessary but time-consuming response to two
outside pressures: the real estate-led economic crisis and the image-projection of Mayor
Boner. As Hunt (2000) puts it, Partnership 2000 emerged out of the ashes of the late
1980s.
A large segment of the business community had grown fat on real estate, but
speculative wealth creation was, at least temporarily, frowned upon. What the initiative
takers found was a climate where it was surprisingly easy to convince people to commit
and invest in an effort that philosophically broke with the laissez-faire approach to
economic development that had reigned previously (Rechter, 2000). The shift taking
place was made possible by the conditions that existed. The crisis was deep, as it placed
the local financial institutions at risk, the very core of the Nashville elite for most of the
20th century. While the banks were not in an undisputed leadership position any longer,
they were eager followers and participants in the process. The advocates of a new
partnership organization were aggressive, going outside established channels, and
creating another model for how economic development should proceed.
The economy itself rebounded relatively quickly. In 1991, the Nashville Business
.Journal could report that "vulture funds" interested in picking up bargain real estate were
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appearing, a sign that better times are approaching (Campbell, 1991, February 25).
Capital-strong firms with, for example pension fund money, could buy at a favorable
price. Real estate people estimated that the value of investment property was 85 percent
of the value just one year earlier (Ibid.). By the end of 1991, Nashville's economy was
again growing faster than most cities, albeit with a much more conservative capital
market. But even if the Nashville market rebounded very quickly, it took several years for
the market to absorb the overbuilt market. Most of the banks had not fully recovered the
real estate losses until 1995. In the West End market, it took virtually no construction for
five years for vacancy rates to drop from 21 percent in 1989 to 2 percent in 1994
(Mooradian, 1995, April 24). Real estate memory is short though; Subarea 10, which
includes West End, has been the dominant sector for new office construction in the late
1990s (Metropolitan Planning Commission, 2000). By 1995, even MetroCenter was
successful as measured by low vacancy rates, down significantly from the problematic
years, which lingered as late as 1993.
The downtown office market still struggles somewhat as new expanding business
is not necessarily located downtown. With fewer headquarters, the auxiliary services
lawyers, business services-are less needed. Indicative is American General's move from
downtown to its new suburban Brentwood headquarters in 1996. When American
General sold its building to the state, downtown Nashville was without a major insurance
corporation for the first time in a century. The South Central Bell tower and the 1998
building hosting Chamber of Commerce and MagneTek are the exceptions as major
additions to the corporate skyline of the 1990s, but even with those additions, downtown
only made up 2 percent of all new office space in Nashville 1990-1999 (Metropolitan
131

Planning Commission, 2000). Instead, residential and entertainment real estate is doing
well downtown even if country music tourism has declined recently.
Nashville's current real estate market differs from the past with REITs pushing
Nashville's growth trend. Property cycles are also increasingly dependent on the global
economy in addition to domestic and local economic conditions (Dehesh & Pugh, 2000).
Fast real estate growth in Nashville occurred well into the late 1990s. Construction starts
in 1997 were back to the level ten years earlier, but slowing tourism and employment
growth after 1998 indicated overbuilding yet again, although not nearly as severe as in
the earlier cycle (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1999). While REITs can
weather an economic slump, Wall Street pressure for short-term profits may again lead to
overbuilding. However, local effects will not be the same as during the late 1980s when
the elite were severely impacted financially, both on an individual and a corporate level.
Moreover, the end of the 1980s business cycle was unique as it was one of the factors that
helped transform the very basic relationship between the political and economic spheres
in Nashville beyond the point of no return.
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7. ''TEN PEOPLE CAN'T RULE THIS CITY ANYMORE:" NASHVILLE'S
CHANGING BUSINESS ELITE

Most of the 1980s was a time of unprecedented growth for Nashville. Even if some of the
manufacturing companies with a longstanding association with Nashville were
successively on the way out, branch plants of national corporations moved into the area.
Changes started to take place in the traditional financial sector along with a growth of a
diverse group of companies in the emerging service economy as discussed previously in
Chapter 5. Overall, these changes had a positive impact on the regional economy. Based
on population, Nashville was moving up the urban hierarchy. However, this success was
not immediately accompanied by corresponding institutional change. In local political
terms, the existing urban regime arrangement was disintegrating, but no clear alternative
was yet emerging. Similarly from a regulationist perspective, no local mode of regulation
could effectively spell out the nature of the relationship between business and local
government, and between Nashville and the outside world. Then came the crisis events
that acted as catalysts for change as described in the preceding chapters-the "Boner
factor" and the business cycle. As I will explore in this chapter, both the political and the
economic spheres experienced internal changes, as did the relationship between them
(section 7.1 ). The business elite abandoned a parochial model in favor of an
entrepreneurial one that was viewed as more conducive to sustained and focused growth.
This rethinking was part of a cultural trend precipitated by demographic changes in
Nashville (and the South), as well as economic restructuring and policy changes like
deregulation (section 7.2). Reforms of the city's Chamber of Commerce (section 7.3) and
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the efforts to create a new economic development organization-Partnership 200(}-
merit special attention (section 7. 4).

7.1 The old "backroom" system

As iJlustrated in Chapter 5, NashvilJe politics have osciHated between the two poles of
good government progressivism and machine-like arrangements, although not necessarily
during clearly identifiable periods or with specific individuals or interest groups. In this
section, I will provide a more detailed account of these structures and individuals, which
will clarify the relationship between business and government and lead into the regime
changes that occurred circa 1990.
For approximately two decades during the 194 0s and 1950s, a behind-the-scenes
machine existed until the coming of Metro government. The machine was Jed by Garner
Robinson, an undertaker, and later Sheriff, from the Old Hickory neighborhood in East
Nashvi1Je21• Local government was used for persona) power and helping friends and
family with jobs and favors. The ability to hire and fire city employees and control over
the court and election system were the fundamental sources of power. This could be
achieved by the maneuvering of two individuals with strategic positions in local
government-Elkin Garfinkle (county court supervisor and chairman of the local
Democratic executive committee) and Jake Sheridan (city councilman and public works
commissioner). To accumulate favors that could be returned on election day was the task

21

Robinson was elected sheriff in 1945 in a close election that hinged on the J lopcwell precinct in East
Nashville. The ballot box was deliwrcd late to the election commission after all other votes in the city had
been counted. and although the number of votes exceeded citizens in the precinct, the machine-controlled
election hoard accepted the result (Squires, 1996).
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of the machine's foot soldiers, the local police officers, who frequently rounded up voters
and took them to the polls. For the machine, any vote that they could manipulate was
important. For that reason, rather than a concern for social equity, political rights for
Nashville's black population were not actively resisted by the machine. Alliances of
some sort between white East Nashville politicians and the black community has been
common since. The machine helped Ben West win the mayoral election in 1951 (in
another late ballot box election) who, as a progressive, had an ambivalent relationship
with the machine.
The unification of city-county government was heralded nationally as a model of
progressivism, yet a system of patronage and informal power arrangements continued to
exist. The three-term mayor of early Metro, Beverly Briley, had a chief supporter in H.E.
Flippin, the owner of a hardware store in South Nashville. Flippin was the mayor's fund
raiser and the major source of patronage. As a way to disassociate inappropriate direct
patronage from the mayor's office, citizens and government rank-and-file were directed
to Flippin for favors. Then Vice-Mayor George Cate says: "Any given Monday morning,
you would see more Metro employees out there by Clark Hardware to see Mr. Flippin
than in the mayor's office. If Flippin supported you, you had a good chance of promotion
in the police department or public works. I think he just enjoyed the power'' (Cate, 2001 ).
Essentially, H.E. Flippen did for Briley what Sheridan did for West and was supported in
his position as informal political operative by the Tennessean editor Silliman Evans, an
old Robinson-machine foe (Squires, 1996). The conclusion here is that mayoral
administrations, or newspapers with a strong good-government profile, all operated
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within the same political system that transcended their philosophical convictions on how
urban politics ought to be run.
When Briley finished his 12 years in the mayor's office, Flippin offered his own
fund-raising capacities and network of support to Cate or David Scobey, also a fonner
vice mayor, two likely mayoral candidates. However, both chose not to run� instead
another strong candidate emerged, U.S. Congressman Richard Fulton. Arriving from
Washington, Fulton was less dependent on the archaic form of power division that
existed between Briley and Flippin. As discussed in Chapter 5, a significant share of the
city's budget came from federal sources by the time Fulton ran for Nashville mayor. This
put Fulton in a very favorable position, as his power disseminated in part from his ability
to use connections in Washington to the advantage of the city. The Nashville Chamber of
Commerce, naturaHy aware of the existing relations between federal and local
government, endorsed Fulton's return as mayor of NashviJJe, even if his pro-business
credentials were somewhat weak. When federal contributions diminished during the
Reagan years, the city and its economic development efforts were affected. Fulton had to
resort to tax increases on three different occasions, although by any standard, Nashville's
taxes remained very low. Regardless of whether Flippin offered any support to Fulton,
the hardware storeowner clearly did not wield the same kind of influence after Fulton
became mayor (Cate, 2001 ).
Fate Thomas, Davidson County sheriff from 1972-1990, replaced Flippin as the
informal powerbroker. He was allied with most people within the local Democratic
political establishment, including Mayor Fulton, who was supported by the political
establishment and was also accused of being a machine candidate from time to time.
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From the sherifrs office, which under the Metro charter was nominally a position with
little political power, Thomas revived an old-fashioned political machine based on loyalty
and favors. "Fate was a master politician. His advice and counsel was sought by
everybody who aspired to a life in the public sector" (Eddie Jones, quoted in Loggins,
2000, July 26). He provided services and government access to his constituents, mainly
working-class East Nashville, but also the city's black community. They reciprocated
with loyalty to him and candidates he endorsed. Thomas' blessing was a significant
advantage for any aspiring politician (Cate, 2001 ). Fate Thomas was the chief political
navigator for Bill Boner in the 1987 mayoral race. and Boner carried enough of the
traditional machine precincts to win the election (Pinkston, 2001). Thomas' reign ended
in 1990 when he resigned and pleaded guilty to various charges of fraud and corruption.
Despite his conviction and prison sentence, Thomas inspired loyalty in powerful friends
such as Ned McWherter, Lamar Alexander, John Siegenthaler, Richard Fulton, and Bob
Clement. At Thomas' recent funeral, Richard Fulton called him "the last of his kind"
(Loggins, 2000, July 26). Indeed, the kind of personal, machine-politics power he
wielded has not existed in Nashville since Boner's victory, and old-style politics became
extinct in Nashville (Pinkston, 2001). By 1993, the Nashville machine was only "a
collection of rusty parts bound by genealogy. None of the elected officers can get along
with each other long enough to formally run a person for office, or steal money, or do
whatever it is that machines do" (Dobie, 1993, March 28).
In the 1970s, Fulton also had the blessing of another source of local power, a
group of corporate leaders known as the Watauga Group, which first introduced Fulton to
the idea of seeking the mayor's position at an informal gathering at the Belle Meade
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mansion of National Life's Bill Weaver. The group was not pleased with the prospective
candidates to replace Briley and had to seek out a qualified, electable candidate to offer
their substantial influence and resources (Dobie, 2002, May 5). Watauga was a highly
informal organization that played an important role in Nashville politics from the 1960s
to its waning days in the early 1980s. Named after a self-governance charter in early
Tennessee history, the Watauga Group consisted of a handful of businessmen that met to
discuss the problems and goals of the city. The goal was high-minded: selfless
improvement of the community, as seen through the eyes of corporate leaders. The
meetings took place once a month and protocols were, of course, rarely recorded. Even
the name was elusive at first, but Watauga was the label that stuck (Dobie, 1990a).
Assessments on the individual composition of the group and its role in Nashville society
are somewhat inconsistent, reflecting the informal and fluid nature of the group.
Nevertheless, a handful of individuals representing some of the dominant corporations in
Nashville can be identified as the original core group. Seven people "whose mandate
came not from the voters on the election day but from the boardrooms and executive
suites of Nashville's largest corporations" (Honick, 1990, p. 36) constituted the center of
the group22 . They were mostly executives of the locally owned banks and insurance
companies. With a few individuals from manufacturing companies commonly mentioned
as members, the core group can possibly be extended to about ten people, and total
membership was about 15 to 20 individuals.

22

To he specific, these individuals were Bill Weaver (National Life), Sam Fleming (Third National), Bill
Earthman (Commerce Union), David K. Wilson (Cherokee Equity/First American), Alan Steele (Life and
Casualty), Andrew Benedict (First American), and Guilford Dudley (Life and Casualty).
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The influence of the Watauga Group was generally considered strong enough to
be called a "shadow government" (Rogers, 1990b) or a "phantom Chamber of
Commerce" (Nelson, 200 I). The existence of Watauga was not known to the public; it
was not customary that members talked about their involvement, nor was it discussed in
the media. It is quite possible that the name Watauga was not mentioned in the press until
after the group's demise, and was not subject to more comprehensive coverage until a
2002 article in the Nashville Scene (Dobie, 2002, May 5) when the group's activities
could be considered history and therefore unindictable. The implicit claims of power
might be exaggerated in the sense that decisions were never taken directly on behalf of
the group. It is unclear to what extent power can be attributed to Watuaga as an entity of
its own or simply as the sum of individual membership. According to Ben Rechter
(2000), a member during the later stages, "people who weren't there didn't understand
what it was," alluding to the group's mythological capacity of direct control; instead he
describes it as a "forum to develop thoughts and ideas." Local problems were discussed,
evaluated, and various ideas were floated. Jack Massey, a leading Nashville investor,
concurs that Watauga meetings involved a lot of talking, but produced few results
(Dobie, 1990a). The nature of the organization prevented any direct collective action, but
it was a place where positions of various interests were evaluated and general attitudes
toward the development of the city molded. Based on this socialization process of
attitudes on the top elite level, individuals then pursued implementation on their own or
together in smaller groups. Many significant local developments and institutions can be
traced back to Watauga:
•

Without Watauga Richard Fulton would probably never have been mayor.
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•

An effort was made to create other, more formal, leadership forums that would
promote civic engagement and forge alliances beyond the small group of leaders
representing financial power. Leadership Nashville, which the Watauga Group
initiated, was an early and successful example of a non-profit organization with the
goals of educating business leadership on civic issues and socializing relative
newcomers into the city.

•

A second initiative was the Davidson Group, an attempt at improving race relations.
Leaders from the white business elite were paired with leaders from the African
American community to develop individual relationships. The initiative had some
success, but some people also had a hard time making meaningful personal
connections (Simpkins, 2000).

•

During its early stage, Watauga discussed the implementation and development of
Metro government, even if its power to control such a large issue was limited.

•

One major public downtown building, the Tennessee Performing Arts Center, was
proposed by three Watauga members-Wilson, Ingram, and Massey-to the
governor, and after raising $4 million in the business community, the center was built
with additional public money (Dobie, 1990a).

•

Although many of the businessmen involved represented traditional and conservative
values, changing the legal framework of alcohol became part of a modernization
process� it was an effort to move the South closer to national norms and make it more
attractive to investment, and in a larger sense, take part in national economic
integration. The Watauga Group represented businesses that favored the idea, and one
person (Eddie Jones) who was "a good salesman" (Nelson, 2001 ), successfully
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argued publicly for a referendum on the liquor-by-the-drink issue. In 1967, the
Tennessee legislature allowed it, and the question passed in a Nashville referendum
with 56 percent of the vote.
•

The Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority was largely a creation of one man,
Watauga member John Tune (see Chapter 9).

•

Perhaps the last accomplishment of the Watauga Group was the Adopt-a-School
Program, which later became the Pencil Foundation (see Chapter 10). According to
banker Ed Nelson, also a Watauga member, this initiative caused the group to
disintegrate. Watuga did not traditionally give money as a collective entity. However,
in 1982 Bronson Ingram, the Watauga strongman at the time who had a reputation as
a behind-the-scenes oligarch who avoided the public eye, was approached by two
outside individuals-two women with civic involvement experience from the Girl
Scouts, Junior League, and League of Women Voters-regarding financing for the
Adopt-a-School idea. Ingram then decided to coordinate a fund-raising effort within
the Watauga Group.
"We [Ingram and Nelson] got together and looked at the list and we put down
assessments for everybody on the list. If it was an individual, a lawyer or some
revered person that had retired, it was a $500 or a $1,000 assessment. Then we
would go to the institutions. The four majors had to give $10,000. We raised
about $80,000 to start Project Pencil and hire somebody to run it and to support
staff. It was about the last time Watauga met." (Nelson, 2001).
The group simply quit having meetings, says Jack Massey, not attributing a

specific cause to the demise (Dobie, 1990a). Non-members also recall that the group
ceased to exist in the early 1980s and that the Chamber of Commerce subsequently
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became more actively, and openly, involved. Whether or not the breach of the unspoken
rules precipitated the decline, there are other fundamental and important changes that
made the Watauga Group disappear as a powetful local institution. The Watauga
chairman at the time, Victor Johnson of Aladdin Industries, stopped calling meetings, as
the prevailing notion within the group was that it had outlived its purpose in an
increasingly diverse and pluralistic Nashville (Dobie, 2002, May 5). This is also
illuminated by the words of Keel Hunt, a person with ties to both political and business
interests in Nashville:
"The Watauga Group was an important institution, probably without ever
intending to be, in a way that is not appropriate today. At that time, the members
of the Watauga Group simply helped to organize the community's response to
various needs and opportunities. It was a very different period of time when the
culture was different than it is today. There was certainly less diversity in the
community. It was commonplace to have major civic decisions and influences
generated by the members of the white male ruling power structure. They didn't
make decisions for the city, but certainly had access to city government decision
makers and they had their respect and esteem, and all of that tended to work. The
Watauga Group was a small, rather informal group of people who would meet
from time to time and talk about needs and opportunities and some very important
things came out of that. People who were then members of the Watauga Group
are still active in the Nashville community one way or the other. Many are friends
of mine� I respect what they did. I think they themselves would tell you that it
couldn't operate in the same way today. It was a perfect case of operating in the
reality of your community at a given time in history. So I think it was a very
positive force, but it was then important for that to change" (Hunt, 2000).
The Watauga Group was not the only local institution that brought together the
leaders of the business establishment. In its own myth, Nashville is a city that thrives on
tradition and is a center of"old money." Nashvillians have at least in the past referred to
the city as having the most churches per capita, and a neighborhood (Belle Meade) that
has one of the highest concentrations of wealth in the nation. (These assertions are,
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however, without quantification.) The old elite were residents of the Belle Meade
neighborhood, and more importantly, members of the Belle Meade Country Club. Like
other similar clubs, it is highly exclusive, intensely private and publicity shy. It is also a
social institution that tends to change more slowly than society around it, and therefore
susceptible to occasional criticism, or even, these days, ridicule. The club accepted its
first Jewish member in 1991 and its first black member in 1994.
It is readily acknowledged that there is an overlap between the most prominent
members of the Belle Meade Country Club and the Vanderbilt Board of Trust, which has
always been a highly prestigious institution. Membership signifies importance, influence
and respect among the local elite. Belle Meade Country Club is of course a private entity
that will not disclose its membership list, but Vanderbilt Board of Trust is publicly
accessible (Figure 7.1). The list is a good representation of the old elite, as Vanderbilt,
along with the Belle Meade Country Club, is a local institution not prone to rapid change.
The chairperson's position is currently occupied by Martha Ingram, business leader and
CEO of conglomerate empire Ingram Industries. When elected in 1999, she was the latest
in a line of Ingram family members on the board. Her late husband, Bronson Ingram, was
the chair from 1991 to his death in 1995, and before that, his father Orrin Henry Ingram
was on the board in the 1950s and 1960s. Martha Ingram has,_ for a long time, also been a
leading force behind many local charitable and civic organizations.
Sometimes the notion that Vanderbilt University is aloof and not rooted in the
local community is put forth, fueled by the fact that the school's student body is largely
non-local. The University has always had strong connections on the national level,
receiving money from major foundations. The perception of indifference to local issues
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Martha Ingram, Chairman, Ingram Industries, Nashville, TN
Dennis C. Bottorff, Vice-Chainnan, First American Bank, Nashville, TN
Kenneth L. Roberts, Secretary, First American Bank, Nashville, TN
Nelson C. Andrews•
Brookside Properties
Nashville, TN

Andrew B. Benedict, Jr.•
First American Bank
Nashville, TN

Monroe J. Caren, Jr.
Central Parking
Nashville, TN

Thomas F. Cone
Cone Oil Co.
Nashville, TN

Miriam McGaw Cowden•
Civic leader
Nashville, TN

Brownlee 0. Currey, Jr.
Equitable Securities
Franklin, TN

Irwin B. Eskind, MD•
Hospital Affiliates lnt'l
Nashville, TN

Guilford Dudley, Jr.• t
Life and Casualty
Nashville, TN

L. Hall Hardaway, Jr.
Hardaway Contracting
Hendersonville, TN

H. Rodes Hart
Franklin Industries
Brentwood, TN

Alyne Queener Massey
Joanne F. Hayes
Civic leader, daughter of late Sam Fleming Civic leader, wife of late Jack Massey
Nashville, TN
Nashville, TN

Edward G. Nelson
Commerce Union Bank
Nashville, TN

Judson Randolph, MD
Civic leader
Nashville, TN

John W. Rich
Civic leader
Nashville, TN

Charles C. Trabue, Jr.• t
Life and Casualty
Nashville, TN

Cal Turner, Jr.
Dollar General Stores
Brentwood, TN

James A. Webb, Jr.•
Nashville Bank and Trust
Nashville, TN

Dudley Brown White
Civic leader
Nashville, TN

W. Ridley Wills, II
National Life
Franklin, TN

David K. Wilson•
Cherokee Equity/First American Bank
Nashville, TN

Figure 7 .1 Local members of the Vanderbilt University Board of Trust.
Source: Vanderbilt University (2001) and various sources. Not included: 27 non-local
members. *Life Trustee. t Recently deceased.
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and the general welfare of Nashville was accentuated in the 1980s when the campus
expanded, creating ill feelings among the residents in the surrounding neighborhoods and
even citywide. Vanderbilt has since then made an effort to engage and interact more with
local society. The Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies was created with an
emphasis on local development. Chancellor Joe Wyatt also became president of the
Chamber of Commerce, tying the university more strongly to local business interests.
From another perspective, the university has always played an important role as a place
where connections were forged, which then became important networks in the local
business elite. Most of the old elite graduated from Vanderbilt. A Vanderbilt degree was
a preparatory experience funneling individuals to community leadership. The Vanderbilt
law school and business schools continue to supply leadership in Nashville, but their role
is more diffuse now without the "grandfather to son to grandson succession" in local
business leadership (Hunt, 2000). It is still important in other ways-as a driving force of
the Nashville health care cluster and as one of the largest employers in Nashville.
Again, if we return to the Watauga Group, it was allied with leaders in the official
structure, such as Eddie Jones, the long-term executive vice president of the Chamber of
Commerce. However, Watauga members did not necessarily hold major positions in the
Chamber, leading to a somewhat ambiguous relationship between the two organizations.
Some people felt that the Chamber decisions reflected Watauga Group interests and
ideas, and that Jones "reported" to more powerful people who controlled the city
(Sherrard, 2000). Simpkins (2000) calls Eddie Jones a Watauga protege who became
more powerful as the old core of the Watauga aged, retired, or passed away. Rechter
(2000), on the other hand, makes a clear distinction between the Watauga Group and the
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Chamber. He describes the latter organization as a downtown club, a "good old boys''
network. Rechter adamantly differentiates the Watauga Group and the Chamber, saying
that they were two different sets of people, which is peculiar as he in the same breath
singles out the bankers as the core group in the Chamber of Commerce. The explanation
may lie in Rechter's personal experience of the late Watauga Group of the early 1980s.
At that point, the old banking leadership had retired from civic engagements, formal or
informal. Nevertheless, they largely represented the same constituency-mainly the
financial institutions. It therefore appears that the most powerful individuals in the city
were only engaged in civic affairs in an informal manner. This created a system in which
the formal organization retained a limited status and the informal one was not broadly
active.
A particular relationship between business and government had also developed
over time in Nashville. During the early Metro government years, then Vice-Mayor
George Cate says prospective office holders were expected to solicit support with a dozen
or so local corporations and their CEOs. The executive officers or chairmen of the board
were opinion-makers and major players in local politics. However, political connections
of top business leaders were shallow and did not penetrate beyond top office holders. The
CEOs of Watauga caliber were quite ignorant of local political practices; a cultural divide
existed between politics and business. In order to gain political favors they needed some
individuals had established close connections with political circles, and those individuals
funneled money from the banks and insurance companies (Nelson, 2001 ). These go
betweens may have been lower level businesspeople within corporations, or somebody
positioned with connections in both camps, but with their ties they could direct money to
146

office-holders with favorable policy views, arrange meetings, or disseminate
information23 . That does not immediately imply that the relationship between business
and Metro government was closer than it is today, but rather qualitatively different.
Rechter (2000) indicates that this arrangement did not translate into a policy that equated
with broad strategic thinking, but rather fragmented, ad hoc development. This view is
corroborated from the political side. No official lobbying-style system existed with the
Chamber of Commerce in the courthouse, which instead saw informal talks and close
connections with certain councilmen, says former Vice-Mayor Dave Scobey (2000).
During the 1980s, a subtle power shift was taking place away from the financiers
and insurance industry. Outside investors were entering local businesses in real estate,
insurance and banks, and even the Grand Ole Opry was bought by the Oklahoma-based
company Gaylord Entertainment. By 1990, the Watauga Group cluster of individuals had
retired, leaving something of a power vacuum. Conventional wisdom traces this situation
to the shift away from local ownership of dominant corporations, such as the banks and
the insurance companies. Even if an entrenched power structure still existed, its powers,
as traditionally defined, had diminished. This should be compared with other cities: "In
Charlotte, N.C., if you ask 10 different people to identify the movers and shakers, you'll
get the same five names each time; try that in Nashville, and no two lists will be alike"
(Honick, 1990, p. 36). Martha Ingram, talking from the local fund-raisers' perspective,
says: "you could gather a dozen or so people in the room who had the ability to commit
23

The most important individual that perfonned this function was Eddie Jones, the executive director of
The Chamhcr. With his background as political newspaper reporter, press Sl."Cretary for Governor Clement,
and an East Nashvillian, he could cross over between the two worlds in a way that nobody c1se could
(Dobie, 2002, May 5).
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fifty or a hundred thousand dollars to a cause on the spot...If you wanted something done,
you knew exactly who to talk to. It's not that simple anymore,, (quoted in Rogers 1990b,
p. 46-47).
Naturally, a small power elite still existed, even if they were not the Watauga
Group anymore. One group of people was identified as the "brain trust" of Mayor Boner.
Later, they were conspicuously absent in the formation of policies that were spawned by
Partnership 2000. A different group, real estate millionaires Ted Welch, R.C. Mathews,
Joe Rodgers, were named as the "heirs" of Watauga (Rogers, 1990b). The reproduction
of the Nashville economic elite that had been passed on from one generation to another,
sometimes in a family lineage, had been disrupted. But nobody paid attention to the lack
of strategy and clear direction for the city, because Nashville was caught in the real estate
economy of the 1980s. Growth was taking place in the 1980s despite the hands-off
approach of a fragmented elite. Not until after I 987 did the issue of strategic decision
making become a serious concern in the city. Undoubtedly, the perception of an
exclusive elite unwilling to share power, a situation detrimental to economic success, was
prevalent in Nashville. One Nashvil1ian said: "there has been recent commercial
expansion here, but it's been held back by the old aristocracy dominating the local
establishment" (Paine, 1985, p. 21). The leading industrial recruiter at the Chamber also
concurred that Nashville's political structure was impeding on the city's ability to attract
new business (Liles-Morris, 1991a). The Chamber of Commerce itself, as a meeting point
and conduit for policy arrangements between the public and the private business realm,
was not working very effectively. As wiJI be discussed in sections 7.3 and 7.4, the
Chamber did experience a period of reform. But before that process will be considered,
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several factors that position these events in a changing economic and geographical
environment should be introduced.

7.2 New business elites: Migration, inter-dependence, new industries
Changes in local power, and eventually in local governance, were influenced by non
local forces. Loss of local ownership of major corporations is often assumed to equal loss
of local power. The situation is certainly more complex, as will be discussed in the
remainder of this chapter. The way the national economy is reorganized through new
policies and technological changes profoundly impacts local industry and governance. I
will use two pertinent examples, banking and health care, leading components of old and
new Nashville, respectively. Furthermore, this was taking place as the culture of the
urban South was changing.
As noted above, there were significant interlocking relationships between major
local institutions. The locally owned banks would have board members who also
occupied seats at the board of the Chamber of Commerce, and sometimes the Board of
Trust at Vanderbilt University. National Life famously worked hand in hand with Third
National Bank (now SunTrust) and had control over, among other assets, WSM radio
(which broadcast the Grand Ole Opry), a television station, and eventually the Opryland
theme park and hotel. During a transition era spanning from the mid-1970s to the late
1980s, ownership of these assets became fractured.
The existence of local headquarters of major corporations is generally regarded as
having a positive impact on a local economy. Headquarters mean high wage employment
and multiplier effects. In the opposite case of a city dominated by branch offices,
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decisions such as which business services to use will be made in another city; the number
of auxiliary services available locally, especially downtown, is therefore likely to decline.
Indeed, office investment in downtown Nashville was lackluster in the 1990s.
As a control center, high-level employees with decision-making power have the
ability to support the community. For example, a major way for the economic elite to
shape local society is through the non-profit sector. Charitable giving and funding for
foundations is assumed to decline if company headquarters are relocated. Corporations
are territorial; the Nashville experience, which most likely is true everywhere, is that a
majority of charitable donations by corporations tend to be given within its primary
geographic area of operation (Bottorff, 2001). An organization such as United Way has
seen contributions decline because headquarters decision-makers are not here. "That is a

major [his emphasis] negative development" (Hunt, 2000). The financial crisis around
1990 also took a toll. In the words of one local banker: "it's hard to worry about saving
the whole ship when you're bailing water up to your neck in your own cabin" (Rogers,
1990b, p. 51). According to Bottorff (2001), the banking industry has not cut local giving
in Nashville. On the other hand, philanthropic involvement has not grown like it would
have during the expansive 1990s if local control had been retained. The underlying
rationale for giving makes sure that a minimum level is maintained. Bottotff
acknowledges "that community involvement is a very important part of your marketing
effort, not just your social responsibility, so [corporations] don't tend to cut back." His
general assessment, however, is that overall charitable decline and loss of headquarters
definitely impacts philanthropy. Beyond the fact that the banks play an active, although
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not leading role, the most significant shift is probably the retraction of the insurance
industry in civic life. It has also been non-local for a longer period of time than banking.
Leadership becomes more transient with less attachment to place. When local
institutions become part of a larger entity, many of the most powerful individuals move
elsewhere. If your city is perceived to have an excellent "quality of life," that can be a
mitigating factor in the process. To stay in such a location, people may decline promotion
and relocation, and may go so far as to leave the company. Under the pressure of recent
corporate reorganization, some high-level employees in the telecom industry have chosen
to stay in Nashville (Bottorff, 2001 ). The other side of the process is that it takes some
time before both new institutions and new individuals are socialized into a role as local
activists, taking part in social place-based engagement. The loss of local control had a
destabilizing effect on the civic leadership in Nashville. Instead of lifelong Nashvillians
who joined Third National Bank with a Vanderbilt MBA, people arrived from other
places, held a CEO position in Nashville for a few years, but soon moved elsewhere.
"There is one bank in Nashville that has gone through so many changes of leadership,
nobody can keep track of who's the CEO anymore. Does that mean that everything
collapses? Of course not. It means that the city is operating a little bit differently" (Hunt,
2000).

7. 2.1 Thefinancial industry
The most important force behind these trends is deregulation. Dating back to the 1930s,
banking laws separated commerce and industry from banking. The crisis following the
stock market crash of 1929 created a backlash against unregulated finance capitalism, and
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a stronger regulatory hand of the state was viewed favorably. Federal legislation placed
geographical limitations on banks, confining them to their home states. Horizontal
integration in the banking industry was also disallowed. Despite the practice of forming
holding companies to circumvent regulations, most banks have been local or regional in
scope until the 1980s. In addition to national restrictions, state laws could limit banking
even to the county level. In other places, banks were allowed to compete on a statewide
basis. In the 1980s, federal law again made it possible for holding companies to invest
over state boundaries, and most states had removed many of their barriers against
interstate banking by 1990. The Federal Interstate Banking Act of 1994 also gave states
more power to locally legislate branching and acquisition. Technological developments
and renewed faith in the market mechanism have been the driving forces behind the
deregulation of the industry. Various restrictions still apply-for example, regional
banking is encouraged over national banking in order to keep strong banks from New
York and other national financial centers from creating national empires. Many Southern
states have, for example, regional reciprocity laws that limit ownership to banks in these
states.
Following the earlier argument about the importance of headquarters, the
assumption is that cities that manage to attract banking headquarters or whose banks are
strong players in the merger and acquisition trend will benefit economically. The trend
under deregulation has been that control over banking assets are now more spatially
concentrated than before (Lord, 1992). North Carolina, especially Charlotte, is a winner
in this process, while Texas has lost much of its financial control. Several reasons can
explain why some cities and states have lost and others won. First, legislation that
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regulates the flow of capital and control of assets still varies between states. Those with
more liberal policies regarding out-of-state investment are more likely the losers of
capital control. Second, states that historically allowed statewide banking fostered a few
strong banks that were later able to acquire out-of-state banks when deregulation was
enacted. This is in contrast to states where only one office (e.g. no branching) was
allowed. Consequently, the scale of operation provided a competitive advantage or
disadvantage later under deregulation. Moreover, the economic crisis around 1990 led to
several bank collapses and left others vulnerable to out-of-state takeover, especially in
combination with liberalizing banking laws.
The deregulation of banking and financial services has had a major impact on
banking in Tennessee. State laws limited branching to home counties until the 1970s,
with some exceptions for holding companies and single out-of-county branches.
Basically, banking is an example of anti-urban policies on the state level where regulation
prevented wealth and power concentration in cities. Tennessee, like most states, was
fragmented in its terms of banking services, although it was not the most fragmented
state. "Banking laws were as different and peculiar as whiskey laws" (Nelson, 200 l ).
Since banks with out-of-state headquarters were allowed to operate banks in Tennessee,
all but one of the state's major banks have been acquired by distant rivals. Charlotte and
Atlanta have become the regional capitals of the banking industry with banks such as
Bank of America, SunTrust, and First Union.
In the recent past, Nashville was the headquarters of three large banks, two large
insurance companies and two major investment firms. In 1985, Nashville had three banks
in the top 150 in the country: Third National was ranked at 87, First American at 96 and
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Commerce Union at 136 (Cason, 1985, April 4). The city was sometimes referred to as
the "Wall Street of the South." Locally, the term "Fourth and Union," after the center of
the downtown financial district conveniently located only a few blocks away from the
political power of the courthouse, became synonymous with the power of the local
banking and financial institutions. All these financial institutions had deep roots in
Nashvi11e. They formed the cornerstone of local business life, and over time they had
become integrated in Nashville's economic life on many different levels. The insurance
giant National Life owned the Grand Ole Opry and Opryland. Life & Casualty erected
the city's first skyscraper. The insurance companies were conservative in their business
methods and social outlook, paternalistic rather than profit maximizing (Carey, 2000). A
hostile takeover by the Houston-based American General in 1982 took NLT, the holding
company that owned National Life, out of local ownership. The entire elite community
was stunned, not only because such a significant company, but the entire Opryland
complex with its symbolic importance, was lost to outside capital. Opryland was later
bought by Oklahoma-based Gaylord Entertainment. (But because of the extremely
decentralized decision-making structure of the corporation, Gaylord is, in practice, a local
company.) In the banking industry, a merger and acquisition process started in the 1980s
as interstate banking was allowed. Third National Bank and Commerce Union bank were
acquired rapidly. First American was in such a bad shape that it was not a prospect for
take-over for many years after the crisis. In the merger era, First American bought out-of
state banks, but these acquisitions did not prove to be productive. That, combined with
weakness from the 1990 debacle, enabled Birmingham's AmSouth to take over in a
merger. As far as the other investment companies goes, Equitable was the South's major
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municipal bond house and the second largest in the country. In 1967, Equitable was
purchased by the up-and-coming American Express. Finally, the ownership transfer out
of Nashville was complete when J.C. Bradford, which had 2,500 employees in 16 states
(mostly in the South), was sold to Paine Webber of New York (Table 7.1).
An emphasis on local capital fostered close relationships between banks,
industrialists, developers, and politicians. The local bankers were the people to know and
to go to. Much local investment was financed locally. For larger or complex deals,
developers and industries that needed more capital than the local banks could provide had
to approach bigger out-of-town banks, but this was frequently brokered by Nashville
banks. One benefit of deregulation is the amount of capital that the new institutions
command. Long distance search for capital is less necessary. Cases when necessary
funding cannot be provided by institutions with a major presence in Nashville are

Table 7.1 Wall Street of the South no more.
Nashville institution
Banks:
First American
Third National
Commerce Union
Insurance:
National Life - NL T
Life and Casualty
Other financial institutions:
Equitable Securities
J.C. Bradford

Acquiring institution

New HQ location

Date

AmSouth
SunTrust
Nations Bank
(Bank of America)

Birmingham. Ala.
Atlanta, Ga.
Charlotte, N.C.

2000

American General
American General

Houston, Tx.
Houston, Tx.

1982
1968

American Express
PaineWebber

New York, N.Y.
New York, N.Y.

2000

1986
1987

1967

Note: Since the acquisitions listed here took place, other reorganizations have occurred. For example, American
General's parent company was purchased by British-owned Prudential in 2001, now headquartered in New York
instead of Houston. Compiled by author from various sources.
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few. The industry is headed towards a dual business structure consisting of very large
institutions with a wide range of services and small community banks providing a high
level of personalized service (Bottorff, 2001 ).
Banks are not the dominant power brokers in most cities any longer, although
they are still involved in civic affairs. Being active locally, several representatives for the
banking industry noted, fills an important public relations function for the banks. But
there is also a sense of inactivity and diminishing leadership. The initiatives from the
banks affecting civic society are not there anymore. These types of substantial initiatives
that can effect the path of a locality are associated with the headquarters function, but
now the capacity to act is more elusive. Banker Ed Nelson says that in contributions to
educational and cultural institutions, Nashville banks are involved, but yet missing in
some ways. New powers have moved into the void left by the banks, but it is hard to
exactly define what those powers are (Nelson, 200 I). The various Nashville banks have
responded similarly in this reorganization situation with only "nuances in differences"
(Bottorff, 2001 ). Although everybody acknowledges a leadership problem, banking
holding companies are also decentralizing, which moderates the tendency towards
diffusion of power. Simpkins (2000) adds that the older generation of local corporate elite
was "moderate" in its ability to perform a civic governance function. In fact, the
generation that came afterward and experienced the deregulated period was much more
competent, better educated, and better leaders, on both a corporate and societal level.
Many of the banks and other financial institutions that propelled the downtown
economy are no longer headquartered in Nashville. Some of the headquarters that were
amassed and erected by the financial companies during urban renewal have been sold to
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other investors or to local government. That means, among other things, fewer jobs
downtown for accountants, lawyers and other service providers. Instead, downtown has
grown as a center for entertainment and government. The dynamics of downtown has
changed, as have the spaces of power:
"The fifth floor of the First American bank is the dining room. On a given day at
noon it used to be jam-packed with people. Primarily bankers, but also other
business people meeting with bankers, lots of activity going on. I have been there
since and it's a ghost town. Only one or two tables have people sitting at them.
All that activity and cross-fertilization of ideas, talking about transactions, that is
gone now. The leadership is down in Birmingham, and when somebody answers
to someone in Birmingham, it's different. The power to make decisions in
Nashville made the business community stronger, but we've lost that power"
(Sherrard, 2000).
As the last indigenous bank, First American was special; it had assembled a board
from the cream of the elite. "Visiting the bank's executive dining room was for years like
being summoned to a city hall, only one with money" (Dobie, 1999, June 3). But Bottorff
(2001), who is familiar with all bank facilities in Nashville, says a similar process
happened at all banks. The number of employees is smaller than when the banks'
headquarters were located in Nashville. This is especially true for special functions, such
as policy managers for credit that bring people into the institution. It is not only a place
"where deals are done," but also for civic involvement. The dining rooms were places for
community relations efforts as much as a place where business synergy is taking place.
More broadly speaking, the number of people in top level management positions
throughout the city are fewer and therefore impact the role of banking in the governance
structure of the business elite. Nelson (2001) too recognizes that the "buzz" is no longer
in the dining room, but instead says it has moved to other places: the City Club, the
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Cumberland Club, and the University Club at Vanderbilt. This type of activity is still
going on, just not at the banks anymore.

7.2.2 The health care industry

To make a rather diffuse social process concrete, I will juxtapose the changing nature of
the Nashville banking with the health care industry. The health care industry makes up an
increasing share of the post-Fordist service economy. The American health care system is
highly advanced and expensive, and health care makes up a greater share of United States
GDP than any other industrialized country. For many companies this represents a
significant cost, while it enables profits and employment in a growing health care
industry. Access to the health care system was broadened when Medicaid and Medicare
legislation passed in 1966, and health care is the area where government spending has
increased the most.
As a health care center, Nashville is more likely to reap benefits from this system
than most other cities. The cluster of growing health care finns is generally perceived as
the most dynamic growth industry in Nashville today. Figure 7.2 shows all the different
activities in the agglomeration. The industry developed in association with the city's
medical schools, especially Vanderbilt, which has a reputation for groundbreaking, Nobel
Prize-winning research, and strong funding from both public and private sources. The
dominant company is HCA (Hospital Corporation of America) whose entrepreneurial
decisions as pioneers in the development of for-profit hospitals have shaped the health
care industry in Nashville. Led by the physicians Thomas Frist, Sr. and Thomas Frist, Jr.,
together with investor Jack Massey from Kentucky Fried Chicken, HCA grew from a
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Figure 7.2 The agglomeration of health care related firms in Nashville.
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hospital originally financed by National Life and Third National Bank to become the
largest private hospital management company in the country. Hospitals usually originate
from large universities, strong government involvement, or non-profit foundations, with
which the South was not well endowed. As Southern health care was served with small
scale, under-capitalized hospitals, it was logical that private for-profit hospital
management emerged in the South along with population and economic growth.
By 1990, the health care industry had grown to become a dominant force in the
local economy. It had more than 80 businesses with headquarters in Nashville with multi
state or national operations. Ten on the top I 00 privately held local companies were in
the health care industry (Nashville Business and Lifestyle, 1990a). Nashville's health care
environment has yielded 15 publicly traded health care companies in the first half of the
1990s, which represented 12 percent of all the health care public offerings in the United
States during that period. Nashville's health care industry produces approximately 7
percent of the region's annual economic output (Eck, 1997, June 16).
HCA has been instrumental in the formation of the cluster because of the high
number of spin-offs from the company. The industry is very dynamic with a rapid rate of
merger, acquisition, and spin-offs. This constant corporate reshuffling regularly idles
management skills that immediately search for new ventures. Many firms have grown by
developing a particular niche of the industry, sometimes aided by contacts that have
developed in a close-knit segment of the business community. Important companies with
roots in HCA included Equicor, �hyCor (at one point the second largest physician
practice management company in United States), and HealthTrust (a leading employee
owned hospital management company led by HCA executive Clayton McWhorter).
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As the city boosters stress, Nashville is an entrepreneurial place24� people are
interested in opening new businesses, and health care is the best example of that attitude.
Nashville's entrepreneurialism, coupled with ongoing industry efforts to reduce costs and
target new sectors, mean there continues to be new local health care start-ups even as
some companies leave Nashville in the merger and acquisition process. New companies
have also been aided by abundant venture capital (Gallivan, 1998, February 23).
Traditionally, the accessibility to venture capital in the South is relatively low, but a local
venture capitalist ranked Nashville as second in the South in terms of capital investment
after Atlanta (Lavey, 1996, August 12). The leading venture capital firm is Massey
Burch, which like most Nashville venture capital firms seeks out entrepreneurs in the
health care industry. Most of this risk capital, which amounts to hundreds of millions of
dollars a year, also originates in the health care industry (Nashville Business and
J,tfestyles, 1990b). The rapid growth of the industry led local economic recovery and

produced a new layer of affluence in Nashville:
"After the real estate bust it was expected to take 10 years to climb back, but after
three years, by 1994, the health care industry had bailed us out. Everybody felt
poor after the two main real estate companies went down the drain. Well, health
care was so successful, that by 1994 it had created 200 new millionaires, so there
was a sense of wealth and well-being in the city ...lt was so clear to me how
people felt poor in the late 1980s, but wealthy again in the mid- l 990s. People
were willing to take risks, be more entrepreneurial, which the economy
accommodated, and they were successful" (Sherrard, 2000).

24

Some -data exists to back up that claim, including top-l O rankings in categories such as hest cities for
entrepreneurs in the country and new start-ups (Nashville Arca Chamber of Commerce, 2<XH� Partnership
2000, 2000: Wolf, 1999).
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Shortly after its inception, the economic development organization Partnership
2000 started to position Nashville as a center for health care-related industries. The
Nashville Health Care Strategic Planning Project was formed to develop strategies on
marketing Nashville as a leading health-care city. The goal was to bring more health-care
jobs to Nashville, not primarily providers, but companies that produce a product or
service for a broad geographical area, a national or in some cases even a worldwide
market. A 1994-1995 study conducted surveys, interviews and focus group discussions
with more than 200 people in health care and related fields in the Nashville area and
around the country. The study's conclusions indicated that there was not enough
recognition of Nashville's position in the industry outside of the city, limited cooperation
among companies, not enough financial support for health care, and a lack of diversity in
the industry. The absence of a trade organization was noted, and on a recommendation
from the study, the Nashville Health Care Council was created in 1995 to support the
existing industry, encourage relocations, promote venture capital for the industry, and
foster good public relations for Nashville as a center for the health care industry. Half a
dozen health care executives fronted by venture capitalist Luscious Birch became the
nucleus of what became the Council, but essentially all powerful leaders in the industry
took part in the effort. The Partnership 2000 program provided seed money, but the
Council is financially independent. Twenty-seven founding member companies
committed the initial $810,000 for the operation of the organization. One focus has been
the establishment of an information services sector in the health care industry, often
considered a missing link in the formation of a comprehensive industrial cluster in
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Nashville. Information management companies typically require superior technological
skill, and Nashville lacks a premier technical university.
The health care industry as a whole has been conspicuously absent in city
governance. Unlike the old financial community consisting of a handful of equal players,
there is one dominant health care company in Nashville: HCA. Beyond HCA, there are
smaller companies with professional management staffs. "In many, many cases, these are
people that don't have particularly strong roots in Nashville. They were either recruited to
that job, or they found themselves here like me" (Bredesen, 2001). As part of a young,
volatile industry, they have so far only intermittently formed strong community ties. This
character of the industry, together with its geography, is important in understanding its
civic behavior. The geographical shifts in corporate headquarters location are especially
common in industries with strong tendencies towards mergers and acquisitions, either
because of cost pressures or organizational restructuring.
Moreover, the health care industry is geographically dispersed within Nashville.
While the old business elite was clearly identifiable with downtown, most new industries,
like health care, are not. Health care firms are found in two other areas of
Nashville-foremost in the West End district west of downtown, but a secondary cluster
also exists in the office parks of Brentwood25 . The corporate geography is distinct and, at
least in the past, distance is almost prohibitive of interaction with the old elite. Phil
Bredesen says of the downtown establishment centered around Chamber of Commerce:
"I started a company of my own in 1980 two miles from downtown or so. [There] didn't

25 The location of health care finns in Nashville is detennincd by using the Nashville Health Care Council's
onlinc membership list. The location of 209 out of 289 finns could he identified.
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seem to be room for somebody like me; a young CEO out on West End Avenue" (2001).
With the health care industry increasingly suburban, there may also be a decrease in
opportunities for inter-personal contacts detrimental to new institution-formation that has
the capacity to pool resources from disparate branches of Nashville's corporate world.
Not only are many companies found outside Nashville proper, but new wealth has created
its own residentia] areas outside Davidson county. This trend is particularly reflected in
the fast-paced development of affluent Williamson County (Johansson, 1998, October).
Such a evolution has the capacity to introduce intra-metropolitan fragmentation of
interests not found earlier in Nashville, where previously only branch-plant
manufacturing was located outside Davidson County. Yet, the industry has potential to
increase involvement over time. There is a distinct place-based interdependency in the
industry that relies on skill, innovation, and cross-fertilization of ideas that is unique to
Nashville.
There are some signs that the money of the health care industry has started to
influence Nashville governance, although much of it can so far be attributed to
individuals like Thomas Frist, Jr. rather than a systematic industry effort. On his
initiative, the Frist Foundation started in the 1980s as a corporate foundation branch of
HCA. The Frist Foundation quickly became the largest foundation in Nashville and has
assumed a leading position in the local non-profit society. It started supporting worthy
but relatively inconsequential projects, such as the newly-opened Nashville Zoo, United
Way, and Cheekwood, a Belle Meade arts center. More recently, the Frist Foundation is
stepping up from giving to existing institutions and organizations to projects that have
potential city-forming character. The best example is the establishment of a downtown art
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museum, the Frist Center of Performing Arts; such a facility had been on Nashville elite's
wish-list for decades.
Thomas Frist also played a leading role when the operation of the city-owned
General Hospital was transferred from Vanderbilt University to the traditionally African
American Meharry Medical College, a move that was applauded as race sensitive and the
right thing to do. The issue also received support from the Chamber of Commerce, which
pursued the issue through a committee led by Ben Rechter. The Chamber saw it not only
an important reform in local health care, but also a step towards improving race relations
"that could have a positive effect in how Nashville can compete in the world, how we
appear to the outside, and how we become a more diverse and harmonious city" (Hunt,

The other two major foundations in Nashville are the Community Foundation and
the Memorial Foundation. The Community Foundation, established in 1991, received
over $6 million in HCA stock from Clayton McWhorter, a health care executive and the
second individual who has been active in local elite life, and is possibly headed toward
"the Bredesen route" (i.e. leaving the health care industry for a political career as a
Democrat). The Memorial Foundation also has ties to the health care industry and was
created when a local hospital-Nashville Memorial Hospital-was sold.
In some cities, foundations or similar non-profit organizations are involved in
strategic urban development. These types of organizations frequently have the resources
The hospital move may have been triggered by Meharry president David Satcher, later the U.S. Surgeon
General. who in a spL'CCh to the husincss community pointed out that the city's leadership had once saved it
from becoming another Binningham (Carey. 2000).
lb
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to observe and act on the larger issues in a city. They are often tools for the local elite to
influence a city's direction in an organized way. Historically, foundations have not
played an active role in Nashville. The three foundations mentioned here, although the
largest in the city, are recent creations and are relatively small, comparatively speaking.
The main reason why an otherwise well-monied town27 like Nashville lacks established
foundations is that Vanderbilt University is very efficient in raising money among their
alumni. Bronson Ingram raised half a billion dollars for Vanderbilt during a fund-raising
drive between 1992-1995 (Wood, 1996, June 6). Also, fund-raising activities in Nashville
for national political candidates reach sums well above virtually every other city in the
country. Without doubt, this limits available money for civic projects in Nashville and
restricts the elite's ability to shape the city in accordance to their beliefs and wishes.

7.2.3 Culture, power, and the Nashville elite

Judging from the events described so far, it is apparent that Nashville was dramatically
changing, not only economically, but also culturally. The civil rights movement ended
the era of inward-looking Southern cities that placed a very high value on family
connections within the city. The civil rights movement liberated Nashville from this
walled mentality and allowed it to be integrated with the rest of the country (even if
vestiges lingered for decades in the shape of school busing; see Chapter 10). Many

27

In 2003, Nashville ranked as the seventh most philanthropic city in the U.S. as measured hy share of
disposable income donated to charity (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 2003).
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perceived liquor-by-the-drink in the late 1960s as a cultural dividing point. With Sunbelt
prominence came demographic changes-newcomers were moving to town 28 •
"All ofus that came into Nashville had different ideas that those that existed here.
We simply had different experiences, where we lived, what we did. The people in
Nashville were very open to taking newcomers in, but [the city] needed a change.
You could almost see it and smell it ifyou were looking around and [being]
involved in social and economic activities around town, you could easily tell what
was happening" (Rechter, 2000).
As an immigrant during the 1970s, Rechter is self-reflective when he says that
newcomers had been attracted to Nashville because a good quality oflife, but yet viewed
Nashville as provincial. Even ifthat was in many ways true, he also lauds a new
generation ofNashvillians as open-minded, less confined by old structures, and eager for
new people to participate in civic and economic affairs. Newcomers, both business
owners relocating and people moving into management positions ofolder companies,
were creating a leadership change (Hunt, 2000). The main new wealth-creating industries
were health care and real estate. Manufacturing was also more dispersed in the
metropolitan area. "You had a lot more people who had real economic clout in their
hands that had no idea who Bronson Ingram was" (Simpkins, 2000). The ''new money" is

28

Census data shows that the immigration rate in Nashville, as measured by those moving into the city
from previous residences outside the MSA, has remained relatively high for a long period of time, which
has an accumulative effect of demographic change. In the 1960 census, 16.9 percent were newcomers, in
J 970 14.8 percent, in 1980 15.5 percent, and in 1990 18.3 percent. There also appears to be a socio
economic component to immigration where outsiders move into relatively affluent neighborhoods. This is
particularly noticeable for immigrants from outside the census designated South. In 1960, the correlation
hctw<.,-cn non-Southern immigration level and income level on the census tract level was 0.499 and in 1970
0.228. Correlation between immigration level and Southern immigration was positive but more modest:
0. 192 in 1960 and 0. I 89 in 1970.
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also "more likely to be concerned with the local school system than ...cracking into the
old guard" (DuBose, 1994, February 17, p. 16).
The newfound willingness of the existing structure to accept newcomers, as
reflected in Rechter's comment, resulted in the creation of a new organization in 1975,
Leadership Nashville. As pointed out earlier, the Watauga Group was behind the
initiative. Leadership Nashville's basic purpose is to invite community leaders to take
part in the organization, and attend a series of seminars on local government, politics, and
civic affairs. A class of 40 meets once a week to discuss various issues over a 10-month
period. Leadership Nashville is generally considered successful in socializing people into
leadership positions with a broad sense of place and commitment to the city. It is
"probably considered one of the most successful leadership organizations in the country,
and clearly played a part in developing leadership in the city," says Sherrard (2000).
The changes in Nashville cannot be detached from developments in the South.
Nashville was situated well for growth; indeed, its location played a major part in the
growth in the auto industry. The service economy was a combination of homegrown
industries and the migration of wealth. Yet, the feeling was that Nashville had a potential
that was not realized, but things were ready to happen (Rechter, 2000). It was a Southern
city with some good resources, but at that time was not a wealthy community per capita.
"You had a Southern culture that was laid back, slow talking and moving. You
didn't have an environment that was conducive to promoting a lot of vision ... I
think all that has changed now...There are a lot of good people spending time
trying to find resources and answers, and that's where change will come from"
(Simpkins, 2000).
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Rechter (2000) found a receptive audience in business circles for a focus on
economic development and regional issues, and he ties that attitude to broad, even
evolutionary community changes, using the metaphor of "going from a teenager to an
adult." This is virtually identical to the idea of the city's coming of age used by Squires
(1996) to describe Nashville's post-WWII political history. The general idea that
underlies such a position is, to paraphrase a commonly-held local sentiment, that "ten
people can't rule this city anymore."
As Nashville was immersed by cultural changes with new people coming into the
community and the loss of old institutions, there was no "naturally anointed" local
leadership, as Phil Bredesen puts it; and when Bredesen ultimately was elected as mayor
in 1991, he exploited the power vacuum. Bredesen acknowledges a number of factors
that can explain why it was possible for him to be elected. The influence of a small elite,
and, like most people, he mentions the banks and insurance companies, had diminished�
there was no business leadership "wearing the crown of power," and nobody just by
virtue of their position was considered a leader in the community. Management had
become more a professional activity than an entitlement of birth (Bredesen, 2001). There
was Jess emphasis on who they are and their family connections and more emphasis on
management training, a development with parallels between the business and the public
sector. In the past, mayors had deep family roots in the community and their families had
been significant political players.
"There was a natural political class in the same way there was a natural business
class ... Most of the mayors, probably all of the mayors post World War II, came
from the same political [environment]. This was the business side of the river
we're sitting in [downtown], and that was the political side of the river over there
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[in East Nashville]. Of course, J came in with none of those connections
whatsoever" (Bredesen, 2001).

An analysis of the electoral geography of Nashville indicates that Bredesen's
1991 election constituted a clear break in how mayors were elected. A review of earlier
electoral results show that East Nashville politicians like Fulton and Boner had a political
base that was broader than just a few neighborhoods, but machine operations nevertheless
enabled the political landscape to be maintained over time (Nashville Metropolitan
Election Commission, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987). A combination of low turnout, effective
organization, favors to wards, and even resorting to shuttling voters to the polling station
on election day-allegedly a trick of Fate Thomas-usually mobilized enough voters. As
long as the system was powerful and effective, alliances with other groups came easily.
Although Boner had friends in high places, as indicated earlier in Chapter 5.4, it is
incorrect to say that he was the candidate of the wealthy. In fact, the opposite is true. The
1987 mayoral election was one of the closest in Metro history (Boner won 52.5 percent of
the vote compared to Bredesen's 47.4 percent) and voting patterns are geographically
quite distinct: working-class and minority-heavy north and east went for Boner and white
middle-class and affluent south and west for Bredesen. The Belle Meade precinct, for
example, voted 78-22 in Bredesen 's favor (Nashville Metropolitan Election Commission,
1987). Traditional notions of how mayors are elected in Nashville still held true at that
time.
Despite the openness in the power structure at the time-Boner discredited,
Thomas in jail, the banks sold, Watauga fading-was Nashville open to an outsider
taking on a leadership role? The outsider/insider issue was manifested in a few ways.
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First, Bredesen had not been substantially involved in community affairs. Bredesen's
view of politics is that any citizen can and should participate. This view is certainly
colored by his position, at least initially, outside the organizations and institutions from
which leaders were normally recruited29 . His substantial economic resources have, of
course, also enabled his view to be heard. Second, he was not a local Nashvil1ian; in fact,
he was a Northerner. The demographic changes were significant enough almost to
neutralize these strikes against Bredesen, who was running against the consummate
insider-Bill Boner, the local Congressman, former high-school basketball coach, native
East Nashvillian who literally had watched and learned from the political ascent of one of
the neighborhood sons, Richard Fulton.
After losing to Boner in 1987, it was almost a foregone conclusion that Bredesen
would ascend to the mayor's position. He was everything that Boner was not, which was
exactly what Nashville wanted in 1991. His core constituency was not necessarily
different four years later, but his appeal had broadened considerably. In 1991, he handily
won with 70.3 percent of the vote over Betty Nixon, a Vanderbilt-area councilwoman and
neighborhood activist. Nixon only won 18 out of 164 precincts, most of them located in
African-American neighborhoods to the north and to the south of downtown (Nashville
Metropolitan Election Commission, 1991). In the changing political winds of the early
1990s in Nashville, the black community had lost its role as an important component of
the winning coalition of the political power structure that had existed for a long time.
19

At the time of his second mayoral candidacy, Bn.. -descnwas less of an outsider, holding board
memberships at United Way, a prominent local private school, and the Nashville Symphony, as well as
founding programs for the homeless. I le had also established a relationship with the Tennessee Democratic
Party.
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Most people describe Bredesen in similar ways: a man of energy and intelligence,
but not necessarily a natural politician. He is not very comfortable with small talk, but is
a goal-oriented businessman-politician focused on the broad tasks of moving the city
forward, with less interest in the day-to-day management of Metro government. Bredesen
came to Nashville in 1975, following his wife who got a Nashville job. Equipped with a
Harvard degree, Bredesen was successful in the health care industry, eventually founding
new companies, such as HealthAmerica and Coventry. In 1986 when he sold Coventry
for a handsome profit, he decided to run for mayor without having previously been
actively involved politically or in civic organizations. Since his first mayoral run,
Bredesen had strong backing from the Tennessean (if nothing else, because of
Siegenthaler's antipathy towards Boner) and from the weekly Nashville Scene (whose
political commentator Phil Ashford eventually became Bredesen's senior policy advisor).
Bredesen reigned unchallenged, both in elections and in policy formation, for a
long time. The last few years, however. Bredesen came back to a city after a failed first
attempt at the governorship, and to a Council more prone to challenge his policy
hegemony. Initially considered harboring "liberal leanings" by local media (Ashford,
1990b ), Bredesen's early reputation as a liberal was later revised. His capital projects
were decidedly "tax-and-spend" but hardly embodied a progressive social agenda.
Bredesen certainly played a formidable role in Nashville's repositioning as a dynamic,
active, high-profile city (see Chapters 8-10). This repositioning did not come without a
price tag. The final tally of public investment beyond operational cost amounted to
approximately $400 million during Bredesen's eight years (Garrigan, 1999, September
16).
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The post-Bredesen period after 1999 indicated both continuity and some change. In an
open three-person race, Bill Purcell, the current mayor, best represents continuity after
Bredesen. A Philadelphia native elected to the Tennessee state legislature from his East
Nashville district, Purcell's election was far from the return of the East Nashville
machine. More than anything, Purcell's political career reflects the changing
demographics of Nashville. The east side is now gentrifying, a demographic movement
that Purcell is part of. Although his previous position as majority whip in the state
legislature gave him a high profile job with strong connections to labor unions, as elected
mayor he found his support predominantly among the middle class, an electoral
continuation of the Bredesen years and another sign that political regime changes in the
city appears durable (Nashville Metropolitan Election Commission, 1999). Figure 7.3
shows that Purcell's support was particularly strong in upper middle-class West Meade,
in the urban neighborhoods around Vanderbilt, and in parts of East Nashville. Purcell's
leading opponent was Richard Fulton, who decided on a final run at public office. His
community base was clear: East Nashville and the city's black neighborhoods. His failure
to win, despite a formidable network, monetary contributions from old elite friends
(Fulton was able to raise more money in Belle Meade than the other candidates), and
front-runner status throughout the campaign, depended largely on the lack of support in
West Nashville. Neither did he command the same backing from unions and the political
establishment as formerly. The most common explanation heard after the election was
that Fulton's old political style was perceived as out-of-sync with the new Nashville.
Fulton's micro-management approach to city politics and his habit as mayor of
employing friends was highlighted in the campaign (Sullivan, 1999, August 3). A third
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candidate, Ben West, son of the fonner mayor, also mounted a credible campaign. The
moderate-to-conservative Democrat had suburban appeal, a pro-business attitude, and
support from real estate and the descendants of the old Garner Robinson machine, but
lagged significantly in more urban areas. Purcell's first tenn was characterized by a
continuous neighborhood turn in local politics and less emphasis on entrepreneurialism.
He was recently re-elected to a second tenn.

7.3 Reforming the Chamber of Commerce

History has not been kind to the Nashville Chamber of Commerce as it existed before
1990. It represented a large numbers of businesses30, but power was, by all accounts,
strongly centralized. Few people offer a favorable rating� instead it has been described as
a "good old boys" network, or more colorfully, "downtown plutocracy nonsense." Ben
Rechter (2000) is very explicit:
"The Chamber was just downtown business people, and it was mostly the banks.
It was a very closed group, it was incestuous in every way that you could say, it
was an archaic form of governance. The leadership never changed, the people
involved never changed, the people they hired never changed. Somebody had to
die before they got a new executive director.. .It was not marketing or being very
aggressive in economic development. ..There wasn't any accountability involved
in anything that was going on."
Any outsider, somebody relocating to Nashville or even business people
representing smaller local companies, had a hard time penetrating the organization.
"There were no chairs leading to the leadership. If you came in to the city, you could be

10

The NashvilJc Chamhcr had the 6th largest mcmhership in the country despite its modest position in the
I 990urhan hierarchy (I Junt, 2000). It currently has a roster of 4,300 husincss members.
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the chair of five committees and work your tail off, you'd hit a glass ceiling where you
could not go above that if you hadn't been picked and chosen by the leadership of the
Chamber" (Simpkins, 2000). Phil Bredesen as a newcomer tried to make inroads, but
found the organization inefficient and socially closed, and he did not care much for them
at the time. There was a lack of activity in the things that chambers traditionally do
best-recruiting industry and promoting the city. The Chamber was not adequately
organized as a force to spearhead economic development. When that became a major
issue, it was not surprising that the organization came under some pressure.
Even if the Chamber itself is now criticized, most people speak favorably of the
longtime executive officer, Eddie Jones. Jones had been the executive director the
Chamber for two decades when he resigned for an ill-fated mayoral campaign in 19873 ·1.
His successor at the Chamber was Keel Hunt, recruited from Republican Governor
Lamar Alexander's office. The Chamber's chainnan of the board at the time was Bronson
Ingram, an extremely wealthy and powerful member of the business elite and the man
behind the appointment of Keel Hunt, which gave him a powerful position within the
Chamber. In fact, his position was too powerful, according to some--"people didn't want
to dance to Bronson's tune. There were various uprisings of independence" (Simpkins,
2000). Clearly this was a time of debate, discontent, and rethinking within the Chamber.
Hunt was fired after only three years following Ingram's departure as chairman of the
board. That the organization needed a change was an opinion shared by all, from rankBusiness had also noticed that the political regime as it had existed in Nashville for decades was coming
to an end: in search for a new arrangement, they tried to run their own candidate. l lowever, the limited
influence of business interests in clccloral politics was evident when the lack of puhlic support made sure
that Jones' candidacy ended long before election day.
31
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and-file members all the way up to the leadership. Hunt (2000) says (possibly an ex post
facto opinion revision) that it was clear that Nashville was changing, the structures had to
change in response-for example, with an emphasis on small businesses and more
minority business in the circle of decision-makers. But some hard feelings lingered: "The
transition is never amicable. There were a lot of people involved. They don't. .. easily
give up that power base" (Harris, 2000).
The Chamber's localist faction, which among others now included businessman
Richard Fulton, regarded outsiders with suspicion. Symptomatic of the change in power
structure, the localist faction's candidate for Executive Vice President lost to a
newcomer, Mike Rollins (Dobie, 1990b). While Eddie Jones had deep local roots and a
local viewpoint, Rollins was an up-and-coming member of the National Chamber of
Commerce Association, and part of a new and younger generation. Rollins attracted a
new breed of people into the Chamber. Young people had a chance to participate in what
became an evolutionary process over several years. Simpkins does not hesitate to call it a
democratization process, and in that assessment he is not alone. Virtually all observers
agree on the nature of the organization after that point: "open," "broad-based,"
"inclusive," and "more democratic" are words and phrases echoed repeatedly. While
Jones reported to "a distinct group of people ...Rollins has a much broader constituency
that he talks to" (Sherrard, 2000).
After the goal of broadening the base had been set, the first step was to forge new
relationships with those alienated from the organization. Bud Wendell, CEO of Gaylord
Entertainment, was one of the critics of the old Chamber. He became actively engaged
and could establish connections with the music industry. Ben Rechter, who had been one
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ofbusiness leaders criticizing the Chamber from the outside, eventually became president
ofthe organization. The new 1991 chairman banker Bob McNeilly was very open in his
statements on diversity and broad-based representation within the organization,
something the media interpreted as indicative ofthe social changes ofthe city's business
elite (Dobie, 1991, April 8). Both minorities and women have assumed leading positions.
Margaret Salle, leader ofa company called Corporate Child Care and a Lamar Alexander
associate, is a former chairperson. So is African-American Samuel Howard, CEO ofthe
Xantus Corporation, a Nashville health care company. The chairman's role has also been
awarded to at least two leaders ofpublic and non-profit entities: Craven Crowell ofTVA
and Joe Wyatt, Chancellor ofVanderbilt University. Joe Wyatt's tenure as chairman in
1995 also coincides with the Chamber's emphasis on improving public education (see
Chapter 10). The Chamber's by-laws were revised to encourage a leadership group as
diverse as possible. Chairmen at the chamber are no longer appointed by the fonner
chairman, but a committee. Small businesses were encouraged to take part, countering
the traditional domination oflarger businesses before that; in fact, halfofthe board today
represents small business interests.
Another interest group previously slighted by the Chamber was corporations in
the metropolitan region outside Nashville. The Chamber had a reputation for only
representing downtown business; but with settlement and economic geography in Middle
Tennessee taking an increasingly dispersed form, the Chamber reacted, albeit rather late,
by broadening itselfgeographically. Contributions today come from corporations in
many counties, but even ifthere is more MSA-wide cooperation within the Chamber than
there used to be, the regionalization goal of Partnership 2000 was more ambitious than
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what could be accomplished. While counties surrounding Nashville recognize that they
do not necessarily compete with Nashville in a broad sense, notions of cooperation often
come in second in the daily quest for improved tax base.
The changing nature of the Chamber does not mean, however, that some of the
old institutions abandoned the Chamber. Banks retained involvement and continue to be
major financial supporters of the Chamber, as they are still financially impacted by how
well the market area they serve is performing economically. Banks, regardless where they
are headquartered, will continue to be institutionally involved in local markets, but
beyond remaining individual ties, the role is likely to be as a financial contributor rather
than as policy-leader. As a leading member of the growth machine, their role can be
expected to decline.
Both local government and the Chamber like to portray their current relationship
as a strong partnership. The Chamber's agenda is broader than previously, now including
social, economic and educational issues, and from that perspective acts as an advocacy
group. Earlier, the business way of creating influence was based on ad-hoc involvement
and political expediency. Now, the interaction is different in character. The Chamber
supplies voting records of Metro Council candidates on "pro-business issues" to area
companies. Annual riverboat tours on the Cumberland are meant to bring Council
members and committee chairs of the Chamber, and policy interaction, closer together.
The Chamber's staff has been very visible at the Courthouse, lobbying for downtown
arena funding and public tax abatements for HCA. The Chamber's efforts are working:
leaders admit that the Chamber has been known for effectively advocating the
perspective of the business community in local public policy. Moreover, the two have
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become more financially intertwined. Metro government usua11y contributes to
Partnership 2000 and the Sport Council, another division of the Chamber. This is in
addition to longstanding contracts such as the Convention and Visitors Bureau, a quasi
governmental entity with a $9 million annual budget that has been operated by the
Chamber since 1973.
Amicable business-government relations were ensured by the election of Phil
Bredesen as mayor. Business leaders were very pleased with his abilities as well, and
Bredesen was greatly sympathetic toward all activities of Partnership 2000--the
association has been described as a close working relationship (Sherrard, 2000). The
Chamber leaders were more comfortable with somebody with a business background like
Phil Bredesen. He was "one of their own, and they ... can talk to him as a CEO talks to
another CEO" (Cate, 2001). Business perceives the time period as one of great synergy
involving the democratization of the Chamber, the resources of Partnership 2000, and the
presence of a new mayor. "Bredesen was a breath of fresh air; he was rich, honest, and
smart." He was a dynamic politician who stepped into a city with "a lot of resources
already there. He wielded those in a way that was almost unbelievable... Partnership 2000
and the Chamber were really like putting fertilizer on the earth." (Simpkins, 2000). The
economic development director at the Chamber adds: "Bredesen is probably, and I have
worked with a lot of politicians over the last 40 years, the most effective politician for
growth that I have ever worked with. And I have worked with seven governors and five
mayors. It was amazing that he could even get elected in Nashville because he is from
New York" (Harris, 2000).
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7.4 Partnership 2000: Joining the economic development game

The emergence of a new institutional framework in the early 1990s, centered around the
public-private economic development organization Partnership 2000, is possibly the most
important component of Nashville's local mode of regulation. (The organization was
recently renamed Partnership 2010, but for consistency, I refer to it as Partnership 2000,
the name by which it has been known for most of its existence, throughout the
dissertation.) The importance of public-private partnerships in Nashville, as well as in
many other cities, represent a shift toward privatization of planning along the lines of
post-Fordist ideology in an era when federal involvement is reduced. A cooperative
consensus between business leaders and politicians can be found in Nashville resembling
an entrepreneurial regime with a mayor, Phil Bredesen, coming from the business
community, and Partnership 2000, a branch of the Chamber of Commerce. This is where
entrepreneurial city governance is explicitly connected with the framework of the post
Fordist paradigm as well as the local urban regime theories. In many ways there is
nothing unique about Partnership 2000-it operates like other public-private partnerships
found in countless cities. It is more private than public and its aim is to promote
Nashville in a broad sense. In order to understand the role of Partnership 2000, we must
investigate how it was created, why was it created, what objectives were present at the
creation, and how these objectives have been implemented.

7.4. I Creating Partnership 2000
The two issues of reforming the Chamber of Commerce and initiating an economic
development program in Nashville emerged the same time. The connecting of these
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questions was logicat the lack of economic development strategy was one of the
criticisms lodged against the Chamber, along with the lack of pluralism within the
organization. As the 1980s were coming to an end, the presidency of the Chamber was in
the hands of bankers and insurance CEOs: James Carrol of American General and his
successor, John Clay of Third National Bank. During their tenure, a group had fonned
challenging the Chamber hegemony by assuming some of the functions that ought to be
in the domain of the Chamber. They felt left out of the leadership process, but had
enough political clout to exercise power independently instead of direct engagement
, within the Chamber. The leader was Ben Rechter, businessman and president of Rogers
·I>·

Group Investments, a multi-million dollar holding company. Rechter came to Nashville
from Indiana, expanding a family business and taking advantage of the opportunity for
new development in the South. The core of the business was raw material and
infrastructural development, especially state-financed road construction. The group had
raised some money from regional constituents, but most capital came from Rechter's own
deep pockets. They planned to fonn a "citizens chamber of commerce" and start an
economic development effort. They represented small and medium-size businesses with,
as Rechter puts it, an understanding for regional development. The economic
development efforts at the state level or in Middle Tennessee were not very aggressive�
none of it was properly financed, nor was it planned well with a defined long-tenn
strategy.
Chamber President Clay approached Irby Simpkins, editor and co-owner of the
Nashville Banner, to lead a new economic development organization as a response to
Rechter's group. As a newspaper owner, Simpkins occupied a strong position within the
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Chamber and had a strong economic development incentive. The Banner had suffered a
decline in circulation since Simpkins bought it and became editor, from about 86,000 in
1979 to 66,000 in 1988, only half of the Tennessean 's numbers. Despite a joint
agreement with the Tennessean in which the Banner's advertising, distribution and
production was controlled by the Tennessean, media analysts suggested that a recession
could further diminish the Banner's profit, as the second newspaper in a city traditionally
suffers during an economic decline (Hood, 1988, November 21 ). The Banner's prosperity
was also limited by its afternoon paper status when the national trend favored morning
papers32. Simpkins had been member of a Vanderbilt-led task force to study local
economic development strategies. The study showed an uneven local economy, a
struggling education system, and a shortage of skilled people to fuel future growth.
Simpkins contacted Rechter, his longtime friend, and suggested the groups should pool
resources as their core economic objective was identical. This understanding was the
catalyst for Partnership 2000, but both sides agree that cooperation did not come easy
"because the Chamber was very focused on itself' (Simpkins, 2000).
Simpkins hired a consulting firm from Atlanta, National Community
Development Services (NCDS), to investigate the possibility of raising money within the
business community in Nashville to fund a new economic development initiative
affiliated with the Chamber of Commerce. As opposed to earlier development initiatives,
what Simpkins had in mind was a public-private partnership also supported by the Metro
government. In some ways, Partnership 2000 replaced Nashville Plus, a Nashville

:u The Banner finally folded in 1998.
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marketing plan from the Chamber that was in effect from the mid-1970s to the mid1980s, although Partnership 2000 was far broader in scope and scale. Simpkins and the
Banner footed the bill for the consultants, as the Chamber's board continued to be

skeptical. In June and July of 1989, NCDS conducted more than 50 interviews among the
business elite to gauge the need for a focused development agenda and the willingness to
fund such an effort. A fundraising goal was set at $4 million based on the interview
responses. The general opinion that emerged was that the Chamber was not as efficient as
it should be. The NCDS study gave the Chamber's overall performance a grade of six on
a ten-point scale (Brayton, 1989, September 4). The critique of the effectiveness of the
Chamber was one of the things that led to the resignation of the organization's highest
executive officer, Keel Hunt, in August 1989 (see also Chapter 7.3).
Rechter was adamant that the condition for cooperation would involve greater
changes in Chamber governance: "radical changes, not just tweaking the edges" (2000).
Simpkins persisted to convince the Chamber that the best course of action was to engage
more people in the process, and he found several individuals within the Chamber of the
same mindset. The first step toward a solution was a meeting with all interested parties.
At Beersheba Springs, a Cumberland Plateau retreat, a meeting took place with a
facilitator where diverse views were voiced on how the future of Nashville should look.
Obviously the Chamber had an organization in place that could incorporate an economic
development effort, but the question was: would that effort be politically feasible? The
Chamber board continued to be reluctant to match the money from the Rechter group.
The media started to report on the internal turmoil, and "the Chamber board didn't like
the press that was going on because it looked like it would usurp their authority. This
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democracy was a little unattractive to them, because they liked the way it had been the
last 50 years" (Simpkins, 2000). But with compromises on both sides and commitments
from key leaders in the Chamber to democratize the organization apart from Partnership
2000, the plans could proceed. To make a clean start, the Simpkins plan called for an
organization separate, but affiliated with the Chamber� but with the changes in leadership
and institutional governance, Partnership 2000 eventually became directly integrated into
the Chamber organization with Simpkins as its chairman.
Disagreements between the civic community at large and business interests,
especially neighborhoods protesting developments dear to the Chamber such as
infrastructure and airport expansion, became a significant hindrance to economic
development. Together with the economic downturn, this discord gave impetus to
Partnership 2000. So when the fundraising started, the business community was eager to
contribute. The banks continued to be the primary funding source. Once the largest local
corporations committed, about 100 to 150 smaller businesses followed. Direct costs
intended to create indirect benefits are harder for small companies to absorb; but
interestingly, Rechter's experience was that businesses were willing to listen, understand,
and participate because <?f. rather than in spite of, his position as a relative newcomer less
attached to entrenched power structures.
As the publisher of Nashville Banner, Irby Simpkins was a high-profile opinion
maker. His leadership in Partnership 2000 made it vulnerable to critique as just another
project of the usual business oligarchy. After some discussions with real estate developer
Nelson Andrews and Gaylord CEO Bud Wendell, the administrative leadership of the
Chamber. Simpkins left the leadership position of Partnership 2000. The young lawyer
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Tom Sherrard, a civic activist and elected member of the Chamber board since 1989, had
participated in the Partnership 2000 strategic planning teams with 30 to 40 other people
to put the initiative in place. Wendell, the new chairman of the Chamber, joined with
Andrews and Mike Rollins to ask Sherrard to head Partnership 2000 in June 1990.
Sherrard himself was surprised considering his relative youth and inexperience. But
Simpkins (2000) clarified that the initiative had to be depoliticized: "we needed a much
more 'vanilla' kind of profile in the community for subsequent leaders so we could get
about the business of raising money and put some of this controversy behind us."
Partnership 2000 was launched in the spring of 1990 with a four-year plan and
funds that had grown to $6 million, exceeding the original goal. Partnership 2000 was not
conceived as a ready-to-implement plan, but instead as a dynamic process with certain
general objectives. These general objectives included improving the relationship between
business and government to promote economic development, organizing support for
public education within the business community, explaining the importance of economic
development to the community, and recruiting new industries, as well as aiding existing
businesses in Nashville. The breadth of these developmental objectives led to the
perception that the effort lacked focus, which was a common critique in the program's
early stages. As a development organization, Partnership 2000 had a rocky media start.
The open-ended nature of the process led the media to portray it as lacking in focus.
According to the media, the visioning process was slow and the promised initiative would
not materialize--perhaps it was doomed to become just another shelved plan (e.g. Dobie,
1991, April 18). But with continuous process-based involvement, Partnership 2000 soon
gained broad support, at least among business interests. Selling the strategic plan to
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Nashville was equally important as recruiting new businesses to the area. It was argued
that "Partnership 2000 should reach the soul of the community and provide residents a
'positive vision of where we are going"' (Simpkins quoted in Brayton, 1989, October 2).
Compared to similar efforts around the country, those involved believe
Partnership 2000 to be very successful, among the top three efforts of its kind in mid
sized cities on the basis of business recruiting, money raising, and participatory levels
and status within the local business community (Rechter, 2000). In contrast to previous
arrangements, Partnership 2000 is a relatively diverse and democratic institution with a
decentralized system where chairpersons of subcommittees within Partnership 2000 had
real power.

7. 4. 2 Implementing Partnership 2000
Partnership 2000 was originally intended to be an independent organization. It is now,
however, the Chamber's economic development arm. It is financed in four-year segments
with the third cycle currently at its end. The funding for the 1998-2002 period was $8.2
million (Harris, 2000). In the commodified language of the Chamber, money is spent on
two things: "improving the product," and "selling the product." Improving the product
includes initiatives on public education, government-business relations, and building
business infrastructure and institutions. Selling the product is city marketing and
industrial recruiting. The effort was to present Nashville as a community that would be
inviting to people with businesses located in large cities, the Rustbelt, and California.
Many of these activities took place earlier, but not in an integrated, comprehensive, and
well-financed way. In the marketing arena, the Nashville boosters started from scratch.
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While peer cities such as Memphis and Charlotte spent $2-3 million in advertising and
promotional activities, the Nashville budget was only $250,000 in 1989 (Rogers, 1990a).
Now, Nashville's effort only falls behind competitors that are significantly larger, such as
Atlanta and Dallas (Harris, 2000). "We marketed on a one-on-one basis ... where we
literally went to companies in cities around the country and told them about Nashville"
(Sherrard, 2000).
The major financial sponsors of Partnership 2000 are called lead investors (Table
7.2). They commit money for an entire four-year period. Below the lead investors, there
are numerous small financial supporters as well. On the public side, Nashville Metro
Government is a lead investor. Much of the interaction between Partnership 2000 and the
local government is coordinated by the Mayor's Office of Economic Development under
the direct supervision of the mayor. Additional independent public contributors include
the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority and two local/regional utility companies,
Nashville Electric Service and the Tennessee Valley Authority. On the business side, all
banks represented locally are consistent contributors. Overall, private money finances
Partnership 2000 to 90 percent (Harris, 2000), making the partnership much more private
than public. BellSouth, Gaylord Entertainment, and the Tennessean are all lead investors
during the two latest cycles.
Some corporations have dropped out of the leading group for various
reasons-American General followed a long-standing trend of disengagement in
Nashville, Nissan's involvement was largely tied to one individual, and Shoney's and
Service Merchandise due to business misfortune. On the other hand, the entertainment
complex centered around Gaylord was more financially supportive in the late 1990s as
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Table 7 .2 Lead investors in Partnership 2000.

Industry

1994-1998 lead investors

1998-2002 lead investors

Banks

• First American
• First Union
•Sun Trust
•Union Planters
•Nations Bank

•AmSouth
• First Union
•SunTrust
•Union Planters
• Bank of America

Government

•Nashville/Davidson County
Metropolitan Government
•Metropolitan Nashville
Airport Authority
•Nashville Electric Service
•Tennessee Valley Authority

•Nashville/Davidson County
Metropolitan Government
•Metropolitan Nashville
Airport Authority
•Nashville Electric Service
•Tennessee Valley Authority

Music/Entertainment

•Gaylord Entertainment

•Gaylord Entertainment
•Nashville Predators
•The Nashville Network/Country Music
Television

Telecommunication

• BellSouth

•BellSouth

Newspaper

•The Tennessean

•The Tennessean

Insurance

•American General

Manufacturing

•Nissan Motor Co.

•MagneTek

Retail

•Service Merchandise

•Dollar General

Health Care

eHCA

Distribution

• Ingram Industries

Non-profits

-------------

•The Frist Foundation

Other service

•Shoney's Restaurants

•Central Parking

Source: Partnership 2000 (1995, 1999).
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were Frist interests (HCA and the Frist Foundation) and newly successful companies led
by dynamic CEOs (Dollar General and Central Parking). But not all leading companies in
Nashville are main contributors to Partnership 2000. Of the top ten non-governmental
companies with headquarters in Nashville, five are not represented in the partnership as
leading investors. Three of them are health care related companies. The city's largest
employer, Vanderbilt University/Medical Center, is not represented. Earlier experiences
show that it is generally difficult to establish institutions that span business, local
government and non-profits (Sbragia, 1990).
Over time, the activities of Partnership 2000 have become more focused. Target
industries with especially strong potential to succeed and bring desired growth to
Nashville are identified. The health care and the music industry were two important
growth areas singled out early as having good growth potential. As new important issues
emerge the developmental focus is always redirected. During the second period, five
target areas were established: education and work force skills, regional cooperation, air
service, professional sports, and the information technology infrastructure. The
organization recently ended its third plan, spanning from 1998-2002 33 • Transportation
and industrial space availability have been recent additional top concerns for Partnership
2000 as Nashville is trying maintain its dominance in the growing urban region. Work
force improvement continued to be a priority for economic development under the third
plan.

33

The last one for which I have collected data.
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Partnership 2000 operates under a strategic plan based on data on comparative
demographic and economic trends supplied by consulting firms. The consultant presents
research material for the Chamber's executive committee, board of directors, and selected
Partnership investors. They direct a course of action, another round of research
determines what businesses and industries will likely grow in the future, and a strategic
plan is formed. Every four years, the Chamber then asks their investors to fund the plan.
Exactly how are these funds spent? During one sample period ( 1994-1996),
Partnership 2000 spent $2,048,000 on marketing (Partnership 2000, 1996a). Half of this
finances communications efforts, which includes advertising campaigns and public
relations efforts. The other million in the marketing fund supports business attraction and
retention. Included here are 30 recruiting trips around the country made by Partnership
staff. Finally, a smaller amount-$697,000-was spent on "making the Nashville region
competitive." This is composed of three approximately equal parts: education initiatives,
supporting the airport authority (which essentially funded their marketing efforts), and
creating an infrastructure for regional economic cooperation.
Despite the regionalization efforts, the list of lead investors suggests a lack of
involvement from regional constituents. One of the hardest goals to implement was the
establishment of a single, consolidated economic development agency for the region with
centralized advertising and promotion. During Sherrard's early tenure, Partnership 2000
did not raise money outside Davidson County in order to solidify support from Nashville
businesses. On the government side, three fringe counties, Williamson, Wilson and
Maury, started economic development programs of their own shortly after Partnership
2000 was initiated. Eager to project a picture of unity, Partnership 2000 depicted those
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moves as a supplement to its own efforts. In truth, cooperation with surrounding counties
has been weak, leading some to question outright the true regional approach of
Partnership 2000 and benefits the efforts have for Metropolitan counties other than
Davidson. Some members of local, non-Nashville Chamber of Commerce organizations
said Partnership 2000 cannot do for them what really needs to be done for the county to
grow economically and be more attractive to industry (Hobbs, 1991, April 1). To combat
these perceptions, Partnership 2000 moved regional cooperation to the front of its agenda
during the second four-year period, and seven surrounding counties agreed to be
partnership investors. "People in the counties were wary of being involved. They thought
they were being taken over. It was a partnership, but we encountered a lot of resistance at
first. After two-three years the barrier broke down" (Sherrard, 2000).
Although Partnership 2000 meets six times a year with other regional actors to
discuss problems and marketing opportunities, its cooperation with these regional actors
remains limited. These participants include Chambers of Commerce of nine surrounding
counties, the marketing division of the State of Tennessee, and the Middle Tennessee
Industrial Development Association, which is sponsored by the electric power
distributors. Only TV A is a lead investor and committed $100,000 a year to the
organization during the second four-year plan. On the private side, few regional
industries been involved in Partnership 2000. In the branch plant automobile industry,
Nissan has been active, but Saturn has not. Nissan's Jerry Benefield headed the
partnership's effort to build a regional task force to address economic development for
Middle Tennessee. But Benefield acknowledges that only modest progress has been
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made, adding that "the counties are usually quite suspicious of what Nashville wants to
do, and they haven't been very cooperative" (Murray, 1994, August 1).
Partnership 2000 is a proven, well-respected program; every four years the
businesses have been supportive and a new plan is funded despite intermittent fundraising
troubles (e.g. American Airlines; see Chapter 9). Participatory practices have also
generated enthusiasm. For example, ambassador's groups entertain and inform people
who come to Nashville for scouting relocation. When these groups were successful,
businesspeople wanted to participate. Partnership 2000 activists often use their positions
as steppingstones to becoming Chamber leaders.
Partnership 2000 itself has also been satisfied with local economic development
during the first half of the 1990s according to their own internal evaluation (Partnership
2000, 1996a). Economic indicators for the city are above or on target. In some important
cases, such as net job growth, Nashville exceeded the Partnership 2000 four-year goal in
only two years. The city also had a more favorable trend in economic development and
population growth than competing cities. Nashville is growing more prosperous, which
ironically has created "strains on business climate" (Ibid.).
In conclusion, Partnership 2000 has emerged as an integral part of how Nashville
business is organized and the function of the city at large. Therefore, the organization has
in effect, become institutionalized. The high rate of implementation of proposals from
Partnership 2000 is a good indication of the importance of the organization and the
impact it has had on the development of Nashville during the 1990s. Its influence has
been strong in, for example, airport, promotional, and educational affairs, which will be
discussed subsequently.
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8. PUTTING THE CITY IN "MUSIC CITY:" POSSIBILITIES AND
LIMITATIONS OF IMAGE REMAKING

The institutional changes documented so far have opened up possibilities for NashvilJe to
more forcefully pursue growth policies. The theme of this chapter is the closer attention
paid to image-making, which represents one of the new policy areas in the theoretical
framework described in Figure 1.3. Image politics is of course not entirely endogenously
determined, but is also an outcome of post-Fordist economic tendencies. Cities are not as
tied to their hinterlands, as dependent on natural resources and manufacturing, or the
Fordist state and federal money as they used to be. No longer are cities cushioned by
these forces, and cities' niche in the urban hierarchy does not provide a stable and
predictable growth environment. Cities are instead thrown into a competitive
environment where the goal is to attract investment. City leaders are always seeking to
improve their cities' position within the system of cities, and therefore "image creation is
central to economic development strategies, especially in cities that aspire to a higher
level [in the urban hierarchy]" (Pagano & Bowman, 1995, p. 47). They have to present a
picture of a growth-friendly environment to pull in increasingly mobile capital as well as
an image of livability to attract a productive labor force. Before addressing the Nashville
case, a description of the underlying components of contemporary urban image-making
should be made.

8.1 The nature of urban image-making

While urban promotion was unsophisticated and piecemeal for a long time, the
development has moved towards more coherent strategies. Place promotion is now a
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fundamental part of guiding city development and an expanding activity (Fretter, 1993).
Holcomb (1994) says that place promotion has become big business, but at the same time
acknowledges "the selling of cities is still in its infancy" (p. 121 ), thus predicting a
tremendous growth in the field.
One way of projecting a favorable image is to stress a unique place identity. There
is a tendency for cities to use generic images on one hand, and on the other, to try to
distinguish themselves, to be different and unique. Familiarity assures investors that the
city is a safe object for investment� that it plays by the rules that everybody follows,
while the unique and place-specific catch attention. This dualism of the generic and
unique produce individual places that nonetheless have strong physical similarities. A
city's image is dependent on the visual impact of its urban environment. The identity of a
city is especially influenced by the visual quality of the downtown area-usually the
most imagable space where the unique is readily observable. From the image-maker's
perspective then, the question of how a downtown should be designed and revitalized is a
concern that extends beyond its relatively confined geography.
A closer look at place advertising reveals that cities stress the generic as often as
the unique and place-specific in representing their assets. Imitation is a safe strategy. A
type of imitation is the use of a relational image (Eyles & Pearce, 1990). Usually, a
relational image is not viewed as desirable and distinct as a non-relational one, and often
associated with second-tier cities. Relational often means lower status, like Nashville's
"the Third Coast" explicitly ranks itself third in the music industry after New York and
Los Angeles. Similarly, "Athens of the South" is also a relational image. Although a
construction often used by cities, the relational image does not create as strong of an
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identity as a non-relational image. In that sense, "Music City" as a place specific, non
relational identity is more attractive than "Athens of the South."
In the post-industrial society, the marketing goal is often reinvention (which is not
directly captured in any of the Nashville slogans). The ultimate objective is to change
people's general perception of the city, although direct place marketing must be satisfied
most of the time with enhancing exposure. In fact, cities may be more successful with
promotional campaigns designed and executed during times of growth and prosperity,
rather than pursuing image reversal amidst post-industrial decline when economic forces
raise formidable obstacles to image rejuvenation (Ward, 1994). However, it takes a
certain level of strategic far-sightedness to pursue image revision and change in
prosperous times that otherwise would suggest a safe strategy that does not deviate from
the status quo.
Social critics view place marketing with an emphasis on the reconstruction of old
images in the post-industrial era as a sign of the times: "The packaged image reflects the
aesthetic taste of the postmodern society, with its eclectic conformity, its commodified
ethnic culture and sanitised classlessness" (Holcomb 1993, p. 142). This implies that the
confonnity of projected images rarely approaches any "real" diversity. Cities "are being
produced as commodities to be marketed rather than as vessels of society" (Holcomb,
1994, p. 117). The critique is reasonable as an exercise in interpretive analysis; however,
marketing is by its very nature a vehicle for commerce, and it is illogical to expect that
promotional material should entail much more than a message designed to help a seller
(the city) find a buyer (investor, resident).
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A more complex situation arises if physical urban redevelopment becomes a
blend between the substantive and the image-dependent. Here, history is commonly
represented in the urban landscape; it can be reconstructed to fit a particular purpose, and
with content selected to represent a particular viewpoint useful to image-makers. Some
see this representation in the urban landscape as a sanitized historical pastiche (Roberts &
Schein, 1993), while others stress that it is in the interest of the elite to incorporate
minority history in a public narrative (Foresta, 1996, April). But as Foresta observes, the
transformation of capitalism can give birth to "many different, competing, and
countervailing place making strategies/' this urban representation does not necessarily
correspond with other cities34 . Representation, or manipulation, of history and culture is
often executed to enhance feelings of a common heritage. Philo and Keams (1993) call
place marketing a subtle form of socialization aiming to convince citizens that they are
have an equal part in something important, and benefit more or less equally from growth
promoting strategies. Such strategies become more and more appealing for the elite in
order to moderate political conflict and enhance local capacities for social and economic
action that further their own notions of progress, but may, at times, also lead to local
tensions and conflict over symbols.
There are solid economic reasons why city officials and business interests are
turning to image politics. When geographical investment options are greater for capital,
more information is required to make the best business decision. What economists call
"imperfect information" characterizes the investment climate, and therefore image

.'4 A similar public nmTativc in Nashville, the walking tour of downtown (swveycd in the fall of 1997),
covers themes ranging from the frontier myth to Music City, hut minority (hlack) history is ahscnt.
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politics become increasingly important. The most direct way of engaging in image
making is advertising. The question is if this type of place marketing is of any
consequence. There is no reason why selling a city should be treated differently than
other products� from the advertising professional's perspective the logic is the same. But
as individuals rarely admit to being influenced by commercial messages, companies
might not be immediately swayed by a city advertisement. The key, however, as in all
advertising, is visibility. So it is reasonable to assume that it does work, just like all
advertising� at least in cases where a clearly defined consumer is targeted and his or her
behavior is well documented by marketing research. Thus, city advertising tends to target
specific groups like relocation experts, corporate decision-makers, tourists, and recent
university graduates.
When selling the city moves beyond this type of direct place marketing, the
audience is broadened to the extent that the control of the image-makers is increasingly
diluted. The images of a city held by any given individual cannot be controlled by one
agent. The increased numbers of media outlets, the latest of them being the Internet,
creates exposure opportunities for cities and an exponential increase in available
information for the receiver. Moreover, different individuals perceive objects in different
ways. So from the perspective of the city official, or any other image-maker, the process
of creating a city image is not an easy task, as images not only change (and change
meaning) over time, but their perception varies among individuals. Images exist that are
multiple and even contradictory, and the complexity of a city must be reduced to a
manageable image. At the same time, the audience is highly differentiated, so the image
maker must produce multiple images of the city. Thus, the city booster must have a firm
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grip on the product and the audience, i.e. what image is being projected and to whom it is
being projected. The diverse audience often limits the aim of image creation to "create
and sustain awareness" (Ashworth & Voogd, 1994).
When scholars have approached the issue of city promotion, they have often
performed various kinds of content analysis of the advertising themes and the images
projected. Short and Kim ( 1998), for example, divide the advertisements of cities into
two basic categories in terms of their slogans and message: business-oriented and quality
of life-oriented. Common themes include pro-business political climate, workforce,
location, high-tech and infrastructure. On the quality of life side, themes include nature
and recreation, weather, cost of living, friendliness, cultural attractions, and historical
heritage. There are, however, fewer case studies directly related to the processes, or the
"machinery" behind image creation. One exception is a cookbook-like overview
providing the essentials of promoting the city (Fretter, 1993). Fretter's recipe for a
successful promotional campaign includes: a shared vision within the city, knowledge of
your own city and what you are promoting, targeting your audience, and the desirability
of a high degree of organization and coordination. According to Fretter, speaking with
one voice is better than multiple and potentially contradictory voices.
In addition to the deliberate, strategic and calculated image generation, there are
other ways in which images are created. Public relations efforts are as essential but not as
well analyzed. This activity is harder to track and does not produce interpretable images.
Particular policies that a city pursues, if they are coherent, consistent and reach a broad
audience via media, will over time change the way a city is perceived. Some cities may,
over time, establish a reputation as business-friendly, and others as livable places whereas
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before they were known as polluted industrial cites (e.g. Pittsburgh and Chattanooga).
However, long-standing images, often tied to a city's economic base, cannot be discarded
instantly. They must be embraced or addressed in a direct or indirect manner-Nashville
as Music City is a case in point here. Cities are inevitably tied to its own historical
progress as well as unpredictable events over which image-makers have no control.
Unfortunately, the level of control over imaging that can be asserted by targeted efforts is
most likely inversely related to the impact level in producing desired perceptions. An
advertising campaign or a new sports stadium reflect the desires of a city, but are
probably less powerful than long-standing associations tied to the city's economic
function. Although such a relationship may be logically assumed, no research addresses
this problem directly. This relationship is conceptualized in Figure 8.1.
Following this model in my Nashville case study, this chapter will consider the
connections between the role of governance change and image-making, the goals of the
urban regime, as well the city's cultural and economic identity. First, I will discuss the
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Figure 8.1 Levels of control and impact of image-making.
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marketing strategies ofPartnership 2000 and look behind the promotional material and
the official image ofNashville it tried to create. The goal is to fi]I the gap in the city
promotion literature identified by Short and Kim ( 1998): "the authorization ofparticular
image, the politics ofimage making, is, as yet, rare1y studied" (p. 60). I will identify the
main players behind the image creation and ask to what degree is there an organized
strategy behind the public image ofNashville. Who is creating images, for what purpose,
and who benefits from the way Nashville is represented? Do conflicts over city
representation exist in the process ofimage creation? What is represented and projected
in Nashville images and what is not? This is followed by an analysis ofhigh profile
development and business recruiting projects from an image perspective-image by
policy in Figure 8.1. A closer look at the changing country music industry and the
cultural context in which it operates also places Nashville's image in a path dependent
context: the close association with country music. I have also assessed the impact ofthese
promotions, policies, and trends on the imagability ofNashville by examining internal
Partnership 2000 documents and by conducting content analysis ofselected national
media. Because this research goes beyond the central analysis oflocal image-making, it
is presented in Appendix 1.

8.2 Partnership 2000 and the Music City strategy

Parallel with the efforts to create Partnership 2000, the Chamber ofCommerce initiated
an image-making process. A 1989 consultant survey done for the Chamber examined
outsiders' perceptions of Nashvi1le. It concluded, to no big surprise, that ifNashville had
a positive image, it was the association with country music. But the image ofNashville
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was also accompanied with a perception of rurality (Duffy, 1997). The city's image was
in some respects interconnected and indistinguishable from Tennessee's. What did
Nashville want to present itself as? The instinctive reaction was to move away from the
traditional stereotype--country music-which by its very definition conveys rurality at a
time when Nashville's goal was to be urbane. During the initial Partnership 2000
brainstorming sessions, other slogans with vague notions of centrality were suggested,
like "The New Beat of the Heartland" (Sherrard, 2000). After a series of suggestions
failed to raise above the banal, the central question was what distinguished Nashville.
After conducting brand testing, country music was the only positive and usable image
associated with Nashville, and the emphasis fell on ''Music City USA" as the slogan for
the city, which had existed for a long time but never adopted officially35. This decision
was certainly reinforced by the recognition of Music City in the survey. It was in fact the
second best-known city label in the country, after New York's "The Big Apple"
(McGraw, 1992), which was a tremendous asset considering how hard it is for cities to
adopt slogans that will not be lost in the chaotic world of messages.
However, there were both positive and negative aspects to Music City USA. The
slogan suggested Nashville is exciting and creative, which is attractive both from a
quality of life perspective and in signifying fertile ground for sophisticated service
industries. It also exaggerated Nashville's weaknesses-the hick town image-a sore
spot that has haunted city boosters for decades. Business Nashville is full of anecdotes

35

The cmTent usage of Music City USA is associated with an announcer at the WSM radio station around
1950. There are, however, references to Music City that date as far hack as the 1870s to the Fisk
University's Juhilee Singers (Feilier, 1998).
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such as this one: "Economic developers called and said 'we want to put a plant in
Nashville, but when you get off the main road, are the streets paved?' We couldn't
believe it, but country music was associated with Appalachia and it didn't seem Nashville
could be a sophisticated place" (Sherrard, 2000). Not that this image problem was new to
the city. The same concerns and the same dilemma regarding Music City has been voiced
by the Chamber and other boosters at least since the 1970s (Ridley, 1995, November 9).
The business community had to come up with a solution of how both to take
advantage of Nashville's association with the music industry and to eventually evade its
inherent limitations. The idea behind the adoption of the slogan Music City USA was to
capitalize on an existing image. From this starting point, the aim was to diversify and
broaden the general perception of the city (McDaniel, 1997). This strategy is logical in
the context of Sunbelt growth, which, for example, is reflected in an upbeat 1978
National Geographic article that portrayed Nashville as affluent and dynamic. The
article's theme was the diversity of the city beyond country music (Kernan, 1978). The
magazine largely repeated the story in 1986 after the Saturn plant helped Middle
Tennessee expand the idea of economic and· cultural diversity (Vesilind, 1986).
Through advertising, Partnership 2000's image building process was in progress.
Aimed squarely at corporate elites, the advertising was placed in magazines like Forbes
and Fortune and depicted Nashville as a corporate city using businesslike images of the
downtown. With the location of an American Airlines hub to Nashville, images of
airplanes were used to convey the message that Nashville was easily accessible and
equipped with excellent transportation. As the strategy suggested, the advertisements
displayed a Music City USA logo at the bottom. The rather generic images of modernity
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displayed a Music City USA logo at the bottom. The rather generic images of modernity
with buildings of glass and steel and airplanes lined up at an airport are aimed at putting
Nashville on the business map. This reflects a building process where new, but rather
simple images are attached to the already established, music-dominated image.
The follow-up process included one-on-one calls to relocation consultants, and
making presentations before business groups around the country in regions of corporate
exodus. One of the first relocation successes was the financial service consulting firm
Deloitte & Touche, which moved its back office functions to Nashville in 1990. Today
the Chamber feels that Nashville probably overattracted back office operations. Together
with Omaha, Nashville became the place where you find more of that type of operation
than anywhere else, says the first Partnership 2000 chairman Tom
Sherrard. Nashville has
�
.

since moved away from that approach, instead focusing on economic activities-a few
service-oriented industries complemented with a healthy number of manufacturing
companies-that have a better capacity to raise the local average income level.
The strategy from the initial campaigns was later refined, but still emphasized the
same theme of image expansion. A successful advertising series launched in 1995 shows
an object easily identifiable with the music industry and underneath it the reader can
catch a glimpse of a product associated with an industry operating in Nashville. In the
picture, the surface layer of the commonly held image of the city is peeled off and below
the reader is encouraged to "Discover the Unexpected" (Figure 8.2). The campaign
included several advertisements based on the same principal concept. A stack of music
sheets reveals a pile of books (the printing and publishing industry), a piano keyboard is
seen on top of windshield wipers (automotive suppliers), and underneath a compact disc,
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Figure 8.2 The "Discover the Unexpected'' campaign. Source: Nashville Area Chamber
of Commerce. Used by permission.
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a Bridgestone-Firestone tire is visible. This is a clever game with shape and form that
reinforces the core message-there is more to Nashville than the music industry; more
than most people think. The goal statement for the ad campaign reads: "Three new ads
[are] designed to generate inquiries among target audiences and industries ... The new
concept repositions the Nashville region as a stronghold for business" (Partnership 2000,
1995). The ads are more targeted than earlier promotions and were placed in industrial

recruitment magazines instead of general interest business magazines36. It is a diversified,
yet focused strategy. Promotion has become more and more specialized. Later, trade
journals serving specific industries such as health care and entertainment were also
targeted. What has taken place is an attempt to completely reshape Nashville's business
image from the bottom up.
The most recent campaign focuses on attracting technology companies
(Partnership 2000, 2000). Especially since Dell computers expanded to Nashville, the
city's strategy has been to address one of the deficiencies in the local economy: the lack
of a computer industry. The new technology campaign has thematic similarities with the
Discover the Unexpected campaign. Now, one tag line is "Arguably, the most popular
instrument in Nashville," accompanied by a picture of a laptop computer. Another ad
states, "These days, being part of Nashville's skilled labor force doesn't necessarily mean
you play guitar," and shows a hand holding a microchip. Again, these ads have been
featured in various business and site selection magazines. In addition, Partnership 2000's
In the 1997-1998 fiscal year, the complete list of publications advertised in include: Area Development,
Business Facilities, E�pansion Management, Plants, Siles, & Parks, Site Selection, Outlook America,
Southem Business and Development, Tennessee Economic Development Guide, and Forhes. Partnership
36

20(X) maintains a list of upcoming cditmial themes for a wide selection of magazines to advertise in the
issues that most likely attract their particular target audience (Partnership 2CX){), 1997, May).
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advertising for the first time not only attempted to attract new investment, but also
recruiting a college educated workforce using, for example, movie screen advertisements
in targeted U.S. cities. The workforce issue is addressed further in Chapter 10.
In most cases an advertising agency is contracted to develop the promotional
advertisements. Only one of the producers of city promotion ads, the Visitors and
Convention Center, uses both an ad agency and produces material in-house. The two-way
communication process always involves a series of meetings between the client and the
ad agency. Like most work of this type, be it consumer products or a city, the sellers and
the professional marketing people develop ideas together. They also rely on national
surveys conducted by a hired research company to detennine what people think about
Nashville and other competing cities, what they read, and where they get their
information in order to fashion the appropriate advertising and public relations effort
(Harris, 2000). In this case, the Chamber of Commerce provides the basic theme-there
is more to Nashville (other than country music) than you would expect. The ad agency
develops design ideas that would best meet the objective in an imaginative and inventive
way. After a mutual discussion on alternatives, a final concept is chosen: for example, the
layered image of the "discover the unexpected" campaign.
Partnership 2000 has also assessed the effectiveness of their advertising
campaigns. The period l 994-1996, which covers the "Discover'' campaign, produced 482
"inquiries" and 283 more serious contacts with businesses called "leads" that can be
attributed to advertising (Partnership 2000, 1996a). On the public relations side,
Partnership 2000 had 209 outside media visits and the organization's staff made 30
recruiting trips around the country. In alJ, 225 relocation prospects visited Nashville, of
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which 71 eventually decided to relocate to Nashville, although Partnership 2000 does not
explicitly tie this to their advertising. Of those 71 companies, 67 were among the six
groups of targeted industries Partnership 2000 focused on during the time period.
Since "Discover" and earlier campaigns, media advertising has decreased. The
first year Partnership 2000 spent $293,300, but by year seven (1996-1997) the advertising
allocation had declined to $164,400 (Partnership 2000, 1997, May). The organization's
public relations plan instead stresses the importance of educating the audience about
Nashville, rather than selling the city to them. Partnership 2000's own analysis points to
outside interest in relocation and awareness of Nashville as a strength. But at the same
time, Partnership 2000 is self-critical. In the organization's public relations plan, the
inevitable mixed message of Music City v. cosmopolitanism is listed under
"weaknesses." Media fragmentation makes messaging harder, and the plan calls the
Music City image "oversaturated." Other negatives include a lack of marketable qualities
that set Nashville apart from competitors and a poor perception of the Nashville school
system. They also noted a declining status for Nashville in various city ratings since the
early 1990s (Partnership 2000, 1997, June).
One recent move in the representation of the city regards the focus on the slogan
Music City USA. As the campaign of broadening the image base has been considered
successful, a need for reconstructing the image has arisen. Conscious moves have been
made to redirect the focus onto Nashville and away from Music City. In newer
advertisements and other forms of logo display, Music City is subordinated to Nash ville
graphically. Note the temporal changes in the logo in Figure 8.3, which is taken from
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Figure 8.3 A change in emphasis away from Music City, as seen in the Chamber of
Commerce logo. Source: Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce. Used by permission.
Chamber employees' business cards. The current logo only alludes to the music industry
with an ambiguous star.
Image-making has become increasingly centralized, directed from Partnership
2000, which depends to a certain degree of consensus in image politics. However, the
attractiveness of the Music City slogan varies among different industries. Presumably,
Gaylord Entertainment is one company that benefits from the extensive use of the Music
City image in advertising. The growing health care industry has expressed feelings that it
is not benefiting from this promotional strategy (McDaniel, 1997); the health care
industry is also the least represented industry in Partnership 2000. Similarly, Vanderbilt
University has been marginally involved in Partnership 2000 (although Vanderbilt
Medical Center has been listed as a "minor investor") with the emphasis on Music City.
Vanderbilt University embodies the other Nashville image-The Athens of the South.
Indeed, the proposal to use Music City USA as the dominant slogan initially met with
some resistance from the old elite: "the Vanderbilts of the world thought it played of
something that didn't capture all of Nashville" (Sherrard, 2000). But despite some
dissatisfaction with the slogan, most of the business establishment has backed the
ubiquitous, but declining, use of Music City USA.
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The shift in strategy at this point was in part due to changing economic
circumstances. By 1997, Nashville had reached an economic plateau (Nashville Area
Chamber of Commerce, 1997b). To continue to spur growth, the Chamber and the
Partnership worked to correct several identified problems affecting the business climate:
eliminating labor shortage by improving the skills of people entering the workforce,
encouraging better government services (i.e. air, highway, and rail transportation, and
crime prevention), and improving financial resources (venture capital and government
investment). These efforts are reflected in Partnership 2000's public relations and image
work. The marketing plan of 1998-2002 stresses workforce recruitment to a much greater
extent than before, and the resulting marketing efforts placed a stronger emphasis on
Nashville's quality of life. The stated strengths of Nashville include an entrepreneurial
culture, acceptance of outsiders, strong name recognition, sports and entertainment in a
dynamic downtown, affordability, and a relatively large number of college students. The
unresolved ambiguity of Music City, however, continues to be a concern even as a partial
shift from corporate recruiting to quality of life marketing is evident. Nevertheless, the
recent Partnership 2000 strategy continues to stress the unique, but through means other
than Music City. The generic messages that most cities rely on-low taxes, light
regulation, moderate climate, nice neighborhoods-will be used sparingly due to their
lack of uniqueness (Partnership 2000, 1998). The marketing goal is instead to have a
message that makes an "emotional impact" on the audience. To do so, Partnership 2000
has devised a strategy focused on a so-called "Unique Selling Proposition" which
emphasizes Nashville's entrepreneurial culture with an open attitude towards both ideas
and people. Moreover, the marketing plan states that public relations tactics rather than
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narrow advertising are effective on decision-makers who develop their attitudes by
dialogue with peers, personal travel experiences, and by articles in media more than
direct advertising material. That said, the plan does not propose to abandon traditional
advertising-it is a "valuable source of leads"-but to broaden city marketing in other
directions (Ibid.).
A handful of other players also promote Nashville through advertising. Major
power companies are usually important in the selling of a place or a region. At least two
reasons contribute to their role in this regard. First, they are firmly attached to place.
Traditionally being a regulated industry, power companies have a service area where they
often occupy a monopolistic market position. Their fortunes are thus closely tied to local
growth, not only through multiplier effects, but also through direct income from increase
in energy demand. The second reason is their size. A power company is often one of the
largest companies in a city, commanding tremendous financial resources. This
combination of local growth dependency and capital strength has made power companies
an important player on the industrial recruiting scene.
The Nashville energy market is divided by the publicly owned Nashville Electric
Service and Nashville Gas, a private company. Nashville Electric Service has been one of
the lead investors in Partnership 2000. However, NES does not spend anything on
promoting themselves and the region directly, according to their development director
(Duffy, 1997). No independent advertising campaign has been launched by Nashville
Electric after 1991 when their efforts were coordinated with Partnership 2000. It is more
efficient "to speak with one voice," (Ibid.) i.e. through the centrally organized campaigns
of Partnership 2000. Their input, as well as the input of the other members of the
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organization, is limited to the marketing committee where the direction of the
promotional campaigns is discussed. Duffy also stresses that from a development
perspective, many factors are more important than generic ads in industrial recruitment
magazines. Targeting specific industries and the ability to present hard data regarding
economic issues, site availability, and tax deals are fundamental to attracting new
business. Good rankings regarding the "business climate" and quality of life in key
business magazines are equally important. By downplaying imagery, Duffy places
advertising in a more modest role for industrial recruitment purposes.
Nashville Gas, the other main power company, occasionally produces advertising
for the national market directed towards industrial location (DiMeola, 1997).
Interestingly, Nashville Gas is not one of the lead investors in Partnership 2000 (although
it is a minor contributor). Their advertising is only in an indirect sense promoting
Nashville, but where to place the ads is carefully researched so as to have the greatest
impact with regards to the specific target audience.
Direct place marketing has two main audiences: relocating businesses and
potential tourists. As in most cities, the entity for marketing Nashville for tourists is the
Convention and Visitors Bureau. Their promotion activities span a wide range of
activities. Through demographic and geographic research, states such as Illinois, Texas
and California have been identified as important source areas of country music tourists
(Sanders, 1997). Resources are often combined, for example when tourist promoters in
Nashville and Memphis, jointly with the State of Tennessee, set up an office in England
at the same time American Airlines offered a short-lived Nashville-London flight. As an
international spokesperson, leading country performer Marty Stuart wrote the song
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"Magic Town" to promote Nashville. The video was aired in selected markets worldwide,
especially through Gaylord-owned Country Music Television, developing an integrated
city-industry promotional strategy in a manner that few cities are positioned to do. The
office in Britain was established to promote Nashville in the European market, but proved
less productive, so Nashville is not currently pursuing international advertising.
Demographically, women are increasingly a prime audience for country music and
advertisements are placed in lifestyle magazines such as Southern Living. The
Convention and Visitors Bureau relies mainly on such general interest print media,
although radio advertising can also target specific audiences in particular regions. Figure
8.4 shows an example of an ad by the Convention Center portraying Nashville as a hot
place, referring to the growth of country music. The Convention Bureau and Opryland
have studied the effectiveness of the advertisements placed on television and in print, and
73 percent of tourists visiting Nashville said the ads influenced their decisions to visit
(Campbell, 1992, December 14).
The Convention and Visitors Bureau has the authority from the Mayor's Office to
act as the central tourist promoter of Nashville. It is not only responsible to the mayor and
the Metro government, but also to the Chamber of Commerce and its members, who
support the Bureau financially. Although all promotional decisions are eventually taken
within the Bureau, major marketing strategies must be approved by the mayor and the
Chamber. In practice, the bureau claims, any restraint placed on promotional activities
has been budgetary rather that objections to content (Sanders, 1997).
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Figure 8.4 In the wake of the big country music breakthrough, the Nashville Convention
Center produced an advertising campaign that reflected the mid-l 990s status of the genre.
Used by permission.
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8.3 Entrepreneurial projects and image-making during the Bredesen administration
While direct place-marketing may have some effect on how a city is perceived (and there
are indications that the perception of Nashville has changed; see Appendix l ), it certainly
reveals how a city would like to be perceived. But beyond advertising and public
relations, there are other activities that may be more influential in materially changing
Nashville, and along with it, its image. In this section I will discuss public policy from an
image perspective as suggested in the conceptual model of image control (see Figure
8.1).
Phil Bredesen exerted limited influence in terms of direct activities affecting the
image creation process. The Mayor's Office plays a role in the coordination of the image
production through an annual event called the Selling Greater Nashville Workshop. The
goal of this workshop is to inform business leaders how Nashville has developed over the
year, how it compares competitively with other cities, and how the development strategy
is proceeding. In short, the goal is to feed business leaders the same data, which is useful
in presenting a coherent front in the recruitment process. More importantly, as mayor
Bredesen had a good grasp of the potential for image-making by entrepreneurial policy.
When considering day-to-day decisions, Bredesen reflected how these decisions would
affect Nashville's competitive position. He found running the daily business of
government less interesting; it almost runs on auto-pilot. Instead, his eight-year mayoral
tenure focused on the tools at his disposal that could reposition Nashville both internally
and externally (Bredesen, 2001). Bredesen's enduring legacy was grand projects. His
strategy was to focus on specific issues crucial from a broader development perspective
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(Hawks, 1997). Entrepreneurial projects during the Bredesen period can be divided into
three categories: corporate incentives, sports development, and downtown revitalization.
As mayor, Bredesen secured five large corporate tax breaks. They benefited: I.
Industries unique to Nashville that play an important part of the economic identity of the
city; 2. Industries that form a vital local cluster which without the subsidy would be in
doubt; or 3. Growth industries in the high-tech or advanced service sector. In most cases
tax subsidies were offered to retain or attract corporate headquarters. The result was
mostly favorable through media exposure portraying Nashville as a dynamic city building
on existing strengths and expanding in the right direction (see Appendix I). However, the
economic rationale of offering large corporate incentives is often challenged. The payoff
in terms of jobs and wages created, either directly or by multiplier effects, may or may
not exceed the costs of the subsidy package. Especially the financial cost of attracting
major league teams and building stadiums may outweigh the gains (Euchner, 1993).
However, some of the multiplier mechanisms are poorly understood and hard to quantify
or subject to economic analysis. Such effects operate in at least two subtle ways: by
making a city appear as pro-business and by supporting a forward-thinking image in the
popular imagination. A brief overview of the subsidies follows.
1. The Opryland Hotel and Convention Center is one of the largest complexes of
its kind in the United States and one of the most profitable enterprises of Gaylord
Entertainment. Since the city-county consolidation, Nashville has two taxation districts.
Opryland is located in the Urban Services District but adjacent to the General Services
District. Metro government agreed to change the boundaries and place Opryland in the
General Services District with its lower property tax rate. Together with a hotel tax break,
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Gaylord stood to save $22 million (Hobbs, 1993, June 14). The move freed capital for a
massive expansion of the Opryland Hotel, which ostensibly was dependent on this
subsidy. Bredesen also promised Gaylord not to expand the city-owned convention center
downtown for ten years after the reopening of Opry land Hotels. Metro government also
had one additional reason for pursuing the policy: as a strong connection exists between
convention activities and air traffic, the move would help secure Nashville's American
Airlines hub (see Chapter 9).
2. Not long after the Opryland deal, the question of headquarters location for the
religious publisher Thomas Nelson emerged. The Nashville-based corporation grew
dramatically in 1992 following an acquisition of a publishing company in Texas. The city
of Dallas tried to lure Thomas Nelson and its 1,300-employee operation, but a Bredesen
negotiated package for Thomas Nelson that included tax abatements resulted in the
company choosing to stay in Nashville.
3. A similar situation existed when HCA merged with one of its main
competitors, HealthTrust. This occurred less than a year after HCA moved its
headquarters from Nashville to Louisville after merging with Columbia in 1993.
Nashville made it clear that the city wanted the new company's headquarters. Bredesen,
who had a reputation of completing deals and was elected to office with overwhelming
support to run government as a business, led the negotiations. Nashville Metro Council
also passed a resolution that gave Bredesen a free hand in negotiations with the company.
Nashville was successful competing with Louisville and, again, Dallas for the
headquarters. Nashville was an advantageous location because the company already
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owned a large expandable office complex near Vanderbilt University. The value of the
HCA tax subsidy has been estimated to be between 26 and 116 million dollars.
4. Mayor Bredesen also played a crucial and influential role in the process that led
to the move of National Football League's Houston Oilers (now the Tennessee Titans) to
Nashville. The acquisition of one or more professional sports franchises had been on the
priority list for the city for a long time� several local businessmen had tried
unsuccessfully to purchase major league baseball or basketball teams for years. By the
mid-1990s, Nashville, based on market size, wealth, and corporate backing, was a serious
contender. The broader goal was to strengthen the city's position as an entertainment
center. However, some inside reports on the workings behind the relocation of the
Houston Oilers recount a process where the team targeted Nashville, not vice versa,
through connections at the Nashville Convention and Visitors Bureau (Dobie & Horick,
1995, August 17). After the initial contact, Bredesen was reportedly skeptical with
National Hockey League and National Basketball Association relocation failures fresh in
his memory. Only after realizing the seriousness of the Oilers' interest would Bredesen
pursue the deal with full force (Ibid.). He enjoyed the fervent backing of the business
establishment: one observer characterized it as "one of the most impressive collections of
Nashville's business elite ever to gather for a Metro Council meeting" (Lavey, 1995,
October 9), when Bredesen presented his plan and urged support for bringing the Oilers
to Nashville. The council eventually decided to put a bond-financed relocation and
stadium deal before the voters in a referendum. The Chamber was "very active" in
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working with their members and to get their employees to vote in favor (Harris, 2000)37•
The referendum passed with 59 percent of the vote in 1996. The image value of the new
team is perceived as invaluable in business circles: "It has put Nashville on the map with
decision-makers around the country ...We're on the tip of the tongue with the Super
Bowl" (Hunt, 2000). Undoubtedly, it has had the desired effect of creating awareness.
5. The last deal of the Bredesen administration was the 1999 construction of a
3,000-employee Dell computer manufacturing plant in the industrial area close to the
airport. Most observers believed this sprawling development would land in one of the
surrounding counties, but a property tax break and free land deal was worked out by
Metro government and the airport authority. High value manufacturing benefits from a
location near airports, a fact that clearly influenced the location decision. Critique from
the Tennessean questioned whether the cost of the public subsidy (which they placed at
$116 million) together with indirect costs, such as schools and services, exceeds the
benefits of the deal (Wissner, 1999, May 7). At this point the public opinion of Bredesen
started to reflect the question of whether Nashville's resources had been overextended in
the pursuit of economic development, but the deal finally passed in city council (27-11)
despite some resistance.
The major elements of image-making through policy are mutually reinforcing.
Attracting sports teams involved major corporate subsidies, but it is also a leading
component in the downtown development efforts. During the last ten years, downtown
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The Yes campaign outfinanced the No side 20-1 with the biggest contributors being NationsBank,
Gaylord, Nissan, and Bridgestone/Firestone (Ippolito, 1996, May I). A leading local public relations firm
also put a positive spin on the deal. Local businesses snapped up luxury suites quickly, but when ordinary
season tickets did not sell out as required, Thomas Frist purchased the necessary tickets (Dobie, 1996a).
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Nashville has undergone substantial changes. Second Avenue was upgraded back in the
1980s during Mayor Fulton's beautification initiatives, but the physical improvement was
only accompanied by a modest increase in downtown visitors, businesses, and residents.
On lower Broadway, heavy-handed tactics of selective liquor violation enforcement in
non-desirable establishments were reported during the Boner administration to "clean up"
the area (Dobie, 1989b). But in 1990, only one million out of seven million annual
tourists visited Nashville's downtown (Hinds, 1990, December 17). Downtown held
equally low attraction value among local residents. Commercially, Second Avenue was
abandoned by retail over the decades, leaving Broadway in commercial isolation; it
developed as a location for more space-consuming goods, especially low-end furniture,
which tied it closer to the warehouse district to the south (Marshall, 1975). Before the
current revival, commercial activities in the area were, for the most part, restricted to
pawn shops, peep shows, and second-hand stores intermixed with empty retail space.
Lower Broadway on the south edge of downtown, with its proximity to the area once
called Black Bottom, had a seedy side to it that is no longer present.
The transformation from a dormant city center to an active, albeit tourist
dominated, street scene is apparent to most visitors and citizens of Nashville. Several
landmarks have been added to the cityscape (Figure 8.5). The first sign of rejuvenation
after the real estate crisis was the 1993 construction of a highly visible new corporate
headquarters for BellSouth, a postmodern skyscraper with the vernacular name "the
Batman Building," due to its two pointy side towers. However, the path of the 1990s was
not to be based on office development. Several major investments have followed, such as
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an arena built to attract a major league hockey team and the Ryman Auditorium
renovation, bringing pedestrians to lower Broadway and Second Avenue. The streetscape
is a peculiar mix of the generic and the unique. Well-known commercial pop culture
symbols with big city, even worldwide, appeal, such as the popular theme restaurants
Hard Rock Cafe and Planet Hollywood (the latter is now defunct), are found next to old
Nashville icons such as Ryman Auditorium. Restaurants of all degrees of sophistication
line the streets together with souvenir shops and some unchanged, colorful honky-tonks
left from years past. With these changes, downtown has become the centerpiece for
image rejuvenation. This is where people-tourists, potential investors and other
important targets for image-makers-can gather, eat and be entertained. The traditional
urbanity that is recreated forms the backdrop to give credibility to Nashville's claim to be
Music City USA. A new landscape of cultural consumption is produced in Nashville as
increased middle-class interest in country music has influenced the downtown changes.
After having Jived in Boston and London before coming to Nashvil1e, Bredesen
valued traditional urbanism, which became one component for his vision of a future
Nashville. The goal was first to reestablish downtown as a cultural and entertainment
center. Bredesen was even suspicious of the Bicentennial Mall, primarily a state project,
which detracted from the spatial focus on the southern end of downtown as the place for
urban rejuvenation (DuBose, 1994, February 17). In January 1993, Bredesen announced
that a downtown arena was under consideration (which together with the Ryman
renovation announced by Gaylord in March 1993 was the starting point of the
revitalization process [McCampbeH, 1993, March 23]). Both downtown development and
Nashville's strategy as an entertainment city could be enhanced with an arena. The arena
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site just south of Broadway was an obvious choice, as some land was in public hands
through the Metropolitan Development and Housing Authority (MDHA). In addition,
MDHA acquired 36 different properties needed to make way for the four block-long,
three block-wide arena project. Initially, Gaylord was singled out as the main corporate
partner; they were uncommitted, yet interested. The arena was not conceived as a space
for a NHL team, but instead as a music and conference venue, with the possibility of
attracting a NBA basketball team. Metro government and Gaylord Entertainment initially
teamed up to bring the NBA's Minnesota Timberwolves to Nashville, a project that
eventually failed, although floor space design was planned in such a way as to keep open
the possibility of hockey (Dobie, 1994, April 7).
Everybody involved in downtown issues strongly supported the idea. Historic
preservationists of Historic Nashville, the tourism planners in the Convention and
Visitor's Bureau, and the Metropolitan Planning Commission all agreed that the
infrastructure and traffic issues could be solved satisfactorily, and the historic integrity of
downtown would not be compromised. Strong support from the Chamber was achieved at
an early stage. A subcommittee within the organization was formed to approach the arena
issue, but the Mayor was the driving force behind the idea and implementation. Just like
in the Oilers' case, Nashville was helped by personal connections in attracting a NHL
expansion team. Dick Evans, the new CEO at Gaylord, was formerly a member of the
Board of Governors of the National Hockey League and an executive with the New York
Rangers and their arena, Madison Square Garden. His strong ties with commissioners of
the league were undoubtedly a crucial factor.
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The downtown arena and professional sports have been Bredesen's "pet projects."
From there on the image creation "will take care of itself," says Cliff Hawks at the
Mayor's Office. He clarifies with an example, the National Figure Skating Championship
held in the new arena: "It is great to have your skyline out there nationally, night after
night on primetime television" (Hawks, 1997). With the arena, Bredesen gets at least
partial credit for the revitalization of downtown, and the implications from an image
perspective. MDHA figures show that $172 million worth of business investment
occurred in the downtown area between the announcement of the arena and the end of
1996, the most intense period of development. Much of it was invested on lower
Broadway: $33 million in new or renovated restaurants and another $33 million in
residential development (Lawson, 1996, December 16). (Meanwhile, downtown
Nashville had one of the highest office vacancy rates in the region at this time--13
percent in 1996.) Downtown scenes are increasingly important pictures for the city's
promotion, especially tourist-oriented material. National chains decided to move in to the
downtown area after the decision was made to build the arena-Hard Rock Cafe
announced its arrival in October 1993 after the take-off was obvious, Planet Hollywood
opened in 1996, and NASCAR Cafe in 1997. One major downtown investment, the $100
million BellSouth tower (project planning started in November 1991), predates the arena
announcement, although its impact on the creation of entertainment space is negligible.
National media exposure of yet greater magnitude followed shortly after the
arena. The city entered negotiations with the Houston Oilers and eventually settled on a
financial agreement. The football stadium is located on the east bank of the Cumberland
River across from downtown. The area was characterized by mixed land use, including a
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dwindling amount of barge-related businesses. It was a logical site; high visibility next to
downtown, but without disruption of desirable urban land uses. A major portion of the
Coliseum is financed by state bonds to be repaid by sales tax revenue generated by the
stadium.
Unlike in the past, the music industry plays an active role in local urban
development. Cooperation between the music industry and the traditional business
community has produced a series of investments downtown such as a revived Ryman
Auditorium and a new Country Music Hall of Fame operated by the Country Music
Foundation. The tourist facilities of country music had been on Music Row for decades,
but increasingly there were potential synergy effects with downtown development. At the
same time the arena idea was developed, Bredesen had other ideas of how to further
enhance downtown's entertainment potential. In the winter of 1993, Bredesen contacted
Bill Ivey, the director of the Country Music Foundation with a proposition for a
partnership to build a new Hall of Fame near the new downtown arena. At first, Ivey was
not interested, but after the arena moved from plan to reality, the leadership of the
Foundation rethought the opportunities of the new location (Dobie, 1994b). In October
1994, the Country Music Foundation announced the move of the Hall of Fame to the new
1ocation downtown, but the move was slow as the city council was reluctant to subsidize
the development over a period of two years (1994-1996). But the Foundation was
eventually granted the title of the old Hall of Fame (the city owned the land) to back
bonds for the construction of the new building. The financing of the structure, in order of
magnitude, was achieved through Country Music Foundation bonds, private donations
(private pledges in the$ 1-3 million range came from the Frist Foundation, record label
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executive Mike Curb, Opryland, and Dollar General), and the National Endowment for
the Arts. $19 mil1ion worth of city bonds and hotel tax money also supported the project,
which was completed in 2001.
It was not obvious that Gaylord should embrace downtown development. In the
early 1990s, few Opryland visitors ventured downtown. With significant investments
made in "Music Valley," the suburban area at Opryland, perhaps downtown revival even
posed a threat to Gaylord� it was not clear whether enough tourists existed to support both
downtown and Opryland. Eventually a decision was taken to renovate the Ryman, which
at the time was a dusty museum and only a brief stop on the bus tour itineraries. The
venue can now host mid-size music acts not limited to country music. Later, Gaylord
created the Wildhorse Saloon, a restaurant and bar with a large dance hall designed to
attract country music fans. Gaylord also became part-owners in the NHL team Nashvil1e
Predators, who play in the downtown arena, officially named the Gaylord Entertainment
Center. Gaylord's downtown investment was tied to the Opryland complex through a
river taxi until Opryland theme park closed in 1998. In the late 1990s, Nashville suffered
from a slump in tourism at least in part due to the Opryland closing, but the most
significant underlying factor is the declining sales of country music. Naturally, this has
posed some challenges downtown development, but the urban revival trend has been
strong enough to avoid serious disinvestment.
A handful of other investments of more recent dates, both public and private, have
had some success in transforming downtown beyond the immediate entertainment district
into livable spaces. A new public library, Bredesen's last monument, is an attractive
state-of-the-art facility. Next to the library sits the Cumberland, a new residential
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skyscraper with upscale apartments. Both are located on Church Street, once the city's
premier business address that after years of neglect has found a new fonn and function.
Finally, the Frist Center for the Visual Arts makes good use of the old downtown post
office 38. The Nashville Civic Design Center, a non-profit sponsored both by the city
under urban design minded current Mayor Purcell and Vanderbilt University, can perhaps
provide comprehensive guidance to a downtown, and indeed a whole city, historically
oblivious to planning.

8.4 Country music: From anachronism to ideal

What has been said so far indicates that Music City USA was the obvious choice for a
promotional strategy. As a ready-made brand label, the slogan has apparent advantages as
a promotional tool. However, the usage is not free of conflict. In this section, I will
discuss the third level of image controt the city's dependency on the country music
image. Moreover, I will explore the changing cultural meaning of country music that
underlies the ambivalent relationship between the business community and the music
industry, and between the social elite and country music. Attitudes toward country music
are important both for the promotional push by Partnership 2000, and the role of Mayor
Bredesen in the remaking of Nashville's image.
Such an analysis calls, first of all, for a brief overview of the music industry in
Nashville. The rapid urbanization of the South in the post-war era meant that many city
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The F1ist Center was perhaps the most suhstantial outcome of Nashville's Agenda, the city's version of a
collective visioning process currently popular after Chattanooga's suc cess. The realization of the project,
however, was dependent on the deep pockets of Thomas Frist.

228

residents were born in rural areas. Music was one cultural tradition that was transplanted
to Nashville. The industry started with radio broadcasting, and later expanded to
recording, music publishing, television, and tourism. Even if the leadership of this
industry came from the outside the established business elite of the city, one connection
was established early: live music radio was developed in association with the insurance
industry, which used it as an advertising vehicle. National Life broadcast its message
through WSM. The station was not focused on country music, but its show Grand Ole
Opry soon became the most popular. WSM and the Grand Ole Opry were originally little
more than expensive toys for a National Life executive's son, Edwin Craig, an early radio
enthusiast. WSM's Grand Ole Opry did emerge, however, as a vehicle for name
recognition for National Life, and despite its position as one of the leading elite
institutions in Nashville, it stuck with the "hillbilly" fonnat of the Opry because its
customer base was mainly rural and working class (Peterson, 1975).
Record companies, still based in New York or Los Angeles, set up offices and
studios in Nashville, but it was a local talent and WSM musician, Owen Bradley, who
can take credit for creating a whole music industry district by starting a small studio in
what is now Music Row. Subsequently, Fred Rose, songwriter with Hank Williams Sr.,
built Acuff-Rose, a music publishing company, and Chet Atkins persuaded RCA to build
studios at Music Row. The rise of country music was accompanied by a new licensing
agent, BMI, that challenged the established industry dominant ASCAP. One trade
organization in particular, the Country Music Association (CMA), emerged as the
industry's leader after its establishment in 1958.
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This structure makes for a seemingly unbreakable connection between the city of
Nashville and country music. The genre may experience upswings or declining fortunes,
but there is little risk that the industry would abandon Nashville and relocate elsewhere.
The structure of country music industry-the publishers, producers, musicians, and
songwriters-makes Nashville indispensable as a location (Daley, 1998). It forms a
place-based cluster of activities that cannot be replicated elsewhere. Two area universities
(although not Vanderbilt University) even offer business degrees targeted towards the
music industry. However, the main attraction and success lies in the daily contacts and
the close-knit intra-industry network, facilitated by the Music Row neighborhood.
Originally Music Row was a small neighborhood converted to office use. A strong
relationship based on physical proximity between record companies, music publishers,
songwriters, recording studios, and other businesses was crucial for the emergence of the
industry. The producer/recording studio-owner attracted recording artists to their
facilities. On Music Row, the executive was often one and the same as the producer and,
at times, even the musician. This configuration has led to an informal and unique
business culture. In fact, the music industry today is still the segment in the Nashville
economy that is most concentrated geographically. Moreover, there is a close relationship
between the dominant outlet of country music, the radio stations, and Nashville-based
industry organizations, most importantly the Country Music Association (CMA).
Mainstream country music is by definition music acceptable for country music radio,
which means music originating from Nashville more than strict, unchangeable rules on
musical content.
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The acceptance of country music nationwide and among a larger spectrum of
socio-economic groups started in the 1970s. It was part of the South moving into the
mainstream of America; the Americanization of Dixie and the Southernization of
America (Egerton, 1974; Cobb, 1982). The Sunbeh South enjoyed migration surp]uses
and positive imagery as o]d racia] problems diminished rapid]y. Whi]e society was
disenchanted with the prob]ems of modernism and urbanization, the South, at least in
myth, represented traditiona] ideals that again served renewed ideo]ogica] re]evance.
When Richard Nixon inaugurated the new suburban Grand 01e Opry in 1974, he lauded
the conservative va]ues embodied in country music. What had been anachronistic and
irre]evant as the Agrarians suddenly became accepted. One music scho]ar (Lewis, 1991)
notes in passing that the exp]oding popu]arity of country music coincided with the
increasingly conservative politica] dimate, but this theme is dearly understudied in
scho]ar]y approaches to country music. Such a comprehensive treatment of cuhura]
change is beyond the scope of this chapter; here it wi11 suffice to contextua]ize the growth
of country music, its use as a promotiona] too] for the city, and loca] e1ite attitudes
towards the music industry.
A]ong with changes in societal ideo]ogy, the musica] and thematic content of
country music was ahered as we1l. Currently, the social context and origin of country
music has been de]eted to make it more appealing to a midd]e-dass audience. What
remains is ]argely a superficia] connection to idea]ized rural values. Music Row has been
successful in adapting the message of the music to address middle-dass concerns and
become part of mainstream America. This trend is reflected in the demographics of the
Nashvil1e tourist. In 1994, 73 percent of the tourists were co11ege-educated and averaged
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an income of $46,000, a significant socio-economic shift from the traditional working
class country music audience. In the present world, the distinction between high and low
culture is less and less pronounced.
The first taste of widespread pop culture success in Nashville occurred in the late
1970s when the so-called "urban cowboy" wave popularized country music and the size
of the industry experienced an unprecedented leap. Country music became a booming
local industry. Unfortunately, country music, like most other genres of popular music, is
highly cyclical. By the mid-1980s, country music's share of overall record sales had
dropped again, and conventional wisdom suggested that the previous success was only a
brief interlude dependent on the whims of a fickle audience always demanding new
musical experiences. In a 1985 front-page special, New York Times predicted the demise
of country music (and implicitly Nashville), but country proved to be more resilient than
that. The following year, country was on the verge of entering a new wave of popularity
and music journalists around the nation were talking about the fresh approach of a new
group of artists, the "new traditionalists." Garth Brooks became the leading star of the
"class of '89," the real breakthrough year. Country music sales more than tripled in early
1990s and country music's share of records sold shot up from 7.3 percent to 18.7 percent,
providing a tremendous boost to the local music industry and Nashville in general (Figure
8.6).
Nashville's independent music publishing companies have at the same time
gradually disappeared. During the 1980s, transnational corporations acquired ownership
of country music. Five dominant publishers established in the 1940s and 1950s were sold
to companies like Japan's Sony, and Britain's PolyGram (whose parent now is Seagram's
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Association of America ( 1998, 2002).
of Canada) and EMI during the late 1980s (Hansen, 1990). Acuff-Rose retained quasi
local ownership a bit longer as part of Gaylord Entertainment but was eventually sold to
Sony in 2002. It has been suggested that the large non-American influence in the music
industry ownership has had a positive effect on Nashville. Nashville may be considered
rural, ignorant, and Southern in New York and Los Angeles, but foreign owners are more
likely to be unaffected by these stereotypes and willing to invest in Nashville, as long as
it proves to be at least as productive as the two world metropolises (Kosser, 1994).
As country music was remade from a cottage industry into corporate empires, the
culture of the industry was transformed (Oliver, 1990, September 10). Depending on
what you read, old Music Row was either "clannish, suspicious of strangers, and riddled
with nepotism" (Lomax, 1985, p. 38) or characterized by a family atmosphere (Hansen,
1990). In either case, with corporatization came a new approach to music-making and
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serious marketing efforts. CMA set up a marketing department, and conducted research
on the country music audience, including purchasing habits, occupational categories, and
demographic analysis including age, household status and individual income. The level
of sophistication in the approach to business management is similar to any major industry
(Campbell, 1992, September 28). Nashville's music industry has also been diversified,
especially through the growth of Christian contemporary pop. Not only more non-country
recordings, but also additional business functions such as tour management, booking
agents, music attorneys, and special accounting groups, have stabilized an industry
otherwise suffering from a current decline in sales (Harris, 2000).
Traditionally, the cooperation between the music industry and the rest of the
Nashville business community has been weak (McGraw, 1992). This does not mean that
partnerships were not forged when mutual interests could be found. In the beginning, the
success of the Grand Ole Opry was made possible by National Life insurance company.
Later CMA formed an alliance with the city and outside business interests to build the
1973 Country Music Hall of Fame, which became a major tourist attraction for Nashville.
The local business community was involved in raising money for the Hall of Fame.
Prominent banker and Watauga member Andrew Benedict was chairman of the effort,
which was an early signal that country music industry was forging connections with the
business elite of the city. The modest tourism retail activity in 1960s Nashville was
located on lower Broadway, but with the Country Music Hall of Fame it moved to Music
Row (only to return downtown 20 years later).
Apart from brief interludes of cooperation, a clear cultural distinction exists
between the music industry and the rest of the business community. In the business
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community at large, the entertainment industry has had a reputation for shady business
practices. More than anything else, it is this cultural distinction that kept music industry
and the old corporate elite separate. For some time the music industry was a relative
newcomer and most people associated with it were outsiders, albeit from rural Tennessee
or other parts of the South. As a business enterprise, the music industry existed in a
parallel universe in Nashville and developed, as noted, a community in itself.
The attitudes of separation stayed in place until the early I 990s, when the
profitability of the industry skyrocketed and interest in cooperation to market and develop
Nashville as Music City USA grew stronger. The collaborative efforts between the
business community and music industry were aided by the Nashville Entertainment
Association (NEA), which was founded by maverick music executive and producer
Jimmy Bowen and operated parallel to the more powerful and entrenched CMA. NEA, a
formerly independent organization, became (temporarily) an official affiliate to the
Chamber in 1990. The NEA's alliance with the Chamber was an indication of the
growing economic influence of Nashville's entertainment industry at that time. The goal
of NEA is to attract more music business, and to expand the entertainment development
plan into the realm of film and video production. It has been recognized that the success
of the city's entertainment and country music profile must be reproduced through an
active and focused growth agenda. Spectacles, such as the "Extravaganza" and "Fan Fair"
are, respectively, aimed at highlighting the city's live music scene, and giving the fans an
opportunity to meet the country music stars. Especially Fan Fair is a significant event for
the city as well as the music industry. Hundreds ofjournalists travel to Nashville for the
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weeklong event, which generates national media exposure outside the narrow country
music press.
The music industry became an official Partnership 2000 priority in 1992 with the
creation of a development director, a task force, and a strategic plan. It was a starting
point of more active approach and effort to understand how the industry matters to
Nashville in general. The focus was both internal, taking care of the needs of the industry,
and promoting Nashville as a music industry center, expanding into new genres and
embracing new ways of reaching an audience, e.g. music videos. Cooperation was
extended to produce advertising and surveying the industry to understand its needs.
Partnership 2000 had the capacity to bring the music industry and the rest of the
business community closer together. In the early 1990s, Gaylord's Bud Wendell was
president of the Chamber, while local business leaders were selected to serve on the
CMA board. An increasing amount of cross-serving on corporate and institutional boards
made the relationship closer than before. One of the dominant forces behind the
cooperation was economic; the music industry was one of the contributors to the wealth
created in Nashville at the time. It was natural for the Chamber to embrace the music
industry considering the openness of the governance system at the time.
Adopting the music industry into the Chamber organization was made possible by
new people and new attitudes. On the music side, a more traditional business approach
was rising with the corporate take-over of the industry. Some of the profits from
increased sales of country music have been invested locally. Important bridge-building
entities such as Gaylord and Partnership 2000 have ensured the cooperation was now
manifested in downtown Nashville. Nashville's urban redevelopment is dependent on the
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new integration of music industry into the local power base. On the other hand, the music
industry can gain from the planning capacity of Partnership 2000. For example, efforts to
market internationally and attract more tourists and music industry business have been
approached together.
There appears, however, to be a cyclical element to the relationship. "The more
vibrant the business, the closer those ties become," says the Chamber's economic
development director (Harris, 2000). The music industry's modest participation in
Partnership 2000 produced few results in terms of new programs and activities. Closer
ties were developed, but "we have still not been able to bridge that gap as successfully as
we wanted to. It is a bit of a divide. We made some serious efforts" (Sherrard, 2000). The
music industry does not rise and fall with the fortunes of Nashville. There may be some
truth to the opposite--that Nashville's fortunes parallel the music industry's--but to a
lesser degree than in the past. Nashville needs country music less and less as it grows
larger and more affluent. This is reflected in the attitudes and relationship between
business and the music industry. There has always been an on/off ambivalence, but in
times when country is not in a boom phase, there is less need to cultivate strong ties.
Nashville's association with music is from a historic perspective a relatively new
phenomenon and in many ways antithetical to "Athens of the South." The city's elite has
been discontented with the country music image for a long time. There are two parts to
the ambivalent relationship. The first one, as discussed, is the cultural and physical
separation between the business establishment and the music industry that can be bridged
if economic and institutional conditions are favorable enough. Second, on a fundamental
level concerning the representation of the city, the elite is unhappy about the high profile
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that country music has carved for itself in the national mind. As Nashville is "their" city,
the parochial image that country embodies devalues the realm which they ostensibly
control. Entertainment in general is not a legitimate elite endeavor from the "old money"
perspective. A distinction between the social and the economic elite is necessary here,
even if there is significant overlap on an individual level.
The social elite is foremost embodied by the Belle Meade neighborhood, which
was carved out of an old horse plantation that provided the right environment for a upper
class neighborhood with its park-like atmosphere and historical connection to an
idealized past still visible in the landscape (see Chapter 7.1). The arrival of country music
was not particularly welcome in this part of town: "Just as blue-blooded Nashville had
beaten back the stench of Dayton, another cultural hurricane arrived from rural Tennessee
to muddy their dinner party" (Feilier, 1998, p. 88). Naturally, the music elite created their
own social space. "Shunned for the most part by the established, monied families of Belle
Meade, many of the nouveaux riches from Music Row laid out their own grand mansions
along Franklin Road or in Hendersonville [ northeast of the city near Old Hickory Lake]"
(Doyle 1985b, p. 157-158). More recently, representatives from the music industry have
also played a role in the transformation of the Williamson County countryside as an
idealized exurban environment (Johansson, 1998, October).
The country music elite found their own charities to support in much publicized
events, but some intermixing did occur. Wesley Rose of the Acuff-Rose publishing
company became a member of the board of directors of traditional elite institutions and
businesses, such as First American Bank and the Nashville Symphony. Buddy Killen, one
of the major music publishers on Music Row, craved acceptance into elite circles and to
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some extent won it through lavish contributions to the "right" charities (Feiler, 1998). He
also brokered the first country music entertainer to performat the Swan Ball, the elite
event of the year39• Country music was becoming too big simply to be ignored. Nashville
government, the business elite, and the music industry joined to build the Country Music
Hall of Fame on Music Row in 1973 and old guard National Life invested in the
suburban Opryland complex.
Nevertheless, there exists a "deeply entrenched well of uneasiness about how
country music, and by extension, Nashville, is perceived by the rest of the world" (Daley,
1998, p. 13). The most disliked image of them all is the Nashville-filmed Hee-Haw
television show, which was in production from 1969-1991, but since has continued to be
aired on The Nashville Network (TNN). The latent, under the surface, conflict over
representation became apparent when a local debate occurred in the fall of 1995. Mayor
Phil Bredesen discussed the "hee-haw" image of the city in an interview with the Wall
Street Journal in the context of recruiting a NFL team and the image implications thereof

(Rains, 1996). Stirring up a great deal of controversy, the mayor was scolded by the local
business community as well as Music Row4°. There was indeed a great deal of sensitivity
involved in the representation of the city, an issue that is largely unresolved today.
39

Johnny Cash was the first such country music entertainer to perform at the Swan Ball in 1970, which also
saw subsequent performances by entertainers such as Loretta Lynn and Barbara Mandrell.
40
The quote in the Wall Street Journal was: "People who have hesitations about moving to Nashville from
New York or San Francisco or Chicago wonder 'Am I going to a nice small city with a lot of good
amenities, or am I going out in the wilderness? ...Nashville isn't big, and it is well known for its hay bales"
(Helyar, 1995, November 21). In a personal interview with Bredesen, he continues to be frank on this
image theme: "There were a lot of people who were--horrified is too strong of a word-but really rejected
the notion of Nashville and the hee-haw image. One of the geneses of Partnership 2000 was the desire to
move away from the hillbilly image and start projecting a different image" (Bredesen, 200 I). The same
week as the hee-haw incident, in a Sports Illustrated interview, Bredesen characterized Vanderbilt
University as indifferent to the local community. Moreover, he did not apologize for his statement, which
displeased leading Vanderbilt alumni on which Bredesen depended politically.
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9. AIRLINE DEREGULATION, URBAN COMPETITION, AND BUILDING A
NEW AIRPORT

If image is an abstract representation of cities, airport development is a concrete task
preoccupying the city's leadership. Airports and air service have emerged as
entrepreneurial tools for cities remaking themselves with intent on moving up the urban
hierarchy. This possibility opened up with deregulation of the airline industry; the
network structure was reorganized and new cities had the opportunity to become hubs.
Deregulation was enacted under the same market-based premises as the banking industry
discussed earlier. However, the implications for power and strategy formation on the
local level are quite different. While banking deregulation played a role in the
transformation of local business institutions in Nashville, airline deregulation often
produces public-private partnerships and entrepreneurial behavior on part of the local
government to generate economic growth.

9.1 Deregulation, hubs, and the mid-size city

In the literature covering the new inter-city competitiveness and entrepreneurial style of
government, there are, on one hand, broad macro-economic explanations often grounded
in the Marxian tradition, while other scholars have pursued empirical investigations on
comparative urban strategies. A neglected focus is the national legislative trends that
force cities to expand their competitive behavior. The most important trend is the push
towards deregulation of a handful of important industries of increasing maturity.
Telecommunication, trucking and railways, and most recently, the utility industry are
moving towards free competition on a national level, setting their own rates liberated
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from spatial monopolies (Nelson & Johansson, 2000, October). All of these industries
exhibit new geographical patterns with implications for cities and regions. Perhaps most
important for intra-urban competition is the development in the airline industry, which
has presented a series of challenges for both the business elite and government in
Nashville. Unlike the banking industry (see Chapter 7), airline operations are dependent
on substantial public infrastructural investment. The opportunity is, therefore, greater for
local decision-makers to use public policy as a tool for economic growth. Because flying
is positively related to wealth, both on an individual and regional level (Graham, 1995), it
is a mode of transportation that has benefits for corporations and the affluent segment of
the population. Thus, growing cities like Nashville must keep up with demand and invest
in better airport facilities as well as position themselves for future urban growth.
The growth of the airline industry has greatly reduced travel time, thus improving
the possibilities of economic interaction between cities and regions. The fundamental
geographical concept of accessibility explains why it is important for a city not only to
have an airport, but also to make it a priority in urban development. Relative location
with respect to infrastructural networks determines the accessibility of a particular city. A
fundamental role of cities has always been as meeting points and transportation nodes,
and if, as it has been argued, society is a network characterized by an informational
economy and a "space of flows" (Castells, 1989). the nodal function is still vital. It
should be noted, however, that transportation infrastructure is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for economic growth.
In some ways, the inter-urban struggle over position in the airline network is
analogous to the railroads more than a century ago. Much like the railroads were
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responsible for structuring the spaces of industrialism, the airline network is the leading
mode of transportation in the postindustrial service-economy. There is, however, one
significant difference between the historical function of railroads and airlines from an
urban entrepreneurial perspective. The airline network is made up of discrete points with
no connecting infrastructure in between. The implication is that such a network is fluid
and susceptible to constant change. Thus, cities are subjected to a high level of
uncertainty, but at the same time have some room to maneuver to improve their position
in the network and in the urban hierarchy.
Deregulation of air transportation introduced a reorganization in the accessibility
of cities. Where earlier government regulations provided the stability for the network
system (that existed, for example, in the railroad network), the investment decisions made
by airlines are now the dominant force shaping the network. Deregulation in the airline
industry was enacted by the federal government as early as 1978, placing the industry at
the forefront of a political shifting tide with roots in the economic crisis of the 1970s. The
neo-liberal architects behind the policy shift argued that government regulations in place
since the 1930s, which decided pricing, entry and exit of competition, and the level of
service to various places, were outmoded and inefficient. Consumer advocates also
argued that the federal regulators were mostly catering to the concerns of the industry
they were to supervise (Sinha, 1999). Deregulated airlines should now be allowed to
make market-based investments, which would, in accordance with traditional economic
theory, drive down the price of air service. But to reap the efficiency benefits of the free
market, capitalism must reign freely to produce its own space. The strategy employed by
airlines has been the development of hub cities (Figure 9.1), instead of a point-to-point
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Figure 9.1 Airline hubs in the United States as defined by FAA. Source: Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (2000).
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pattern, through which most of their flights are routed41 • Fewer direct flights increase the
average flight occupancy level--the load factor---thus making the system more cost
efficient. But travelers are also inconvenienced by longer routes, delays at crowded hub
airports, and declining in-cabin service and comfort.
The evolving network of airports and the airlines' "hub-and-spoke" system have
been investigated by transportation geographers (Shaw, 1993; Shaw & Ivy, 1994;
Reynolds-Feighan, 1998). The dispersed geography of the United States encouraged the
development of multiple hubs for individual airlines, and the emergence of smaller hubs
allowed the concept to creep down the urban hierarchy. After an initial wave of new
entries in the market, a period of bankruptcies, mergers, and reorganization occurred
during the mid-1980s leading to a reconcentration of the industry in the 1990s (and yet
another recent crisis that is largely beyond the temporal scope of this dissertation).
Deregulation results in fewer airlines through industry consolidation, and generally,
emerging control centers (i.e., hub cities) have benefited through more flights, higher
employment and lower fares, except in hub cities dominated by a single carrier, where
prices have increased (Goetz & Sutton, 1997). A problem with hub routing is that it does
not necessarily reflect the needs of local communities in which they are situated, but
rather the needs of the airlines and their national network. Barriers to entry have been
larger than economists predicted, and the benefits from competition are not as strong as

41

Two competing views exist on what constitutes a hub. First, the Federal Aviation Administration defines
a hub simply based on the total number of flights to and from a metropolitan region. All commercial
airports are classified as large, medium, small, or non-hubs. From an airline network perspective, the FAA
definition is inadequate. It is more common to think of a hub as the locus of a particular airline's hub-and
spoke system. Henceforth, I will follow Button et al. (1999) and define a hub as one of the nation's 75
largest airports where at least 60 percent of the flights are operated by one airline, and/or 85 percent
operated by two airlines.
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expected. The problems of competition and pricing at the hubs and abandonment at the
periphery have produced considerable political debate on deregulation and possible
adjustments of the regulatory system.
Compared to the attention paid to the network itself, there have been fewer studies
from the perspective of cities. However, these findings generally support the notion that
airports are quite important for the local economy. Irwin and Kasadra (1991) find that
improved airline centrality of a city has a positive effect on employment. In a similar
study, Goetz (1992) also finds support for the idea that growth in air passenger
transportation is positively related to population growth, although the effect appears to
diminish over time. Especially employment in producer services tends to increase if a city
is well positioned in the airline network. Good airline connections are good for travel
intensive service industries and manufacturing, which emphasize just-in-time and high
value goods. High tech employment is positively correlated to the existence of a hub
airport (Button et al., 1999). These findings are significant even if controlled for
causation, i.e. airport connections bring employment. Debbage ( 1999) takes this
argument to its logical conclusion: changes in the airline network can drastically affect
the competitive advantage of places. Acquiring hub status can then be an effective way to
improve a city's position in the national urban hierarchy, and if the local economy has
strong global connections, a gateway status with international flights can be equally
beneficial. It should also be noted that urban competition not only occurs in the
nationwide hub-and-spoke system, but also between airports in proximity of each other
(Graham, 1995).
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Although the inter-urban perspective on the airline industry has been covered in
previous research, urban case studies are almost non-existent. One exception is
Whitelegg (2000), who describes the integral part airline transportation has had for the
growth of Atlanta. An effort by the city's political establishment backed by the financial
resources of the local banks ensured expanded airport infrastructure, which was also tied
to expanding high-tech defense economy and the desire to be the progressive capital of
the South. The goal of becoming a city of international standing started with service to
London in the late 1970s, which "put the city on the world map," according to the
boosters at the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. Delta Airlines, as an integrated part of the
corporate elite in Atlanta, dominated local airport politics and expansions took place so as
to benefit Delta's operations. Its "fortress hub" in Atlanta could emerge because of the
company's power in local politics.
Not all cities are equally positioned to use the deregulated network as an
entrepreneurial tool to promote local growth. Location, historic ties to particular airlines,
and the strategies and competition among airlines and their networks all affect cities'
possibilities of gaining a hub (Shaw, 1993). There are several factors that affect an
airline's choice of hub city (Graham, 1995): first, it must be located so as to serve a
sizable passenger market. Important here are two locational attributes-centrality and
intermediacy (geographical "inbetweenness")--that suggest which places are
strategically located to occupy a prominent position in the airline network (Fleming &
Hayuth, 1994). Second, as all private enterprises, an airline is striving for monopoly
status; a potential hub can offer protection against competition, thereby potentially
increasing the profit margin. As seen in the Atlanta case, political power can translate to
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monopoly power. Third, airport facilities must be adequate, as expanding infrastructure is
costly and time consuming. It is especially in this last area where a city can be active.
With these requirements in mind, deregulation can benefit mid-sized cities the
most. The argument is simple and straightforward: the system under federal regulation
was relatively static where cities had their place in the airline network hierarchy. In the
long run, major cities can lose centrality in the system and move down in the urban
hierarchy, but a large city will always have good connections simply on the basis of its
population size. This critical mass offers a multitude of choices for all travelers going to
or from a major city. Conversely, a small city is unlikely to attract a hub or significant
passenger traffic that goes far beyond its peripheral location in the urban hierarchy.
However, if a mid-size city manages to attract an airline hub, its accessibility and
centrality can increase significantly42 • From the perspective of cities, a window of
opportunity has, therefore, opened with deregulation. As suggested above, an airline can
be persuaded to locate a hub locally if facilities are improved and expanded. As
overcrowding in airports has been a concern in the deregulated period, an ideal airport is
one that is expanding and not already used to its limits by competitors. A place where the
future design and expansion can be shaped by the interests of the hub carrier is also ideal.
On the other hand, if neighborhood and local environmental concerns are perceived as
obstacles to growth, development could be discouraged.
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Even if the logic behind mid-size city competition with airports is reasonable, and there is no doubt that
some cities have behaved entrepreneurially, the question is how the air transportation system actually has
developed since deregulation from an urban hierarchical perspective. A quantitative analysis is presented in
Appendix 2. The result is mixed, but provide some empirical evidence that mid-size cities can be either
winners or losers in the deregulated system.
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9.2 Airport governance in Nashville

The remainder of the chapter is concerned with the Nashville experience of building a
new airport and gaining and losing hub status. First, however, an overview of the political
system that governs airport policy in Nashville is in order. The airport in Nashville is
operated by a quasi-governmental agency-the Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority
(MNAA). Although affiliated with Metro government, it is not financed by city taxes;
instead, it generates its own income. MNAA is controlled by a board that sets policy and
appoints an executive president who then independently staffs the authority. The idea was
conceived and developed in 1969 by a local business group with Watauga ties led by
John Tune, a Vanderbilt-educated attorney, president of the Chamber of Commerce
during its pre-reform days, and a General in the Air National Guard. It drafted legislation
to establish an airport authority separate from Metro Government. And even if the idea
did not originate in Metro Government, then-Mayor Beverly Briley helped to lobby the
state legislature to pass legislation that would enable the formation of airport authorities
in the state (Mathews, 2001). The Metro Council passed a resolution creating the
Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority the following year.
The motivation for direct involvement of the business elite was "taking the airport
out of politics." MNAA today feels it operates without the constraints of bureaucracy,
without the "good ol' boy" syndrome (Willis, 2000) that is implicitly associated with
local political culture. What Metro government lost in political control it gained in
financial flexibility. This structure enables the authority to operate in a flexible manner
and bypass some layers of political approval. Yet the airport is publicly owned, as are
virtually all airports in the United States. This independent structure is increasingly
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common, but there are still many directly city-owned and operated airports. Both FAA
and cities have resisted outright privatization, but several forms of partnerships have
emerged where everything from concessions to airport management itself is in private
hands, while the public realm retains ownership control (Truitt & Esler, 1996). Many
operate on a leasing-basis by private company, but because of airports' importance for
regional economic development it is considered inappropriate for them to be judged by
their immediate profitability alone. The public good function that airports perform makes
them different than private companies. Yet MNAA, in its informational material, strongly
stresses that the airport is "run like a business."
The new airport authority was allowed to raise bonds to purchase the airport from
the city. MNAA now owns the facilities and is solely responsible for the airport's
operation, which is funded by airline and concession fees, federal and state grants, and
passenger charges. Revenues from concessions and others renting space in the airport
terminal make up a significant share of the total revenue: 45 percent in 1992. MNAA also
has a passenger facility charge, an additional funding source enacted in 1996 despite
opposition from the airlines, that pay such a tax and pass it on to passengers, at least
partially. On the other hand, this allows MNAA to maintain an unusually low landing fee.
The airlines have some power over airport decision-making. In exchange for fees
paid to the airport authority, the airlines have veto power over the budget presented by
the airport authority. The airport in practice operates as a partnership between the airlines
and the authority. Nine so-called signatory carriers participate in the partnership with
American Airlines as the main financial contributor (and power-player). American has
occasionally used its veto power to control investments at the Nashville airp ort (DuBose,
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1995, January 5). American is tied to the Nashville airport through a contract in which it
has to pay gate fees (or as it is now, sublease many of its gates to other airlines) until
2017.
This structure does not mean that MNAA is entirely independent from Metro
government. First, the mayor appoints the board, and appointees must be approved by
city council. MNAA has a ten-member board, which by law is comprised of people
representing different interests: three business and finance representatives, two pilot
representatives, two neighborhood representatives, one engineering representative, one
legal representative, and the mayor. The original charter called for each member to be
appointed to a seven-year term. The mayor can potentially influence his appointees, but
the long tenure is designed to discourage informal political control. The MNAA charter
was written and conceived to have a structure that would not be influenced politically.
Since the late 1980s, the mayor has held an official seat on the board. With
political contacts in the state legislature, then-Mayor Bill Boner was able to add this
amendment to the governance structure. MNAA at the time was rising in political
prominence in Nashville with airport expansions and subsequent conflicts between
neighborhoods and the airport, so this was an attempt to reassert more political control
over decision-making in airpo rt policy. Boner attended board meetings for a period of
time, but the practice has not been continued since. Most agreed it was a bad idea to have
the individual who appointed the board members as a member himself. Bredesen, for
example, never attended meetings, but instead had a non-voting observer on the board in
his place. Bredesen had a good relationship with the board leadership and certainly
wielded considerable influence during some time periods, such as the London route
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considerations, but he did not intervene in day-to-day operations. This fits Bredesen' s
modus operandi-active intervention in selected policy issues deemed to be of highest

importance for the city's overall development. The level of political control exercised
then is dynamic and depends on actions taken by the mayor and his relationship with
MNAA. The second power tool that the city can exercise is as the regulator of local land
use, as the airport is located in Davidson County. In the case of an expansion or changes
in the physical structure of the airport, this regulatory influence can be significant.
MNAA Board Chairman John Tune's strategy to create an independent airport
authority was well-received from the beginning among the business elite, and he
recruited those who believed that good air service would have an impact on the city.
Since the founding of MNAA, the board has been dominated by business interests under
any of the legally required categories. As an example, the current chairman, Fred
Dettwiller, president of a company called DET Distributors and a political campaign
contributor to Bredesen, was originally appointed to the board on the pilot's seat. The
MNAA board has been called "'the elite board," and serving on it is "one of the plum
unpaid assignments in town" (Newman, 1994). David K. Wilson, banker and long-time
chairman of the board at Vanderbilt University, was one of the founding members of the
MNAA board. So was Franklin Jawman, head of local manufacturing giant Genesco.
Tune himself was MNAA chairman during the first decade.
Later, Tune suggested his friend, real estate developer Robert Mathews, as a
board member, and since Mathews had the ear of the mayor this proved easy to
accomplish. Mathews remained active in airport issues and became MNAA chairman and
the main representative of business interests throughout the 1980s and 1990s. David K.
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Wilson and Robert Mathews were acquainted with General William Moore, a former Air
Force general who worked in the private aviation industry. They approached Moore to be
the airport's chief executive officer in 1984, a position he held until 2001. The main
reason for hiring Moore was his political connections at the Federal Aviation
Administration from his background in the Air Force43•

9.3 Airport expansion in Nashville

Nashville is not in the immediate traffic shadow of a larger city, which creates room to
develop airport growth strategies. The airport is seen as the key component of Nashville's
role as a transportation center in the mid-South region44. With deregulation just
implemented and projections of increased traffic in Nashville and nationwide, MNAA
began planning for a new terminal in 1980. The existing airport was built by the Work
Progress Administration during the New Deal and opened in its present location in
eastern Davidson County in 193 7, but became increasingly inadequate for a growing city.
Reaching the maximum capacity of the old terminal, 1.3 million passengers annually,
was imminent. MNAA and the airlines agreed it was time to build a new terminal. The
original plan was a modest proposal in comparison with the final result, but enough to
accommodate a feeder, or a mini hub (Brayton, 1987, September 14). Then, in 1985,
American Airlines called an informal meeting with the heavyweights at MNAA-Moore,

43

"We walked down the halls offAA and half the people saluted [Moore] and the other half said, 'Hi Bill.'
Having been in the system up there, he knew most everybody. He was a very knowledgeable individual of
how the system worked" (Mathews, 200 I).
44
This role is, in fact, relatively modest. At 7 percent, Nashville has the third lowest employment in the
transportation sector of the 11 peer cities. The city that stands out as a transportation center is Memphis,
with 12.9 percent of the workforce employed in the transportation sector (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1997).
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Mathews, and Wilson-to inform them that Nashville had been selected as the planned
new hub. American had initially considered Denver, but that city's inability to build a
new airport in an acceptable timeframe had the airline redirecting its focus to the eastern
United States as part of an expansive growth plan. The saturation of major hubs led to an
airline focus on second tier hubs. Nineteen other cities, including Birmingham and
Louisville, were reportedly considered as well, but Nashville would be the hub if their
airport expansion could be refitted to suit American's plans (Ibid.). Nashville was
positioned to serve as a central point in American's cross-pattern network as an
intermediate stop between Florida and the Midwest, and the Northeast and Texas (Reed,
1993).
At that time, MNAA's plans were still in progress so the negotiations were timely
and could influence the infrastructural investments. The addition of a third runway was
crucial. MNAA pursued a fast track construction schedule to comply with the wishes of
American, which expressed confidence in MNAA and General Moore's ability to deliver.
Additional bonds were issued to cover the new American concourse and runway.
American's involvement in planning the new terminal was significant. For the first time
in Nashville, one airline became almost an equal partner to MNAA in the airport.
Financially, it was responsible for all the amenities in the new C and D concourses.
Because of American's hub decision, the Nashville airport plan expanded from a 30-gate
to a 46-gate terminal when it opened in October 1987. Additional construction of
runways and runway extensions continued until 1994. The bond financed expansion and
continuous improvements have cost $300 million.
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The Nashville airport is only eight miles from downtown Nashville. Long before
an expansion proposal was concrete and before suburbanization had surrounded the site
in eastern Davidson County, the city purchased large swaths of land to eliminate barriers
to future expansion. This strategy has enabled the airport to expand contiguously from the
original WPA airport of a modest 340 acres to 4,460 acres today. At one point, a
consultant suggested that a new airport should be built in an adjoining county, but Tune
and the board pursued expansion at the old location (Mathews, 2001). MNAA was not
willing to give up its central location, forego the opportunity of future industrial and
commercial real estate around it, and abandon Davidson County for a suburban
municipality as the board largely represented local Nashville rather than regional
interests.
Predictably, despite land use suggestions in the long-term master plan, additional
residential real estate developments had occurred in the vicinity of the airport. A
hypothetical runway location was specified, but as master plans and reality are often two
very different things, lax planning allowed residential development south of the new
runway. Because of the intervention of American Airlines, the runway was fast-tracked,
surprising the residents surrounding the airport, who wanted to stop the entire project.
American Airlines put pressure on officials by declaring that no runway meant no hub, a
move that was front-page news in 1987. Noise pollution became a thorn in the side of
MNAA and has been since then; this issue also included a major controversy surrounding
construction of a fourth runway after 1989. Homes in subdivisions immediately south of
the airport had to be purchased in 1986.
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The Donelson area to the north was also affected, but a buy-out was not feasible
because the land could not be integrated into the commercial districts surrounding the
airport. Representing several hundred households in Donelson, an organization called
Neighbors Organized to Insure a Sound Environment (NOISE) became the major
opponent of airport expansion. These homes were virtually unsellable on the market.
Through various legal means, NOISE tried to stop both the terminal and the runway, but
MNAA eventually won the lawsuit against NOISE to continue construction. The third
runway opened in November 1989 after several years of neighborhood protest. But the
noise problem had to be addressed as the houses in question were in the approach of the
runway (Figure 9.2). A plan for noise abatement was developed with the aid of
Congressman Bob Clement where MNAA could issue bonds instead of applying and
waiting for federal money to proceed with an incremental noise abatement program, as

_..,.

Figure 9.2 Noise exposure map 1988. Source: MNAA. Used by permission.
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had been customary nationwide until then. Installation of thicker windows, doors, and
attic insulation during the five-year program included 2,400 homes at a cost of $95
million (Willis, 2000). MNAA was first in using the program that Clement introduced.
Another political concession was made to expand the MNAA board to include a
neighborhood representative, a person living within a five-mile radius of the airport.

MNAA had political support from the city. Active help came from the Metro
Government and an airport expansion task force to coordinate local issues. Then-Mayor
Richard Fulton (2000) thinks that MNAA treated the residents fairly, making funds
available to reduce the noise, but admits that the long-term planning and land use process
had broken down allowing development in the first place. However, there have been
claims that MNAA board appointments represent political opportunities for mayors to
build a group of like-minded people in those positions, resulting in a systematic lack of
critical neighborhood advocates (Newman, 1994). Despite the history of councilmanic
courtesy in Nashville, councilmen representing neighborhoods around the airport could
not mount a political challenge and forge a citywide opposition. Neither could they
secure solid support from the next mayor, Bill Boner, who was ambivalent on airport
expansion vs. neighborhood concerns and the conflict between pro-growth and anti
growth forces. Since then, the issue has not been as politically potent as it was in the
1980s and early 1990s. It was even hoped that Nashville's airport would be among the
world's largest by 2005 (Moore, 1989, November 10). A plan for a fifth runway existed,
but it was contingent on an expected doubling on the American hub, which never
materialized. A large piece of land has instead been offered through a land lease from
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MNAA to Dell Computers which, as documented earlier, has located a manufacturing

unit close to airport.

9.4 The rise and demise of the American Airlines hub

The major renovation of the airport was ready in September 1987. The number of flights
almost doubled in a year with the American Airlines hub in place (Figure 9.3). By 1993,
American had 70 percent of the Nashville market, a relatively normal market dominance
for a mid-size hub city (Goetz & Sutton, 1997). The investment appeared to have paid
off: between 1985-1988, $200 million worth of bonds were issued, while multiplier
effects from more business, investments, employment (the Saturn location decision was
influenced by the new airport), and visitors reaching the local economy were predicted
at$500 million by MNAA and the Chamber of Commerce (Nashville Magazine, 1987;

Total passenger traffic at Nashville airport 1979-1999
11

i••
l
C

10

9
8
6
5

! i I

year

I

Figure 9.3 Passenger traffic at the Nashville airport 1979-1999. Source: MNAA, various
years.
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Young, 1988, January 24). In 1990, the expansion was considered the shining beacon in
an otherwise slumping local economy. Fleet maintenance of American's commuter
subsidiary, American Eagle, added new jobs. The airport area became the hottest
submarket in real estate, but like elsewhere in the city at the time, the area was affected
by overbuilding; it had a 25 percent vacancy rate by I 990 (Saponar et al., 1990, August
27). One of the few negatives was a downgraded bond rating because of the increasing
reliance on American Airlines (Doganis, 1992).

9.4.1 American Airlines reorganizes
Unfortunately, post-deregulation volatility in the industry meant that change was
imminent. American Airlines opened four hubs in two years, more than any other airline
in the country, and already had main hubs at Dallas and Chicago. In addition to
American's presence in Washington D.C. serving international traffic, American Airlines
opened hubs in San Jose, Nashville, Raleigh-Durham, and San Juan from 1985-1987
(Figure 9.4).
However, another airline shake-up had a considerable impact on American's
strategy. As part of the industry's restructuring, Eastern Airlines filed for bankruptcy.
American immediately moved into Miami, filling the void Eastern left in order to open
up a South American corridor with Miami as a central connector. American's focus
shifted greatly, and flights were cancelled at Nashville and Raleigh-Durham. With Miami
in the network, American had overextended its capacity for north-south routing along the
east coast, and as a result decommissioned the Raleigh-Durham hub. It took the Raleigh
Durham airport until I 999 to supercede the number of flights it had during the early
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Figure 9.4 The American Airlines network in the early 1990s. (Reprinted from Journal of
Transport Geography, Vol. 1, S-L. Shaw, Hub structures of major US passenger airlines,
Pages 47-58, 1993, with permission from Elsevier.)
1990s peak (Debbage, 1999). But American Airlines was still spread too thin and
suffered a loss of $22 million in 1992 and $7 million in 1993. It closed San Jose while
scaling down in Nashville. At the end of 1995, American announced what was already
apparent: Nashville was no longer a hub.
American Airlines peaked in Nashville in 1992 and began a gradual pull-out of
flights in 1993. At the same time, total passengers '�enplaned" and "deplaned"-which
includes through traffic that merely changes flights in Nashville-saw a downward trend.
Nashville's total passenger traffic peaked at 10.3 million in 1992 and dropped to 7
million in 1996 before the trend was reversed (Figure 9.5). At its peak, American
Airlines operated 280 daily flights from Nashville, which was cut to 52 in 1996. Overall,
average daily flight service reached 652 in September 1993, but dropped to 392 by
February 1996 (Bolick, 1996, February 26).
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Figure 9.5 Passenger traffic by airline 1979-1999. Source: MNAA, various years.
However, American Airlines did not depart from Nashville entirely. The scaling down
was gradual, which allowed Nashville to form a crisis response. After all, "the hub has
been the single biggest factor in the growth and success of the local economy" (Joe
Rodgers, quoted in DuBose, 1995, January 5, p. 18). The reason why American did not
leave Nashville entirely had to do with their financial arrangements in Nashville
compared to Raleigh-Durham and other airports. In Nashville, American Airlines was,
and still remains, a signatory carrier that acts as a guarantor of the airport's debt and is
responsible for long-term lease agreements at concourses C and D. As of fall 2000,
American still had 17 departures a day, mostly to other hub cities.

9.4.2 Southwest Airlines and post-hub development

Even before the new terminal was completed, Southwest Airlines was on the way to the
MNAA board to make Nashville not a hub, but a "focus city." In fact, when Bob
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Crandall, American Airlines CEO, announced that Nashville was going to be an
American hub, he beat Southwest by only days (Willis, 2000). That limited Southwest's
Nashville operations, but it remained eager to expand45 • When American searched for a
hub replacement but none was forthcoming, MNAA spoke to other carriers immediately
about expansion. Southwest seized the opportunity. and with the new gates could expand
from the previous 18 to over 100 flights a day. Practically every other carrier in Nashville
also added service, either through higher frequency or establishing new flights (Figure
9.5). Nashville was still attractive with a new terminal facility that ranked very high in
travelers' surveys (Davis, 1998, February 17), a reputation as one of the most efficiently
run airports in the country (Velocci, 1997, June 16), a good location, few weather delays,
and a favorable signatory carrier package.
Despite other airlines moving in to fill the void, the reality was that airport
suffered a tremendous setback in the number of flights leaving and arriving at Nashville.
However, MNAA portrays the loss of the hub as a blessing in disguise. First, American
Airlines exit has enabled more airlines to operate out of Nashville, and, indeed, the
airport has experienced a proliferation of operations (Bolick, 1996, February 26).
Disruption was minimized; in some cases, Nashville did not miss one day of service to
certain destinations, as those routes were instantly absorbed by other airlines (Willis,
2000). Second, hub cities often suffer from monopolistic pricing. Greater choices have
benefited consumers; budget airline Southwest is now the major airline, pressing down
the average ticket price in the Nashville market. The downside is that Southwest is rarely

45

Herbert Kelleher, the CEO of Southwest, decided that Nashville was a good market to move into after
visiting his daughter, who was attending Vanderbilt University (Petzinger, 1995).
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the first choice for business travelers. Especially the headquarters and the large
corporations that are financially important for the airport have less to gain from the new
structure. Businesspeople who prefer comfort and scheduling flexibility are unlikely
Southwest customers, as they are less sensitive to price than other travelers. Instead, they
favor a high level of service including high frequency flight schedule, frequent flyer
miles, and airport �ounge facilities (Button, et al. 1999). All of the�e things can be best
provided by a hub and airlines that compete with differentiation rath�r than price.
Furthermore, hubs are more likely to provide direct, less time-consuming flights, same
day return, and more international connections.
The second reason MNAA is touting the development of the last six years as a
success is the improvement in origin and destination (O&D) numbers (Figure 9.6). The
total number of travelers using the Nashville airport has decreased after the departure of
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Figure 9.6 Passenger traffic at the Nashville airport, total and local origin & destination.
Source: MNAA, various years.
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the American Airlines hub; however, there are more passengers ending or beginning their
journeys in Nashville. Basically, the O&D traffic is reflective of a successful local
economy and an extensive service area46• No multiplier effects are extended to car rentals
and hotel stays with non-O&D passengers. The number of O&D passengers at the
Nashville airport was 3.2 million in 1993, and has risen consistently in the 1990s (Bolick,
1996, Februray 26; Parker, 1997, August 11). In 1999, the total number of passengers
was 8.5 million, of which 6.2 million was O&D travel, which is crucial in recruiting non
hub air service.

9.5 Local policy and the airport as a growth engine

The marketing arrangement of air traffic is a complex interrelationship between airlines,
airport authorities, and government or corporate city boosters. The airlines are
responsible for their own general corporate promotion, but as all flights are local, place
based marketing for specific flights and airports is also necessary. Promoting the airport··
itself, and implicitly the city, has become the domain of airport authorities. Airlines are
benefiting from this necessity, and sometimes they have power to influence expenditures.
In Nashville, the signatory carriers approve the airport's budget. The airport authority, in
tum, realizes that airport marketing is inseparable from city marketing in general, and it
forms partnerships with other organizations. Partnership 2000 was formed in 1990 when
American's hub was still developing; air service became one of its first leading priorities.

46

The hinterland of the Nashville airport includes 79 counties within a 100-mile radius of Nashville and a
population of nearly 3 million. The basic tools in determining service areas are parking lot and baggage
claim surveys (Willis, 2000).
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One quasi-governmental entity is financially intertwined with another, as marketing
expenses are shared between MNAA and Partnership 2000.
The new American Airlines hub was used in Partnership 2000 advertisements in
business press to market the airport and its facilities in connection with the city's quality
of life and business opportunities. Advertising was paid for by Partnership 2000, but
MNAA was a lead investor in Partnership 2000. The marketing plan experienced
problems from the beginning. As ads were running in Fortune in 1991, American
Airlines' internal problems-a pilot strike-and cutbacks affecting Nashville made the
bright aviation future alluded to in the advertisements highly improbable. Partnership
2000 and MNAA debated whether or not to withdraw the ads, but the promotional
message of Nashville as a good transportation location remained important. The main
purpose of the ad "is to raise CEO awareness of Nashville as a business address, with
good air transportation alternatives" (Sherrard, quoted in Hobbs, 1991, January 14 ).
Further marketing programs to sell Nashville's airline hub, along with the city as
a tourist destination, began in 1991 and were directed by American Airlines with support
from government tourism offices, the Chamber, and other corporate sponsors (Hobbs,
1 992, April 1 ). One strategy was to target audiences in 19 cities connected with the
Nashville hub with ads placed in the various market newspapers and radio stations. A
1993 campaign included infomercials on cable stations and free advertising on CMT
Europe (courtesy of its owner Gaylord Entertainment), as a new London route would
hopefully revitalize Nashville travel. In fact, American was the beneficiary of millions of
dollars worth of in-kind contributions to promote Nashville as a tourist destination and
American Airlines as the way to get there. These included the broadcast time donated
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from Gaylord, and direct financial assistance from Partnership 2000. Market research
suggested that passenger increases during the fall of 1993 were the result of Partnership
2000's promotion of American Airlines and the Nashville hub (Hall, 1993, November
22). Local traffic continued to increase 13 percent in 1994, possibly influenced by the
advertising (DuBose, 1995, January 5). The fact that the Chamber of Commerce, through
Partnership 2000, spent their own money to support one particular corporation was not
received well among the other airlines, which called the Chamber's policy favoritism and
anti-free market (DuBose, 1993, October 14).
The support from Partnership 2000 was matched by enthusiasm from local
government. A next step where the city could potentially have some clout was the
development of international travel. MNAA entered into lengthy negotiations with
American Airlines to acquire an international route47• MNAA had been assured by
consultants that Nashville could sustain international flights, who suggested London,
Paris, or Frankfurt. A flight route in 1990 to Toronto had already made the airport
"international" (Keel, 1990, November 8). MNAA focused on a London route, which in
the case of most American cities is the number-one flight to Europe (unless a city
operates under a specific international gateway arrangement, such as Northwest's
Memphis-Amsterdam). This thrust coincided with Partnership 2000 efforts to increase
country music tourism from Britain. American Airlines, rethinking their Nashville hub at

47

The international aviation system is complex and regulated; usually, bilateral agreements between
countries determine the level of flight service, and ownership restrictions have limited globalization in the
industry. International airline alliances are the industry's response to bypass such regulations, but a
liberalized market with "open skies agreements" is growing (U.S. Department ofTransportation, 1999). As
of 2000, there was no open skies agreement with the UK; instead, United States has a bilateral agreement
determining the number of flights.
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this time, was less enthusiastic than MNAA, and instead MNAA had discussions with
Mayor Bredesen to circumvent American Airlines; the idea of a city-owned route was
tloated48 • Bredesen, having lived in London before moving to Nashville, undoubtedly
favored that destination. Moreover, Nashville's business and tourist connections with
Britain were stronger that with any European country, hence a flight to London was
sensible. The logic for the city to buy a route is compelling: if the city (or a quasi
governmental airport authority) is investing in building an international terminal
including customs facilities (which were completed in June 1994), maybe cities can own
that route instead of the airline. Moreover, the city and the region benefit perhaps even
more than the carrier through multiplier effects. In the volatile American Airlines era, the
idea had obvious appeal from the city's perspective.
An opportunity appeared with the merger between British Airways and US
Airways, which created a new airline--USAir-with superfluous flights to Britain, and
existing routes from Charlotte and Baltimore were cancelled. In an unusual move,
Nashville Metro government agreed with USAir to purchase one of the airline's London
routes for $5.5 million (Hobbs, 1993, June 14). It was unclear where that money should
come from. Mathews (2001) recalls: "Bredesen said .. .ifl can't get it in the city's budget,
I' 11 put up the money personally, because I think it's worth more than five million
dollars." Any international air route changes have to be approved by the U.S. Department
48

Exactly whose idea it was to pursue the strategy is not clear. It was reported that Mayor Bredesen
suggested the idea to Gen. William Moore, president ofthe Airport Authority (Hobbs, 1993, June 14), but
today Bredesen says he cannot recall if he personally developed the concept of buying the London route for
the city (200 I).
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of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Authority. A local government purchase of an
international route had never been suggested before. It not only confronted regulators
with a new question, but it was intriguing to all players in the airline industry-airlines,
airports and cities-and generated much national press (Busche, April 27, 1993; Cooper
& Pearl, September 21, 1993; Schmit, October 18, 1993). But USDOT was concerned
about future precedent-setting implications, and did not award Nashville Metro the
route49. Instead, American Airlines was awarded the two open London routes, one from
Nashville and one from Raleigh-Durham.
Even if the new route was not city-owned, civic boosters were elated over the
London connection. Not only was it seen as a sign of continuous prosperity-"the next
leap on Nashvi11e's road to economic greatness"-(DuBose & Dobie, 1994, April 7), but
it could also enhance American's desire to stay in Nashville as a hub carrier. The route
was inaugurated in May 1994 with four consecutive flights carrying, on special
invitation, practically everybody in Nashville's political and economic establishment.
Initially, the route was a success. Load factors were high the first months, about
80 percent, due to the novelty value and strong tourism traffic at the time (McCampbell,
1994, June 18), but American Airlines operated Nashville-London for only 15 months
before shutting it down. The route had an average 70 percent load factor during those 15
months (Willis, 2000). American said it was not enough to make a profit, while MNAA
still believes that the development of the route indicated long-term sustainability. The

49

USDOT argued that it was "not prepared to endorse an auction process that could rapidly come to
represent a widespread mechanism for reallocating these national assets on the basis of the deepest civic
pockets" (the USDOT order that clarified that cities cannot purchase airline routes, quoted in O'Brian,
November 8, 1993).
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disagreement stems from the fact that American Airlines was dismantling its Nashville
hub (although the route was cancelled before the hub was officially gone), and without it
they could not sustain an international flight. MNAA is currently still searching for
airlines and charter arrangements to rebuild international connections, especially with
Britain.
American's cuts in the flight schedule occurred at the same time Nashville was
actively promoting the hub. "There was a lot of talk about what we should do. What kind
of incentives can we give them to stay" (Willis, 2000). Both local government and
business acted on behalf of American Airlines to make their operations more profitable.
American Airlines CEO Crandall met with the mayor and Nashville business leaders in
1993, and said that 300,000 new passengers a year, or eight per flight, was needed to
make the hub profitable. The prosperity of airline operations are dependent on long-term
changes in local business and population growth, but in the short run, there are a few
things that the city can do. A convention center, for example, automatically generates
more air passenger traffic. Bredesen made the explicit connection between supporting
Opryland's expansion and securing the airline hub. When American announced that it
needed eight more passengers per airplane, the Opryland expansion could provide four of
them (Hobbs, 1993, June 14). The tax-subsidized expansion increased Nashville's
convention capacity dramatically, even though it could not make a difference regarding
the hub.
American Airlines was favored in public policy in other ways as well. In 1994,
the Tennessee legislature granted a jet fuel tax exemption specifically aimed at American.
The deal was broadened to benefit Memphis-based FedEx to satisfy West Tennessee
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representatives as well. American even leaned on Metro government to help them make
their routes more profitable by, for example, flying first class, but such flagrant disregard
of lowest-cost purchasing procedures could not be accommodated by the city (Bredesen,
2001).
Moreover, American Airlines wanted the city's business elite to commit to
keeping the hub. As part of a "Fly American" campaign, Partnership 2000 focused on
increasing local business traffic on American. A calling effort targeted 180 local
companies with the largest travel budgets to persuade them to use American. Robert
Mathews, both as a Chamber activist and MNAA board member, coordinated the effort
on behalf of Partnership 2000 to draw together 60 to 70 executives who "did the door
knocking and arm twisting" which led to "mildly positive results" (Foster, 1994, May
16). As mentioned earlier, the Chamber and Gaylord Entertainment also entered a joint
marketing agreement with American to increase incoming tourist traffic.
Nashville did respond with support for the airline, "but in the end American didn't
support the community. There was some bitterness in the community regarding
American" (Willis, 2000). Mayor Bredesen, the city, and the local business elite feel they
put their prestige on the line, as well as hundreds of thousands of dollars, to promote the
American hub. "We tried to oblige them for a while, but I have very ill feelings about that
whole thing. I don't think their management at the time, and one of the few businesses
I've dealt with, were shooting straight." (Bredesen, 2001). American Airlines' corporate
culture under hard-nosed CEO Bob Crandall left little room for compromises between
theairline and localities. Since 1996, Southwest Airlines has instead been the partner in
Nashville advertising (Figure 9.7). Recent campaigns have involved cooperation between
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Figure 9.7 A wall mural in central Nashville at the corner of Fifth Avenue South and
Franklin Street celebrating Southwest Airlines' presence. Photo: Author.
Southwest, the Convention and Visitors Bureau, and the state (Wibking, 1998, October
13). Partnership 2000 and the Nashville business elite have been less active in airport
promotion and policy.

9.6 Air traffic and the entrepreneurial city: Some concluding thoughts

Deregulation not only changed how airlines operate, but also how airports operate. So
long as the government had a strong hand in determining where airlines could fly, little
incentive existed for an airport to market itself. The possibility of influencing future route
development was limited to political connections. Current airport strategy testifies to the
fact that airports are very competitive in marketing themselves to the airlines. Under
deregulation, the attention of airport authorities has shifted from government regulators to
airlines as their powers have increased. "It's our job to educate the airlines about what the
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market wants" says MNAA (Willis, 2000), which put together promotional packages
presented to targeted airlines whose geographic strategies would work well in Nashville.
Such packages include market potential, general regional economic data, growth
projections, livability, and the like (see, for example, Metropolitan Nashville Airport
Authority, 2000, November). The time from the sales pitch to a successful deal with new
air service usual!y takes from six months to two years.
Business interests can also influence the network arrangement. When American
Airlines planned to cancel its routes to Los Angeles, Music Row threatened to
collectively instruct their travel agents not to use American Airlines. American responded
by scheduling two more flights to the West Coast (Mathews, 2001 ). After the demise of
the American hub, MNAA has worked closely with the Chamber of Commerce and
Partnership 2000 investigating the needs of the business community, which warrants
special attention. The business community was the most disrupted by the American
Airlines move; their bets had been placed with American, and air service was taking a no
frills tum in Nashville. Based on the Chamber's wishes, MNAA analyzed market
deficiencies and competed for flight routes that can be supported. The Chamber surveys
their members annually on travel behavior, ensuring that travel-intensive industries such
as health care (in one year, HCA booked over 42,000 flights out of Nashville) can specify
where they need to get to in the morning and come back at night (Willis, 2000). Such
scheduling is also available to Detroit for the automotive industry (Davis, 2000, June 18).
Here, airport authorities are caught in the dilemma of trying to serve the public at lowest
possible cost and accommodating business by obtaining and maintaining a hub. In its
marketing plan for 1998-2002, Partnership 2000 worries that Nashville is facing strong
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competition from cities with better air service. Such internal documents suggest that
MNAA is incorrect, at least from business' perspective, when suggesting that the city is
better off with improving O&D data instead of a hub.
The loss of the American Airlines hub indicates that airlines are important
players, but do not necessarily develop local ties. As users of an airport facility they
remain for the most part non-local entities. Cities may try to create stronger place
dependencies for airlines through signatory carrier agreements, but in this case, those
efforts could not overcome the volatility of the market. The qualitative strength of
coalitions between cities and airlines is a factor that can impact the air network. In this
case, American Airlines was perceived as "not shooting straight," not being a team
player. It was not only Nashville that was uncomfortable with American Airlines. The
company's aggressive corporate style had earned them the nickname "Arrogant Airlines"
among the regulators at USDOT in Washington (Reed, 1993). Airports around the
country are vulnerable to the geographic demands of the airline industry, but the question
remains open whether the outcome would have been different if some other airline had
established a hub in Nashville.
The local response of this dependency situation was Bredesen's attempt at buying
the London route, a good example at innovative policy conceived at the local level from
local experiences in an era when federal urban policy has modest aspirations. In the end,
national regulators turned down Nashville's request, but there is no obvious reason why
the outcome could not have been different. The city was confronted by a situation where
an argument could be made that the city itself should reap the benefits of having a route.
If federal authorities had accepted Nashville's argument, the implications would be
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profound, as costly inter-city competition could erupt when desirable international flights
are available. If city-owned, a Nashville-London route would most likely still exist today;
perhaps with low profitability, but presumably with other regional economic benefits.
Interestingly, the MNAA structure was intended to shelter airport operations from
political action. This progressive notion should be reexamined with respect to Bredesen's
involvement in airport business-active engagement in recruiting an international route
and changing the time frame which board members serve from seven- to four-year terms.
Nobody has raised a concern or called his actions inappropriate, even if the city buying a
route would be the ultimate political involvement. This reveals that the idea of undue
politicization is viewed selectively. Politics is something that gets in the way of the
business of running an enterprise, even if it is quasi-governmental. Because of these
tendencies, the Nashville business elite is pleased with the arrangement of a public, but
flexible airport authority. It is popular in business circles to serve on the MNAA board
(Willis, 2000), which is considered a powerful entity. The regional benefits and the
public good function are so strong that the privatization issue has not been raised. In
some places, support for privatization has gained strength, but in Nashville, the
government and the MNAA have a businesslike arrangement, representing amicable local
capital-state relations in the post-Fordist era.
Currently, the Nashville airport as an object of public policy has faded from
public concern. Fewer passengers, smaller planes, and cancelled routes have led to a
decline of traffic at the Nashville airport (Bernard, 2002, December 22), and airlines are
not in an expansive mood; reorganization of the network is not imminent. The airport has
moved from being a growth engine in its own right to being a reflection of Nashville's
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general growth. Located between hubs in Memphis, Atlanta, Charlotte, and Cincinnati,
Nashville's airport cannot currently expand traffic beyond what the local market can
support. It is now facing local competition in the mid-South rather than national
competition in the hub network system (Davis, 2000, June 18). As a policy tool, the
airport is dormant and has re-entered a managerial rather than an entrepreneurial mode.
The Nashville business elite has been less actively involved since the loss of American
Airlines hub. What can be interpreted as a window of opportunity that was opened by
deregulation is now again shut for mid-size cities (at least as long as the future
arrangement of the airline network is undetermined as the industry is suffering from
prolonged crisis). For Nashville, the experience included both successes and failures, but
the question is if airports as a locus for local entrepreneurialism has been an illusion; this
is a question that perhaps other case studies can answer.
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10. BUSINESS ENGAGEMENT IN LOCAL EDUCATION: EMERGING
SOCIAL REGULATION

"As a businessperson you get involved in all these things that you
think are good for the city, and you get to know what makes it tick.
You get to know the political and non-profit entities, find out what
helps build strength. Education is the big issue right now"
(Nashville real estate developer Robert Mathews, 2001 ).
10.1 Reproducing the labor force and building civic capacity

Public education is held in low esteem by many, and education is high on the reform
agenda in cities around the country. Not only is public education seen as incapable of
providing individual students the necessary skills, but also as limiting future economic
progress and prosperity. Business is generally as negative towards the performance of
schools as the general public; however, it tends to be more positive about reform
possibilities, viewing schools as an enterprise in need of better management. Local
business interests have become one of the leading forces of education reform, a marked
shift from the recent past and an important example of changing social regulation on the
local level.
Many people, both in Nashville and nationwide, trace the current reform
movement to a 1983 federal study, A Nation at Risk, which warned against "the rising
tide of mediocrity" (p. 5) in the American educational system. The report outlined a
broad reform agenda, but what is particularly interesting is the rationale behind the call
for educational improvement, and to whom it was implicitly directed. A Nation at Risk is
a Reagan-era document where fear of losing the competitive edge is evident as economic
globalization was taking off and the F ordist system was crumbling. In the eyes of
business and many policymakers� apart from an outmoded industrial organization, a
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fundamental problem was the inability to e�ucate a productive workforce. Employers
complained they had to absorb costs that ought to be a public responsibility. Poorly
educated workers had to learn on the job what they should have been taught in school.
European apprentice programs and Japanese study ethics and test scores were much
envied. The report continues: "Our once unchallenged preeminence in commerce,
industry, science, and technological inno\'ation is being overtaken by competitors
throughout the world ...we live among determined, well educated, and strongly motivated
competitors. We compete with them for international standing and markets, not only with
products but with the ideas" (p. 5). Because education "undergirds American prosperity,"
A Nation at Risk makes the case for recasting education in the light of economic
competitiveness. The time has come, it is argued, when the abundance of resources is not
enough, but learning and skills are the determinants of success. Therein lay the main
obstacle; achievement levels had suffered a long-term decline, a disturbing break with the
notion of progress so dominant in modem thought. The problem had deep roots beyond
the school walls: there is a "shoddiness in many walks of American life ... This
shoddiness is too often reflected in our schools" (p. 6). The U.S. economy, indeed the
entire nation, had lost its edge, lulled into a leisurely state. It received a stern warning in
the report: "history is not kind to idlers" (p. 6). The document was taken as a call to
business interests. American capitalism had not only lost sight of its core
characteristic-unbridled competition-but business interests must shape human capital
formation in a more active manner.
Education improvement is a difficult, long-term solution to sustaining economic
growth; and as I will argue here, it is an emerging part of the general regulation of post278

Fordism. The business interest in education has shifted from the initial incentive of
raising productivity through a better-educated labor force to a broader agenda of social
reform. Education has always has been a local concern, of course, but education reform
pushed by local regimes with a broad coalition base, including business, indicates a
stronger focus on active social policy formation on the local level. Local educational
policy and reform can be situated within contemporary anti-federalist and devolutionary
thought and is, at least ideally, a way to come to terms with the problems in postF ordism.
On the local level, business-friendly policies, especially the general emphasis on
low taxes, suffer from a contradiction with regards to public investment in human capital.
As labor mobility remains much lower than capital, local skill level is one factor that
limits economic development. Because of the high level of variability in education, not
only between regions, but also between urban, suburban, and rural districts, a good public
school system is important. Knowledge-intensive economic activity increasingly
demands a good educational infrastructure. From a political economy perspective,
education can be viewed as the crucial component in the reproduction of the labor
force-together with broader labor relations, education constitutes a local mode of
regulation. The local governance structure of education, as we will explore in this
chapter, includes actors such as city government, the school board, the state, business and
labor organizations, labor practices and conventions, race, ideology, and the historical
path dependency of place. With some variation between cities, these actors have created
local capacities and institutions that can address the education problem. A key point here
is that new forms of training and education are taking place in local places to produce a
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work force that may be, more than anything, designed to be competitive vis-a-vis other
places (Painter, 1995).
Much of what is known about current urban school reform in United States, and
the local political environment in which it operates, comes from a large comparative
study of 11 cities entitled Civic Capacity and Urban Education with political scientist
Clarence Stone as the principal investigator (Jones et al., 1997; Stone, 1998; Portz et al.,
1999; Stone et al., 2001; Stone, 2001). Following Stone et al. (2001), success or failure in
the education arena is dependent on what they call local civic capacity, which arises from
the collective action of important local stakeholders.
There are several factors that may influence the level of civic capacity in a
particular place. Coalitions that do emerge, according to Stone et al. (2001), can be
assessed along three dimensions: breadth--the level of participation among divergent
interest groups; cohesion-the level of consensus among these interests regarding the
reform path; and durability-the temporal strength of these coalitions and emerging
institutions. Cities with a low socioeconomic level, very fragmented political interests, or
a history of federal oversight have a harder time developing civic capacity. In all cases,
historically contingent factors are strongly influential.
The desirable outcome of local civic capacity building is effective school reform.
Different types of institutional changes have been proposed and implemented to various
degrees. Decentralization within the existing organization of school bureaucracies is
popular, usually so called site-based management, as are calls for "accountability," the
idea that individual schools should be evaluated by performance through quantitative
measurement, usually test scores. More drastic is the implementation of school
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competition. The voucher system allows students to leave poorly performing public
schools. The philosophical underpinning ofthe voucher system and its potential benefits
suggests that only substantive alternatives to public monopoly on education can improve
student learning, at least ifmicroeconomic principles are the best tools to understand and
approach the problem. The establishment ofcharter schools reflects privatization and
deregulation, as they are managed independently on a non-profit or commercial basis by
Education Management Organizations (EMOs) for the public school system. This
movement is currently in doubt as EMOs have shown little progress in delivering
education at a lower cost and improving test scores compared to traditional arrangements
(Fitz & Beers, 2002). A partial solution to make some public schools more attractive is
the creation ofmagnet schools where only gifted students are admitted. The classroom
approach, changing the learning process, also remains a major component ofreform.
Various curriculum and pedagogical innovations have been implemented locally. Recent
federal legislation also calls for national standards to guard against local failure. Other
issues that perhaps should not be included in a list ofreform options, but nevertheless
play important roles locally, are the questions of funding levels and the districting and
selection ofstudents-who goes where. Finally, the relationship between schools and
local community and the institutional framework that must be in place to effectively
accommodate communication between the two is essential in civic capacity formation
and school reform.
Most cities have pursued reform with some force. All 11 case cities in the Civic
Capacity and Urban Education project have taken education seriously, but with modest
success in improvements. Stone et al. (2001) attribute this to the lack oflong-term
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commitment from the community at-large and the problem of converting "short-term
alliances into institutionalized relationships" (p. 2). Most places are suffering from
superintendents with short tenure, the pursuit of the latest pedagogical or organizational
trend, and business interests whose overriding concern is to make schools cost-efficient
rather than good performers. Moreover, schools do not only serve as education
institutions, but especially in the middle-class African American community, their role as
a provider of employment has become so pervasive that other concerns have in effect
become politically secondary. Orr (1998), for example, contends that "race, jobs, and
politics" are the main obstacles to reform in Baltimore.
Even in the best of circumstances where various interests agree on the importance
of schools for the future well-being of the community, the plurality of school politics
makes coordinated efforts and tangible improvements hard to achieve. Neither is civic
capacity automatically transferable from one arena to another. While Atlanta has been
successful in other aspects of economic development, its capacity to effectively coalesce
around school reform has been largely unsuccessful; it ranks at the bottom of the cities
studied in the Civic Capacity and Urban Education project (Stone, 2001). No biracial
coalition has been built; instead, racialized discourses, distrust, and fragmented interests
have characterized Atlanta school politics. Both in Houston and Atlanta, business
communities have been active in school reform but have tended to emphasize efficiency
and spending limitations rather than applying a broader approach (Stone, 1998).
Similarly, the high profile of desegregation in the local community, overwhelming black
dominance of the public student body, and rigid bureaucracy marginalized business
interests in school reform in St. Louis (Jones et al., 1997).
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On the other hand, cities with enduring institutions dedicated to school
improvement with extra-local support has continued to progress, such as in El Paso
(Stone, 2001). Pittsburgh also benefits from long-standing cooperative arrangements
between local government and business, and such a consensus has produced business
involvement in education that goes back for several decades, a more extensive
partnership than in most cities. In Boston, The Vault, an organization similar to the
Watauga Group, initiated a public-private partnership called Boston Compact focusing on
education starting in the early 1980s. Business leaders have had significant impact on
reform by threatening to withhold support unless the appropriate reforms, such as site
based management, are implemented. However, federal oversight and racial tension has
limited business' consensus-building agenda in Boston. Even if the general conclusion is
that a school system under federal court supervision is not likely to find a strong local
support through civic capacity, the need for progress can lead to "court-induced
consensus," like in San Francisco (Fraga et al., 1998).
Even if no clear trend of improvement emerges from the 11 cities, all of them
have witnessed a business community playing a stronger role than in the past. Business
interests are even perceived as the most influential actor in school decision-making,
ahead of the school board, teachers, the mayor, and others (Stone et al. 2001). Business
may or may not have been successful in exercising power, promoting its agenda, or
producing tangible results, but in all cases it has tried. Stone views business engagement
as a positive, even necessary, ingredient in school reform, creating the necessary breadth
in formulating a local agenda. Others take a more critical view of school-business
partnerships in particular, calling them a threat to democratic participation (Taylor,
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2000). However, business hegemony in education policy is unlikely in most places. With
increasing levels of citizen involvement in education as well as other local issues.
business taking a seat at the table is reasonable.
The strengths and the drawbacks of the civic capacity studies are the same as
those found in urban regime theory: the importance of the locality and possible synergy
between various interest groups that can advance a community's capacity to approach
challenges are thoroughly explored, while the connections with broader political and
economic forces beyond the city limits are scarcely addressed. It is assumed that
globalization has somehow activated corporate interests, but this research does not further
address the logic behind that assessment. It is, therefore, necessary to connect the insights
from regime building in the education arena with ideas on the growing importance of
social regulation on the local level. To explore this connection, I will return to Nashville
and investigate how its business elite has pursued education reform.

10.2 A struggling education system under federal supervision

History is an inescapable part of understanding educational policy in any city. Nashville's
school system was under federal oversight for decades, and no major initiative has been
implemented without an eye to how it will affect desegregation. As elsewhere in the
South, white Nashville engaged in resistance to school integration. The city's most
notorious event was the 1956 bombing of the Hattie Cotton Elementary School in East
Nashville. This incident came in the wake of the 1955 Kelley v. The Board of Education
that challenged the slow integration of Nashville high schools. Before unification,
Davidson County had a fragmented, quadruple school system based on both geography
284

(city and county) and race (black and white}--separate and unequal. Kelley v. The Board
of Education was not ultimately resolved until 1971, when a federal court handed the
school system a desegregation order. In a fragmented political system and strong home
rule sentiment, desegregation is unlikely to succeed; but when geography is conducive to
reform, as in a county-wide educational system like Nashville's, desegregation is more
likely to be more effective (McDermott, 1998). A redrawing of Nashville school districts
created more integrated schools to reach the mandated goal of25-30 percent minority
representation in each school, reflecting the overall racial make-up in the school system.
The additional solution to the combination of persistent residential segregation
and school desegregation was busing. Predictably, the plan resulted in a surge of white
children enrolling in private schools. Approximately 8,600 white students left the public
school system the year following the implementation of the busing order. Census data
shows that the school-age population in Davidson County attending private schools
jumped from 8.7 percent in 1970 to 15.9 percent in 1980. This was an unprecedented
increase, as private school enrollment had been stagnant or even declining during the
1960s. Undoubtedly, busing was the most emotionally charged local political issue at the
time. The response to busing was unanimously negative among whites and while mixed
feelings persisted among blacks, many accepted it at first as a necessary means to achieve
equality. Pride and Woodard ( 1985) conclude that busing partially achieved its goals.
Contrary to public opinion, busing improved race relations in general and pupil
performance was not negatively affected; in fact, black scores increased somewhat. The
problem was that public confidence in public schools was shattered by busing and did not
recover for decades, especially among the group that must be its greatest supporter-the
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white middle class. Sitting Mayor Beverly Briley was challenged, but eventually survived
a 1970 mayoral campaign facing a councilman named Casey Jenkins who ran on a one
issue platform of resistance to busing. Relying on his general popularity, Briley could
deflect populist anti-busing opposition, which could have thrown Nashville into a
quagmire of racial politics. The 1971 busing plan was in place until 1980 when local
judge Tom Wiseman ruled that busing was no longer necessary. This decision was
overruled by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which created a complex system of
busing based on age cohorts, where black and white children would alternate in being
bused to schools in other parts of the city. Since 1980, white flight has for the most part
been stemmed and private school attendance has increased at a slow pace, from 15. 9
percent of all school age children in 1980 to 17.5 in 2000.
The tendency of the Nashville elite to send their children to private schools has
traditionally made them indifferent to public schools. This can decrease the tendency for
political mobilization on behalf of public schools among the elite as well as the middle
class. The individual logic is compelling: as changes in a school system are long-term,
few individuals are willing to commit to the local public school system, either by sending
their children to a public school or by expending social capital on its improvement.
Instead, it is only as a collective entity that business can address the issue. The overall
demographic structure may also work against urban school districts if younger families
suburbanize and reside outside the jurisdiction of the central city, which makes the
natural supporting group of school involvement smaller. Stone et al. (2001) suggest that
the propensity for urban school districts to have fewer white children than overall racial
population data indicate is equally attributable to age structure-white families with
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school age children are underrepresented-and private school flight. Figure 10.1 shows a
higher than average private school attendance in Nashville compared to peer cities,
although well below Louisville and New Orleans. It should be noted, though, that the
local structure of school systems, e.g. county-wide v. fragmented systems, create
different incentives for public school abandonment.
Perhaps the closest parallel to Nashville in terms of county size, racial
composition, and a county-wide system is Charlotte, North Carolina. If one views
enrollment in private schools as triggered by changes in the public school system, again
Nashville compares poorly. As evident in Figure 10.1, the 1970s were a crisis period
where private schooling increased rapidly in most cities. Only Memphis exhibited a more
drastic pattern of public school flight than Nashville, although Charlotte and Jacksonville
largely mirrored the trend as well. While private schooling appears, to various degrees,
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Figure 10.1 Percent school age population enrolled in private schools (grades 1-12) in
Nashville and peer cities. For a relevant comparison, the geographic unit used is the
entire central county of each city. Source: US Bureau of the Census, various years.
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to have lost its appeal during the 1980s, a small increase is again detected during the last
decade.
Unfortunately, desegregation and busing in Nashville did little to diminish the
racial achievement gap. Some blacks even perceived it as harmful to black identity and
community institution building, as blacks bore the burden of busing (Pride & Woodard,
1985). As busing was never viewed by anyone involved as a satisfactory solution, the
search for other mechanisms to satisfy the desegregation requirements led to the
establishment of magnet schools in the mid-1980s. The ultimate goal was not to better
serve gifted children, but rather to achieve mandated racial balance within the school
system. A court-ordered quota system where, in practice, all qualified black students are
admitted and white students are selected randomly has produced the wanted results.
Currently, the school system is 44 percent white and 48 percent black, and the prescribed
racial ratio of each magnet school is 60 percent white and 40 black with a 10 percent
margin. This has been achieved, as magnet schools have a black student body of 30-35
percent (Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 2001b). Even with an expansion-the
number of magnet schools increased from three in 1992 to eight in 1998-the program
has not progressed as fast as anticipated. The major reason is that most interested and
qualified minority students have been absorbed by magnet schools and further expansions
would most likely lower the share of blacks overall in magnet schools, which has also
been acknowledged by internal memos in the school system (Phillips & Read, 1995,
September 28). There have been reports of empty seats reserved for black students while
a long waiting list for whites exists, as well as problems with the random selection
process. The public dissatisfaction with what was supposed to be the jewel in the system
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was especially voiced in the mid- l 990s by outspoken school board member Murray
Phillip (whose son was not selected for a magnet school), who opposed the quota system.
The inherent problem with magnet schools also became apparent: instead of a
racially based segregation pattern, strong class segregation has emerged. Because
selection was based on voluntary, unsolicited applications and no transportation was
provided, students from affluent families have been overrepresented. As noted in a
Vanderbilt study, the class effect was especially strong in Nashville, with its county-wide
and socio-economically diverse student population, compared to other cities in the study
(Phillips & Read, 1995, September 28).
Most agree that the long-standing court order has affected the school system
negatively. With white flight and busing, a large segment of the population became
disillusioned with the public schools. The prevailing attitude was that the public schools
did not have the children's best interests at heart, an attitude rooted in the fact that the
school system is restricted to operate within a framework imposed from above: all major
changes within the school system must take place with court approval. Even if the
purpose is laudable, it limits the avenues of action for the school administration. This was
the state of things for almost 30 years. Nashville had a whole generation of affluent and
middle-class people who never considered public schools as an option (Knestrick, 2001 ).
In no small part, the negative perception of the public school system was related
to relatively low levels of funding. Overall taxation in Nashville is strongly affected by
the level of taxation in Tennessee, which was 49th in per capita taxation among U.S.
states in 1998; also, the taxation structure is regressive in nature with a strong
dependency on sales tax (Sharp, 2000, April 26). Because of that, Nashville recently had
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the sixth overall lowest tax burden among the nation's largest metropolitan areas.
Compared to peer cities, Nashville's average family tax burden was reported as 66
percent of that in Birmingham, 58 percent of that in Charlotte, and 51 percent of that in
Louisville (Graham, 1996, August 12). This revenue limitation naturally affects school
spending. As in most places, education spending is the biggest item in the local budget.
Any given year, the school system consumes about 40 percent of Nashville's budget.
(The school district's operational budget is funded one-third from state sales tax and two
thirds from local property and sales taxes.) However, of the 48 largest school systems in
the country, Nashville was ranked 46th with $4,112 per pupil annual spending compared
to the average $5,643 in the mid- l 990s (Holladay, 1996, July 18). But with recent tax
increases, Nashville's school expenditure has gained on the national average. It is
currently $7,038 compared to $7,436 nationally (while the Tennessee average is only
$6,055). Teachers' salaries in Nashville are also very near the national average
(Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 2000). This has been possible because the low
level of state support is offset by high city taxation. Per capita city taxation in Nashville
is $1,349, while peer cities range from $373 in Memphis to $839 in Birmingham (U.S.
Bureau of the Census, 2000b). As a consolidated city-county government, this
comparison probably overestimates relative taxation in Nashville where no separate
county tax exists, although it should be noted that consolidated Jacksonville and
Indianapolis have lower local taxes than Nashville.
One way of reforming the educational system is simply by increasing the funding
level. The recession during Boner's mayoral period of 1987-1991 induced a fiscal crisis,
and the Metro government was forced to cut the funding for local schools as a result of
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budget shortfalls. According to a study conducted by the Nashville Chamber, $3,553 was
spent on each student in metropolitan Nashville during the 1988-89 school year. In
Louisville, $3,335 was spent per student, while Cincinnati and Indianapolis spent $5,538
and $4,417 respectively (Kennedy, 1990, July 23). The city itself appeared incapable of
dealing with its troubled school system. The natural supporting group of public
schools-the parents-found an ally in a coalition of civic groups with ties to leading
business interests. For the first time, their interests were merging with that of the business
community. The ad-hoc organization Parents for Public Education was started in 1987
by parents in middle class West Nashville, which evolved into a political pressure group
that advocated more school funding (Ashford, 1990a). It put a 50-cent property tax
increase earmarked for the school system on the political agenda. This was another
indication of the political shift in Nashville--direct public involvement of grassroots
middle class in politics. The alternative weekly newspaper Nashville Scene sardonically
noted that "most politically involved people are not sheriffs deputies but West Nashville
mothers concerned about educating their children...1 t' s a lot to absorb" (Dobie, 1990c, p.
4). Combined with a re-thinking in the business establishment-the first time ever the
Chamber called for a tax increase!-power was wrestled away from a withering machine.
The response from the business community and other civic groups was to form
the umbrella organization Coalition/or Public Education (CPE), which included the
Chamber of Commerce, Nashville Board of Realtors, Junior League, League of Women
Voters, and Fraternal Order of Police. The goal was to promote the tax increase
referendum to create resources for public education and to increase awareness of the
importance of supporting public education (Rogers, 1990b). Monetary investment does
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not automatically produce a better result, but is a necessary step towards educational
improvement. The Chamber had concluded that the school system was understaffed and
lacking in technology, therefore allowing business to suggest a tax increase (Knestrick,
2001). A referendum cannot be scheduled directly by a citizen's initiative, but CPE had
the capacity through a public relations, lobbying, and fund-raising campaign to
successfully convince the school board to ask for a referendum (Dobie, 1990c).
Explaining the economic rationale behind the tax increase, CPE said a no vote would be
"costly to the Nashville economy," hurting company recruiting and competitiveness. The
chairman called support for education and a yes vote "the most important things that will
happen to Nashville this year for economic development" (Kennedy, 1990, July 23). The
referendum came after three consecutive years of school budget trimmings: $9 million,
$18 million, and $13 million respectively (Ashford, 1991, June 13). The proposition was
voted down on August 2, 1990. Although a crushing defeat, the 2-1 margin was a better
result for education proponents than a similar 1981 referendum that was turned down by
a 5-1 margin during a time period when court-ordered desegregation and busing stirred
public sentiment.

t 0.3 Education as economic development

Although business interests over time came to endorse broad changes in the education
system, their initial and immediate concern was labor supply. Unemployment remained
low throughout the 1990s; in fact, it was a continuation of a trend stretching from the
mid-1980s. Even during the recession, Davidson County unemployment peaked at a
modest 5.8 percent in June 1991 and since then fluctuated, for the most part, from 2.5 to
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4 percent (Center for Business and Economic Research, 2001b). Full employment in
many job categories led to a problem of finding qualified labor, a condition not specific
to Nashville. In fact, the city ranked only 45 th in a 1998 survey of tight labor markets
around the country (Nashville Business Journal, 1998, June 12). Nevertheless, the local
business press reported repeatedly about corporate inability to fill its vacant positions.
Business has approached the problem in various ways. A part of the Chamber initiative
has been lobbying to encourage low-paid, but productive Mexican immigration, and help
the immigrants with housing, language courses, and driver's licenses. More importantly
here, a shortage of skilled workers above entry-level service jobs led to a push from
business to have more input in the skills students acquire in school. Especially the
curriculum of vocational training has been targeted. Here, local business interests have
been aided by the state, which has used literacy programs to raise the minimum skill level
in the state's workforce and expanded community colleges and vocational schools. An
additional solution is a growth in corporate apprenticeship programs. A driving force
behind the interest in schools and apprenticeship programs was an early Partnership 2000
study of strengths and weaknesses of the Nashville area as a competitive region. One of
the weaknesses pointed out was an underqualified labor force (Murray, 1995, January 2).
Current census data support this conclusion, showing that of the ten peer cities, only three
(Birmingham, Memphis, and New Orleans) had a higher share of the workforce without a
high school diploma than Nashville in 2000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000a), which is
peculiar considering the city's overall economic success. Implicit in the early findings of
Partnership 2000 was that knowledge upgrading is also strategically important for
economic development. The Chamber was acutely aware that one of the first questions
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asked by a potential corporate relocator is about the quality of the local school system
(Hunt, 2000). It is not unusual that companies indicate that the education factor is one of
the deciding factors against moving to Nashville. To potential business recruits, the
quality of Nashville's public schools is indicative of how the city at large is run and how
the community sets priorities (Kennedy, 1990, July 23 ). Mayor Bredesen (200 I), aware
of this duality, says that "aside from the moral requirement that we operate a good public
school system, that it's essential to our economic success... Our economic progress is
being limited in some ways by the availability of people (for) skilled, technical jobs."
This is especially important in the context of Davidson County, which has no significant
population growth in the foreseeable future: a limited labor supply is a bottleneck for the
local economy. At the same time, Bredesen admits that eight years of education reform
has done little to actually affect the competitiveness of Nashville.
The emphasis on filling skilled technical jobs below the four-year college
education level is a testimony to the need for reskilling. In the opinion of the Chamber,
this is where high schools have failed. The Chamber's employer surveys indicate that
high school graduates lack basic skills in reading and math, as well as social skills and a
professional attitude toward work. "We've gotten to a point in the nation where we have
people with college degrees doing work that could be done by high schoolers"
(Knestrick, 2001 ). Geared at sending the good students to college, high school education
is not only lacking technical and vocational aspects, but the socialization process has also
broken down. When the Chamber is pointing out that prison builders look at high school
graduation scores to estimate future need for prison space, the economic goals of business
interests have then inevitably led them into a path of social reform as well.
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Immediately after the 1990 recession, Nashville's fast-paced economy relied on
labor migration, but by 1997, the nation's economy was catching up and non-local
competition for labor was stronger. With approximately 48,000 college students in the
MSA and 28,000 in Davidson County (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 2000a),
Nashville is reasonably well situated to find white-collar workers50. The major deficiency
is the lack of a premier technical university that can fuel a high-tech economy. For
engineering skills, Nashville is dependent on recruitment from outside universities and
the inflow of qualified labor has improved. One corporate recruiter says that the interest
level in Nashville jobs around college campuses is higher than in the past, attributed to
increased exposure Nashville is receiving in media as an entertainment center and the
impression of a vibrant downtown area (Nashville Business Journal, 1998, June 12).
There are, however, limits to attracting a high-tech work force. The Chamber, as the chief
promoter, places ads in college newspapers, especially if the school is strong in fields
such as computer science and engineering. While Atlanta, for example, advertises in
Boston, the Bay Area, and other high-tech areas, competing with big city amenities and
competitive real wages, Nashville's geographical recruiting range is more modest. "Being
Music City, we don't do our prospecting in Boston. We think our best bet is universities
within 300-400 miles, including the University of Tennessee and smaller denominational
schools" (Harris, 2000). Graduates of University of Tennessee recently viewed Nashville
as the best location to start their careers (Partnership 2000, 1999).

50

Here, the relative education level is better compared with the situation for the lower skilled workforce
discussed earlier. Nashville ranks number fourth of the eleven cities in the peer group in terms of percent of
the population with at least a bachelor's degree (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000a).
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With the failed referendum fresh in mind and a clear economic development
agenda after the organization's reinvention process, the Chamber has developed an
educational platform guiding initiatives for public education. In the Chamber's strategic
vision, which emphasizes economic development, education falls under "improving the
product." The money financing the Chamber's education program comes from
Partnership 2000. Although the Chamber's ambition is to be a regional force, the
immediate focus is Davidson County schools and bringing "accountability and higher
standards" to the school district (Knestrick, 2001). The Chamber views its initiative as
part of a national trend. Following the conclusions of A Nation at Risk, the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce recognized that American schools were falling behind the rest of the world.
Locally, it was the Boner crisis that finally activated business interests in education as
well. "After the economy turned bad, everything was cut in Nashville, including school
budgets. The city fell on hard times, businesses fell on hard times. When things are bad,
you start to look for short-term and long-term solutions. That's when business became
interested in our schools" (Knestrick, 2001). The concern in the early 1990s grew to
active involvement encouraging education reform in the mid-1990s as the city itself was
contemplating education overhaul. Education and workforce issues became one of five
target areas for the Chamber after the election of Vanderbilt Chancellor Joe Wyatt as
chairman of the organization in 1995. For example, a School-to-Career program starting
in 1996 jointly organized by the Chamber of Commerce and Nashville's public school
system emphasized work-based experiences to improve reading and writing skills while
increasing productivity through training (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 2002).
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This type of activism was new to the Chamber. In 1981, another round of court
ordered desegregation was going into effect with new school zones, closings of old
schools, and a new busing system. Members of the school board were being elected for
the first time (previously, they had been appointed), and the governance of the schools
was laden with uncertainty. Support for public education was at its lowest point before or
since. Public schools, suffering from underfunding, lack of interest, and court-ordered
constraints, were interested in support wherever they could find it and solicited financial
aid from the Chamber, among others. The attitude of the Chamber board at the time can
be summed up as "our business is business, not schools" (Knestrick, 2001). However, the
school system and superintendent Charles Frazier managed to forge relationships with
individuals in leadership positions who, even if they did not endorse direct Chamber
involvement, acknowledged the needs of the school system. The Metro school system
was treated as a needy, charitable organization worthy of paternalistic support. The
channel through which support could be offered was the PENCIL Foundation (Public
Education Nashville Citizens Involved in Leadership). Women's organizations such as
the Girl Scouts, Junior League, and the League of Women Voters fronted a support effort
for local schools, and developed a plan for a non-profit organization that became the
PENCIL Foundation. "Several business leaders, including Ed Nelson of Commerce
Union Bank and Bronson Ingram of Ingram Industries, helped bring the goals of PENCIL
to the business community and gain private-sector commitments of financial support"
(PENCIL Foundation, 2002). To be more precise, the start of the PENCIL Foundation as
one of many elite civic projects was steered by the Watauga Group, and, as it turned out,
became its last effort (see Chapter 7). Private schools saw robust growth, while the public
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system floundered economically and suffered from lack of community support, which
triggered this modest response from the business community. The PENCIL Foundation,
still in existence, was established in 1982 as a non-profit organization with support from
various business, community and education leaders to administer support programs.
Private businesses provide the majority of the funding to PENCIL, which for the 2000
fiscal year is $1.5 million (Guidestar, 2000). The 36 founding corporate members have
increased to 288 recently with the goal of making business more "community conscious"
(Zepp, 1992, March 23).
Of the PENCIL programs, Adopt-A-School is the most dominant. In Adopt-A
School, companies are pared with schools to offer various types of support. As the word
"adopt" implies, this is less of a partnership, and more a program where business views
itself as a benefactor of local schools. Other programs include job training for post-school
young adults, school-to-work transition programs for high school seniors, teacher awards,
student competitions, and dropout prevention. As with most programs, the emphasis was
placed on improving basic skills. Although the embryo to structural change in the school
system existed in the PENCIL programs through the introduction of decentralized site
based decision-making, the current leadership of business education initiatives dismiss
the early PENCIL work as lacking in substance: "They were fluffy, 'feel good' type of
partnerships. Give old office furniture to the teacher's lounge, that sort of thing. It was
not a partnership aimed at bettering schools or getting better results. The whole idea of
adopt-a-school treated the schools as poor stepchildren" (Knestrick, 2001). Although the
Chamber has become a partner in some of the programs initiated by PENCIL, like the
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School-to-Career program, the Chamber has moved on to become a political player with
an agenda of its own to the full extent allowed as a non-profit.
The Chamber's new strategy of activism includes efforts to shape public policy by
recruiting reform-minded school board members, creating a Political Action Committee,
lobbying state and local government, monitoring achievement and evaluating the school
system, and influencing attitudes toward taxation and school improvement among the
public and its own constituency. The Chamber's policy is governed by an education
committee complemented by ad hoc task forces. It currently has a full-time administrator
for educational affairs, who is also a registered lobbyist with a background in Republican
politics and, ironically, with experience in educational policy from the Boner
administration. The Chamber takes positions on state and local legislation and is probably
the most important outside opinion-maker after the teachers' union.
The tool for the Chamber to influence school board elections is a political action
committee-SuccessPAC. In the spirit of progressivism, the original Metro charter called
for a school board of professional staff members appointed by the mayor and confirmed
by the council, the normal procedure under a strong mayor system. But in 1982, the city
was embroiled in another round of busing and desegregation lawsuits that closed several
neighborhood schools in order to gerrymander school boundaries. As a result, the charter
was amended under pressure from parental groups, led by residents from affluent
suburban Bellevue, who felt that an appointed board was unresponsive to their concerns.
(The elected school board was equally unsuccessful in circumventing federal court
rulings, of course.) The current nine-member board of education is a semi-independent,
elected body led by an appointed full-time director. The school board sets the budget,
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which the council must reject or approve. Judging from the poor public perception of the
school board during the 1990s, the electoral changes have done little to satisfy students
and parents, and the relationship between the city and federal courts remained in stasis
until 1998. The Chamber supported the move to an elected school board, although in
retrospect, it appreciates some of the advantages of an appointed board (at least when the
person with the appointment power is dependably pro-business like Phil Bredesen). With
no option but to work with an elected board, the favored tactic is to engage in and
influence individual elections. In 1997, the Chamber charter was changed to allow a PAC
solely to influence school elections (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 1998a).
SuccessP AC raises money under guidance of a 12-person board, and during the last two
election cycles SuccessPAC has funded like-minded candidates and their campaigns. The
Chamber has a solid record in the elections it has engaged in: all the board members
supported have won. In the six seats up for election in 2000, all are now occupied by
candidates endorsed by SuccessPAC (Nashville Area Chamber of Commerce, 2000b). It
should be noted, however, that the seats of two candidates were uncontested and in one
additional race, SuccessPAC endorsed both candidates. In any case, the result is a school
board that largely works for the same goals as the Chamber, which is drastically different
from school board politics 10 years ago when business was marginally involved and
without a strategic agenda. As late as the mid-1990s, the school board had a reputation as
a political backwater where few serious community activists bothered to be on the ballot
(Dobie, 1996, May 23). To select potential board members, the Chamber works with
civic groups that tend to be ideologically like-minded, with a membership base that draws
from the business community (Rotary, Kiwanians, etc.). Two board members have
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previously been members of the citizens' panel that produces the Chamber's annual
Progress Report on Metro Schools (which is discussed subsequently in section 10.5). The
Chamber stresses to its members that serving on the school board is an important form of
civic involvement. Especially people with expertise in business management, public
relations, and finance are solicited, while "retired coaches and those married to current
teachers" are avoided (Knestrick, 2001). The Chamber, with a staff dedicated to
educational issues, functions in effect as policy experts to "their" elected candidates.
On the other hand, the teachers have the politically active Metropolitan Nashville
Education Association (MNEA}-the teachers' union. MNEA is a considerable force in
policymaking and represents about 80 percent of the city's teachers. The PAC of the
teachers' union can rival the Chamber's SuccessPAC financially. It is actively engaged in
supporting not only candidates for the school board, but also candidates for city council.
The Chamber views MNEA as a defender of the status quo in the educational system, and
the two groups often take opposing views on reform issues.
Business operates under the guidance of enlightened self-interest, assuming its
involvement is a "win-win" situation for local society. Obviously, the benefits of
improved schools are indisputable: the local economy will remain strong and an overall
improved quality of life will be achieved. Business interests view themselves as neutral,
progressive proponents of good schools: "It's not politically feasible to push too hard on
student achievement and accountability, because you want the support of the teachers'
union. But we push it, and business organizations all across the nation push for it. If we
don't ...it will never happen" (Knestrick, 2001). Business interests position themselves as
agents of change, moving the inherently conservative school board forward.
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t 0.4 Educational reform policies
On the political side, Mayor Bredesen's business culture approach to governance has, at
times, placed him in an antagonistic relationship with both civil service employees and
political entities such as the school board (which Bredesen, at separate occasions, has
called "monolithic" and "dysfunctional" [Garrigan, 1998, February 26]). As typical for
arrangements where one side controls finances (the mayor and the council) and one
ostensibly sets policy (the school board), the exact nature of the power division depends
on the agents involved. Bredesen engaged significantly in educational issues and
exercised power to influence policy. A mayor with strong interests in the school system
must "meddle" in the business of the school board, because he has little nominal power
over educational policy. Bredesen has, for example, used the tactic of outspoken criticism
to influence the public perception of how the school system is governed. The school
board, if not directly responsible to the mayor, is subject to public opinion as an elected
body as well as financial approval from the city council, over which Bredesen wielded
considerable power. The response was mixed from entrenched agents-the school board,
school administration, and teachers. Some were protective of their power, while others
viewed Bredesen as someone who could rally support for schools, including more money,
from business interests and the community at large.
Phil Bredesen made it clear from the beginning that he considered education a key
component to his vision for a future Nashville. His first "State of the Metro" address
strongly emphasized education and opened the possibility for various reform options,
although it was not until his second term that education reform saw significant forward
movement. His rhetoric was a blend between economic necessity and moral imperative.
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The economic rationale was directly influenced by Partnership 2000, which is an
example of the organization's ability to give its agenda top priority in local politics.
Bredesen's educational policy was inspired by Partnership 2000's analysis of labor force
deficiencies (Murray, 1995, January 2), but also was colored by his experience as a
business executive in Nashville; the trouble recruiting workers because of concern about
the local educational system was "issue one, two, three, four and five" (Bredesen quoted
in Ashford, 1991, June 13). The property tax was raised on three occasions during eight
years mainly to finance Nashville's grand development projects and the school system
(Figure 10.2). The first 1993 tax increase primarily financed the downtown arena, but
$100 million was also allocated to the Metro school system. The second in 1997 raised
salaries for city employees, financed the downtown arena, and a much discussed school
reform, while the 1998 tax increase was entirely tied to the school reform projects.
Although the property tax rate was lower when Bredesen left office compared to 1991,
the city raises much more taxes now due to drastic appreciation of property values (the
city is obligated to lower the tax rate at property reassessment time to keep the tax
collection the same, as can be seen in Figure 10.2, although it is customarily followed
immediately by a tax increase).
As attitudes toward school funding among many Nashvillians, including the
business elite, were slowly changing, the prospect of addressing the educational process
took a step forward in 1988 as local school systems were allowed to ask federal courts to
end oversight. The u.s.·supreme Court, increasingly adopting the philosophy of
localism, has encouraged the end of federal involvement. During the period Nashville has
been under a desegregation court order, the legal system has been less and less willing to
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Property Tax Rate
(Urban Service
District)

$4.81
$4.50

$4.24
$4.12

$ 3 .. 73 (reassessment)
$ 3.58 (reassessment)

1991

1993

1997

1998

Figure 10.2 The property tax rate in Nashville 1991-1999. Tax increases in 1993 ($.77),
1997 ($.54), 1998 ($.12). Compiled from various sources.
approve of affirmative action and racial diversity as dominant criteria in determining
school district boundaries and ways to combat segregation. Of particular importance is
the Missouri v. Jenkins case in 1995, where the Supreme Court narrowly disapproved (54) of federal oversight of a school system in Kansas City. Some of the court's
determining factors were devolutionary-"restore state and local authorities to the control
of the school system"-while also rejecting integration as a necessary, over-arching goal;
"courts are [too] willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be
inferior" (The Legal Information Institute, 2003). The Nashville desegregation order was
increasingly viewed as irrelevant by all parties, even by those whose interests it was
intended to protect. Black children had to be bused the longest distances and many high
schools in black areas have closed, which is detrimental to community building efforts.
The school board, on the other hand, is naturally interested in local autonomy, and other
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reformers, such as the business community, perceived the layer of non-local control as
merely an unnecessary obstacle.
Bredesen and a new active school director in Nashville, Richard Benjamin,
appointed a committee to study the possibility of ending federal oversight as well as
implementing broader school reform. This required consent from a range of actors: the
plaintiff in the case, who was a lawyer with ties to the original civil rights lawsuit; federal
courts; the Nashville school board; the mayor; and the city council, which must approve
and finance a new plan. Such a plan must still promote desegregation and satisfy the
plaintiffs, but without overwhelming use of racial criteria, which would likely invoke a
new opposing lawsuit. It must also create neighborhood schools and abolish the
ubiquitously disliked busing system while maintaining a racial balance. Finally, it must
implement education reform that would convince the public and various interests groups
that it could foster better schools and results worth the investment of significant
resources. To create such a new balance is costly. The committee appointed by Benjamin
drafted a plan during a two-year period, dubbed Commitment to the Future. The cost of
implementing the plan was initially estimated at $310 million, which added about $100
million to capital improvement costs and operating costs at $80 million on top of the
annual school budget of $350 million (Lawson, 1996, November 18).
A Chamber committee was one of the institutions that reviewed Commitment. As
part of its mandate from the Chamber, the committee was asked to rate the importance of
the program to the Chamber. The overall plan garnered an "important" rating from the
committee, and especially pupil-to-teacher ratio was considered "very important"
(Lawson, 1996, November 18). However, the Chamber's leading concern was
305

measurable goals. The Chamber's progress report called Commitment a "wish list," rather
than a strategic plan, focusing too much on increased funding rather than reform. Its
contribution was the formation of a concrete implementation schedule-a "business
plan." The mayor also issued criticism that mirrored the opinion of the Chamber. In this
contested environment, a newly-elected critical voice on the school board, Murray
Phillip, also became an outspoken critic of the plan, various educational issues, and the
teachers' union throughout the late l 990s 51 •
If the old system is dismantled, it has to be replaced with a new model that can
provide a framework of equality and standards superimposed on neighborhood schools.
The solution was found in a pedagogical innovation called Core Curriculum combined
with the desegregation plan. Before Christmas 1996, Murray Phillip presented Mayor
Bredesen with a copy of education scholar E.D. Hirsch's book The Schools We Need and
Why We Don't Have Them. It is a more direct prescription for education reform based on

the philosophy developed in Hirsch's 1987 book, Cultural Literacy. Bredesen reportedly
was so impressed that he circulated copies among friends and policy makers (Garrigan,
1997, March 20). The book, which has received national attention, basically argues that
the basis for a successful citizen is an understanding of core knowledge and values
common to the populace at large. Hirsch's (1987) idea is that everybody should share a
common body of knowledge in order to be able to communicate with each other fully
participate in society, laying the foundation for a more equitable and economically
effective society. The way to achieve that is not only by establishing a comprehensive

51

Murray Phillip even ran for mayor in 1999 as a general nay-sayer with fiscal conservatism as his main
theme.
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curriculum, but also by returning to more traditional pedagogical methods: facts,
memorization, testing. Knowledge itself, at least in a K-12 setting, is more important than
acquiring skills and tools to facilitate future learning (Hirsch, 1996). A new school
curriculum has emerged based on the ideas developed in the book, usually referred to as
Core (Knowledge) Curriculum. It has been implemented in several hundred schools in
the country. The pedagogy appeals to different sides of Phil Bredesen, the artist's patron
and the businessman with a propensity for applied skills and science.
Not long after Bredesen read the Hirsch book, he returned with a restructured
school reform proposal, now rechristened Commitment to Excellence, adopting parts the
original plan, while adding his own touches centered on Core Curriculum. This was an
unusually long budget debate where Bredesen made his priorities public at an early stage
in order to build support (Garrigan, 1998, February 26). The proposal, a 249-page
document, was presented as a competing plan to the initial Commitment. Means to find a
solution to the problem went beyond the ordinary, such as a retreat with a majority of
council and school board members. Core Curriculum was well received by interests
usually antagonistic, the teachers' union and the Chamber's education experts. Core
Curriculum spells out in some detail what should be learned every year, satisfying the
Chamber's idea of measurable goals. Even if most business leaders voiced general
support for the plan, endorsements were tentative to make it clear that money should be
accompanied by reform that was viewed as business-friendly--Core Curriculum, smaller
class sizes, accountability, and choice. Also, some fiscal conservatives objected. Small
businesses' main representative, Charles Fentress, a state director of National Federation
of Independent Business and a city councilman, said his constituency was not in favor
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(Rutledge, 1997, April 14). The school board was only moderately enthusiastic, perhaps
because the plan originated within the mayor's office, but eventually endorsed it. With a
new school director, Bill Wise, Bredesen faced a school board that was willing to
compromise and less attached to the earlier plan developed by the previous director.
Politically, the tactic paid off, but only after Vice-Mayor Jay West, as the "speaker" of
the council, cast a tie-breaking vote that allowed for a 20-cent tax increase that earmarked
$200 million to the revised plan. The city council approved a budget and a tax increase
that was not as large as the mayor and the school board wanted (20 cents for the school
system instead of the 30 cents asked for), yet big enough to implement much of the plan,
including Core Curriculum. One primary theme is a coordinated, simultaneous
curriculum throughout the school system. Initially greeted with enthusiasm, there has
been a more recent debate whether Core Curriculum is effective, but no conclusive
consensus has emerged. The tax increase funded a reduction in class size and the hiring
of new teachers, including more music and art teachers, to implement Core Curriculum
ideas52 •
The issue of desegregation was left to be finalized by the school board. The board
came to an agreement with the plaintiffs, and the court order was eventually lifted in
September 1998 (Pride, 2001). Funding for a School Improvement Plan that addressed
the desegregation issue was approved by council with a 12-cent tax increase. It was
estimated that the plan would cost $250 million to implement. As the projected costs
were higher than could be financed within the budget, an agreement was also reached to
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The latest superintendent, Pedro Garcia, has changed the curriculum to match the state's achievement
tests to improve scores, and by doing so, partially dismantled Core Curriculum (Pulle, 2002, December 26).
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solicit private sector money to finance certain operational components of the plan
( Garrigan, 1998, January 22).
The new system has been in operation since 1999. The goals of the plan are
complicated and, in part, contradictory. The past system to achieve racial balance was to
bus black children, mainly from the inner city to the suburbs, from grades 1 to 4, while
white children were bused from grades 5 to 8. In high school, a mixed busing system was
used. The new plan would put children closer to home and create new community
schools that would satisfy the court order, while minimizing busing. The five-year plan,
finalized in 2003, of rebuilding, reorganizing, and restructuring, entails the following:
• The school has moved to a three-tier system (instead of four) so students would
only have to attend three different schools through high school.
• Students should attend integrated schools, so race will continue to be a factor in
school districting. There is a legal precedent to allow prescribed ratios based on
race that emanate from the 1971 Supreme Court ruling Swann v. Charlotte
Mecklenburg Board ofEducation. The Nashville plan is deemed legal as it is
broader in its scope than just racial quotas.
• Students are to attend schools closer to home, which would closer approximate
the ideal of neighborhood schools. This is still a compromise, as integration
continues to be a part of the plan. New school zoning meant that some older
schools were to be replaced with new schools located elsewhere, and some
students actually have to attend schools farther from home.
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• Up to 12 new magnet schools should be built, acceptance methods revised, and
all students would be guaranteed transportation to create not only racial but also
socio-economic class balance.
• Merit-based pay for teachers is encouraged, but placed low on the agenda to
ensure the support of the teachers' union.

10.5 Business as the education watchdog

The idea of evaluating and measuring the achievements of the school system originated
within the business community and became a component of the larger reform plan. One
of the first steps taken by the Chamber was to initiate a series of school evaluations in
order to identify where the problems were. Led by banker Robert McNeilly, the
framework for an annual school evaluation was developed, and the first Progress Report

on Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools was published in 1993. It was inspired by
national calls (the so-called "America 2000 Goals") which encouraged local communities
to develop such evaluation statements of school performance. The Chamber stresses that
the reports are produced by a citizens' panel, hence they are community reports rather
than Chamber reports per se. Although many interests are represented in the staff that
operates the evaluation program-the latest 200 I report was issued by an 18-member
panel representing business, educational, and civic interests-the report is under the
guidance of the Chamber. The panel rates Nashville schools in five categories:
communications, efficiency, equity, learning, and security (Nashvil1e Area Chamber of
Commerce, 1997a; 1998b; 1999; 2000c; 2001).
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A brief analysis of the assessments indicate that school reform has, at least
partially, progressed over time and met with approval of business interests. In 1994, the
overall grade of the school system was C for critical, and the following year, the
Chamber progress report stated that the school district and board did not do their jobs.
The report stated that the schools needed measurable goals, which became a condition for
support and more money from business interests. "After that, they set some goals. Really
a pretty controversial environment that year," says the Chamber's education expert
(Knestrick, 2001). However, the 1997 Progress Report points out that data from the
school system is too inconsistent and incomplete to comprehensively evaluate progress
and measurability, and goal-setting must improve. Moreover, the Progress Reports appear
to be gaining strength in influence. As a "voice of the customer," they have been
institutionalized and widely distributed among school officials and politicians in
Nashville. In 1998, the tone is increasingly positive and optimistic as several important
reforms had been implemented, which should lead to improvement. Goal adoption, Core
Curriculum, and the lifting of federal oversight are parts of a "turning point" for the
school system. Use of funds appears to be efficient too, the 1998 report states. The school
board was judged to be more collaborative and communicative than in the past. The
value-added measurement provided by the state suggested that "dramatic increases" in
learning are taking place, even if the absolute achievement still fell below desirable
levels. On the critical side, the report scolds the teacher's union for only engaging salary
disputes and not educational reform. The report also presented a "customer satisfaction
survey" for the first time in 1998 where interviewed residents gave the school system a C
grade.
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In 1999, the school improvement plan had progressed on time and within budget,
according to the report. Parents are generally satisfied and teacher's salaries are well
above the average for the Southeast. The best grade so far from the panel was awarded, a
8-, because the school system has started to display a ''culture of high expectations." The
report notes, however, that the public continues to mistrust the efficiency of local
government in general, including the school system. Moreover, sales tax collection
fluctuates, which led to funding problems for schools in some years. A serious problem is
also that stakeholders in the community do not agree on what needs to be done, and there
is little financial support from non-governmental sources. According to the report, some
community members appear to regard Metro schools as a welfare or charity program for
those who cannot afford private schools, instead of recognizing that public education is a
viable institution that can improve the quality of life in Nashville. There is a "disconnect"
between support for schools and community expectations, according to the report.
Despite reform efforts, the 2000 report starts to exhibit impatience with the lack
of academic improvement in the school system, downgrading it to a C. Nashville is stuck
with "just average" compared to other urban districts, something with which it should not
be satisfied. Public perception was again showing a downward trend, and more
respondents actually believed the schools were worse than they had been five years
earlier. As this attitude is considered somewhat unfair by the report, it suggests that better
public relations efforts must be undertaken by school-supporting institutions. The new
mayor, Bill Purcell, and the school board receive good marks for their focus and
commitment. Only two of the nine board members have more than two years experience
on the board, which makes them "less entrenched" in their thinking. The mayor's
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performance audit was good53, as was the monetary contribution from the Frist
Foundation to allow for a thorough nationwide search for a new director of the school
system.
The call for community support is slowly gaining ground, according to the 2001
report. The school improvement plan continued on schedule and an International
Baccalaureate program was established54 • In the end, however, the report is pessimistic
and ponders the effectiveness of the reform work, as achievement levels actually
decreased. Demographic trends showing more socio-economically disadvantaged
children are also worrisome; more students have subsidized school lunch, and more
money has to be spent on programs for non-native English speakers. The school board
and the new director Pedro Garcia are rated high in leadership. Garcia's criticism of
MNEA has endeared him with the business community, as has him emphasis on the
basics (Pulle, 2002, December 26). Garcia was also voted Nashvillian of the Year in 2002
by readers of the Nashville Scene. Community support finally achieved a satisfactory
grade by the report, while the schools themselves only got a U for "unacceptable" and
"unfinished." Garcia has also changed the curriculum to match the state's achievement
tests to improve scores, and by doing so, largely dismantled Bredesen's Core Curriculum.

To assess the efficiency of school operations, a performance audit was ordered, which was performed by
a consulting firm (MGT of America). The audit's main conclusion is that the system is adequately funded
and managed reasonably well. One criticism levied at the audit was its limited scope. The report did not
evaluate the education process itself and how to improve learning (Barry, 2001, February 15).
53
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The International Baccalaureate program is based on an internationally recognized high school
curriculum. The goal is to capture international capital flows and attract FDI. A German chemical company
reportedly declined Nashville in favor of Charlotte because the city did not have an International
Baccalaureate program where German employees felt comfortable placing their children. "Hopefully our
lobbying paid off a little bit,'' says the Chamber (Knestrick, 2001 ).
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Some reforms have indeed been implemented, but it might be just as illuminating
to consider what has not been achieved in terms of reform. One such instance is the
charter school idea, where each school develops their own curriculum, budget, and
employee relations. Charter schools are in line with neoliberal ideology; they create
competition and one can subject them to "accountability" on academic achievement and
financial management. Two Nashville entrepreneurs with a for-profit company called
Alternative Public Schools proposed on two different occasions in the early 1990s to take
over the management of a magnet school and an underperforming school. The proposal
was turned down once by the state and a second time when it was narrowly voted down
5-4 by the school board, even if the mayor and the director of Metro schools had voiced
support of the idea. The opposition from the teachers' union was considered crucial
(Dobie, 1995, September 21). Local independence on labor relations was especially
problematic, as was the proposal's lack of specifics and a proven track record. The
Vanderbilt-educated businessmen leading the company had a history of community
involvement, including Leadership Nashville and other non-profits, but no training in
education. In 1998, the state pushed for charter schools again. Federal support made the
case strong from a financial standpoint. But Mayor Bredesen had reversed his position on
charter schools as a Democratic gubernatorial candidate in search of labor support,
maintaining that competition exists through private schools and magnet schools, and the
root of the problem is not lack of competition. Instead, Bredesen said, what is needed is
consensus on rethinking education, preferably around his Core Curriculum initiative. In
1998, the Chamber voiced official support for charter schools. Eventually, it only
supported the principle, but did not back the legislation. One reason was that it felt that
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private management firms should be able to operate charter schools, which the legislation
would not have allowed; the legislature and the school board have been reluctant to go
that far (Knestrick, 200 I).
So, after a lot of work, has student performance actually improved? To answer
that, we can turn to two sources: Metro schools accountability reports and the value
added performance scores from the State of Tennessee. These reports satisfy the
accountability concerns of the Chamber, which has assumed the leading watchdog
function in this area. The idea of measurable goals filtered into the school system from
the outside, which led to the issuing of goals and annual assessments published annually
by the school system. This idea, originating from the Chamber and its citizen's panel,
was adopted in I999. The goal is to have comprehensive data readily available, which
was not the case before the reports were instituted.
The accountability reports offers mixed results, with no clear indication that
scores show a general upward trend. Assessments are available for individual schools as
well as composite results for elementary, middle school, and high schools, taking into
account various measurements on reading, writing, national test scores, dropout rates, etc.
The conclusion must be that learning has not improved; gains one year are negated the
next and no particular trend is discemable (Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools,
2001a).
The state also grades the school district based on performance. The School
Improvement Act of I992 was designed to encourage reform and comprehensive
measurements of performance. Nashville scores below average, which has earned it C
and D scores from the state in 2000-2001. Value-added learning (defined as "the
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minimum standard or expectation is that students will gain a year's average growth,
compared to the national norm, for a year's instruction in each subject area") show
reasonable, but uneven results; generally a B grade for the Nashville system
(Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, 2001b).
As evident in the progress reports, business takes the contradictory position of a
booster and a critic. It promotes the school system and presents its achievements. "The
school system itself is not always capable of telling its own story. The Chamber tried to
step up and ...help with factual information about the progress schools are making," says
business activist Keel Hunt (2000). Recent journalistic accounts have also concluded that
student scores in the Nashville school system are lower than the state average and most
surrounding counties, but above average when socio-eonomically adjusted (Ashford,
1998, July 23). While business stresses that schools are performing reasonably weJl and
that money is not wasted in bureaucracy, it also threatens to withhold monetary support if
structural reform is slow as it seeks change in education system. The conflicting position
is a result of the marketing role that the Chamber and business interests perform. They
are eager to show that Nashville schools are at least as good as comparable systems
around the country, and have the capacity to satisfactorily educate motivated middle-class
students. Their agenda, although not always in the details of reform, has often placed
them on same side as the Bredesen administration.
Currently, the school system is better positioned than in the past to deal with its
problems. In the 1999 election, both for council and mayor, education had finally
achieved the high profile status it had not have since the contentious busing days, and
now for a positive reason. Current Mayor Bill Purcell has continued with increased
316

funding, mainly for capital improvement projects, promoting smaller classrooms and
even considering bypassing the state legislature on charter schools. Political cooperation
in educational issues is far greater than in the past. It was customary, until recently, that
school board and council did not communicate at all beyond budget negotiations. During
Purcell's tenure a closer relationship is reported (Pride, 200 I). A wide range of public
and private educational support groups has also emerged the last few years. Project
STARFISH arranges summer program for at-risk students in grades K-3 (privately
funded), Project GRAD encourages an improved high school graduation rate among
inner-city youth (a Metro schools and Vanderbilt University joint program), and the
Center for Basic Skills focus on teachers' education (a Tennessee State University
program). However, there is a distinct feeling of disappointment among various interests
that reforms have not paid off immediately in improved test scores. There is an increasing
awareness that there are no easy solutions to the educational problem. Nevertheless,
Nashville may be found in the middle of the civic capacity schema developed by Stone et
al. (200 I), and the role of business in education policy is rising and increasingly
institutionalized.
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11. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As cities and regions are more and more interdependent, the coherence and dominance of
traditional political and economic urban elites is challenged. As one observer noted
regarding the economic boom of the 1990s: the good times are killing off the local elites
(Lemann, 2000). But as this research suggests, recent trends reflect an elite
reorganization as much as an absolute decline of local power. The influx of new capital
and industries offers an imperative of how local business interests should be organized to
maximize their efficiency. Nashville's experience indicates that the city has moved from
a political system characterized by the dominance of a closed, exclusive power group to
broader, inclusive (although still-elite dominated) institutions with greater concern for
strategic planning and long-term growth. A distinct social and cultural change within the
business elite has enabled it to mobilize internal resources through collective
coordination and action, in contrast to older, more laissez-faire attitudes toward
governance. The restructuring of local business institutions has also facilitated a
rethinking of the proper relationship between business, the local state, and local civic
society. New forms of local cooperation are developing-a "local mode of
regulation"-in conjunction with the narrowing scope of the federal government. An
emphasis on entrepreneurialism (e.g. private/public partnerships, city marketing, airport
development) in urban economic development has been broadened to incorporate extra
economic concerns (e.g. education).
Local development can then be included in the theories of post-Fordism as an
integral part of a broader regime. Some national trends have acted as forces of
convergence on urban regulation: the decline of national redistributive programs;
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increasing spatial competition, which limits the options of local policymaking; and urban
marketing, which results from cities' need to distinguish themselves in this environment.
At the same time, these trends are contradictory; they have also created a system with
possibilities of pursuing divergent strategies locally. The devolution of regulation has led
to increasing emphasis on local solutions, some of which aim to address growth concerns,
while others address social issues that normally are perceived as neglected under post
Fordism. This often requires, as evident in Nashville, a change in the urban regime.
Despite "peripheral Fordism" with industrialization characterized by branch
plants and significant outside control, as well as government expansion from the New
Deal and onward, Southern cities remained in the hands of local oligarchies for a long
time (although in Nashville, the economic elite had to coexist with a non-business
dominated political machine). This arrangement worked well for Nashville when it was a
"subregional nodal center" filling mostly a distributive function (Stanback & Noyelle,
1982). Today, the city's service and manufacturing exports are broader in scope. For
example, the auto industry and the health care sector produce for national markets,
diminishing the connection and dependency on the local hinterland (which is probably
true for most cities). It is possible to establish national economic networks using
contemporary communication technologies, but companies are now also allowed to
compete nationally to a greater extent than in the past through deregulation.
These economic forces increasingly posed a threat to the oligopolist local regime
and the old downtown business community. A regime shift was evident in Nashville in
the 1990s, but it did not emerge suddenly and without warning. As a Sunbelt city,
Nashville was less affected by the structural economic crisis of the 1970s. Nashville did
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not experience post-Fordist deindustrialization with widespread unemployment and
population losses. In fact, the 1970s and 1980s were periods of economic growth
accompanied with an influx of new residents. With increased mobility of capital and
people came new growth industries, new economic elites, and a regionalization of the
local economy. Various accounts from the research document a pervasive feeling of
social change in Nashville at this time, permeating virtually all social classes in local
society. From an elite perspective, the inflow of more affluent people increased the
demand for new elite neighborhoods, networks, and institutions, challenging "old
money" Belle Meade interests.
However, it is usually in a time of crisis when new policies and governance
systems are formed. Even if many of the underlying structures were changing over
time-a perception of a power vacuum instead of the traditional bank and insurance CEO
dominance was emerging in Nashville-local configurations of power and governance
did not undergo a drastic alteration until circa 1990. Compared to the restructuring of the
industrial regions in the United States, the end of the real estate-dominated business cycle
may seem moderate, but it had, using the terminology from Chapter I, catalytic qualities
that resulted in a "delayed" post-Fordist transformation of governance. Instead of
freewheeling growth, there was a need for sustainable economic perfonnance55
demanding a stronger collective action approach from the business elite, which was
foremost expressed in the creation of Partnership 2000, the reform of the Nashville
Chamber of Commerce and their post-1990 activities. This represents the institutional
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For example, Richard Fulton (2000) says the most important oversight of his 1975-1987 mayoral period
was the lack of attention paid to long-range thinking and planning.
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parallel to an economic restructuring process, the local realignment to a new economic
paradigm. These institutions, in effect, dismantled the old power structure. '�What came
out of the ashes of the old structure was a very capable, enlightened and empowered
group of new leaders," says former newspaper publisher and business oligarch Irby
Simpkins (2000). Decisions taken within Partnership 2000 have repercussions on the
whole city. This reflects a political structure where private-public partnerships (with the
emphasis on private) take on strategic planning decisions. Certainly there have been other
forces, such as a growing grassroots movement that includes environmental groups, anti
airport groups, parental groups, anti-development NIMBY groups, and so on. City
planning through the institution of subarea planning has also codified citizen input in the
planning process. But without a strong tradition of community participation, unionism, or
other institutional arrangements that can offer an alternative regime, the business elite is
still most influential in local governance. However-and I believe this is symptomatic of
contemporary urban regimes-because the scope of business has been broadened beyond
core economic concerns, it is operating in policy areas that it cannot dominate and must
therefore seek out cooperation and compromises with other sectors of local society.
To draw out some further implications of the regime shift, we need to return to
past governance. The previous regime relied on informal networks of powerful business
people, the Watauga Group being the most obvious example of such an arrangement.
This is not to say, however, that the Nashville business elite necessarily acted in a
coherent and decisive manner or managed to make a strong imprint on the path of
development the city has taken. Instead, power was informal, ad-hoc, and without long
term agendas. It is quite legitimate today among the Nashville business elite to criticize
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its own history, and most individuals will freely do so, limited only by lingering
allegiances on a personal level. Here, business exhibits a certain level of reflexivity. This
frankness indicates self-awareness of an internal paradigm shift and a distancing from the
old regime. Business can do so because it disassociates itself from the old regime and
views contemporary structure as more enlightened, democratic, and efficient.
Representatives from the current business community also willingly frame the nature of
past governance in terms of gender, race. and power. But, interestingly, its members may
also stress the appropriateness of past ways. "The city did well from the 1960s up to the
1980s operating with a small group of white males who congregated around the banks,"
says Fred Harris (2000) of the Chamber of Commerce. Regarding the subsequent
reformation of the Chamber: "that response was just as realistic for that day in time as the
one by the Watauga Group for their day and time," continues long-time business activist
Keel Hunt (2000). To create a dynamic city, diversification of power is preferable,
according to powerful banker Dennis Bottorff (2001) who, along with others, suggests
that institutions like Watauga were reflective of a smaller community with a
concentration of power. Changes in governance, however, cannot simply be explained by
the fact that a city is growing larger. Other cities have experienced similar power
divergence even if they, at the time of oligarchal dominance, were larger than Nashville
is today. Instead, the cultural and economic forces of inter-urban competition, and the
expanding geographical scope of capital has made such narrow localism of the past
illogical or impossible. In Nashville, financial deregulation was also instrumental in
dismantling the old local regime and the loss of locally owned banks broke the
interpersonal banker-developer connection. In some ways, however, size and spatial form
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may indeed influence power arrangements. Whereas financial institutions tend to cluster
(generally downtown), sprawling, multi-nodal suburban cities are not as conducive to
coherent social interactions among the elite as in the past. This forces business elites to
organize themselves in a different manner. Spatial growth, economic diversity, and
governance change may then have affected each other in a dialectical way.
When power is dissipating from existing institutions, the power of business is not
automatically given. In a governance system characterized by openness and
indeterminacy, local capital acted in their common interests to develop a new relationship
with the city56• To assert power today, local elites in Nashville (and elsewhere perhaps as
well) have moved away from a traditional arrangement based on individual informal
power and towards place-based groups where power lies in collective action that can
reproduce itself beyond the individual level. This is a necessity in an environment where
both capital and personal mobility is high. The importance placed on such institutions
means that the economy is dependent on mechanisms that lie outside the market. This
includes various forms of public goods, the social creation of knowledge and skills, the
reproduction of labor, and so on. Taking such factors into account, the competitive nature
of capitalism is limited, and cooperation may be an equally important feature. Market
forces alone are generally too focused on short-term decisions to be optimal from the
perspective of a city. It is precisely such cooperative, collective behavior that has been
documented in the previous chapters. From business' perspective, it is no longer enough
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Some fundamental factors underlying the relationship between capital and localities remain the same,
however. Not all capital is footloose, including real estate and other forms of sunk investment; there are
exit costs; and capital (and capitalists) does not come detached from social and cultural considerations.
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to demand special interest favors from the city's politicians. Instead, business interests
must act collectively to create the resources that move the city in a desirable (to them)
direction. As Nashville's growth is not the result of one dominant industry and the
decision-makers within it, the emphasis must then be placed on the collective strategies
coming out of the local elite. This type of regime might be particularly associated with
cities with a diverse economic base.
The developments within the business elite may not have been possible without
corresponding changes in the political arena. The withering machine drastically altered
the political landscape of Nashville, and the city moved from a populist image of former
Mayor Bill Boner to an entrepreneurial municipal government. The relationship between
business and government did not necessarily get closer, but instead more transparent,
formalized, and openly active. This pro-business attitude of city government is often
associated with a new type of mayors (of which Bredesen is clearly an example) whose
policies are a response to state devolution and have received national attention in the
l 990s57 • Because of some parallels with the pre-Fordist era, these urban policies have
sometimes been described as neo-progressive. Different, however, from the progressive
notion of keeping political actors away from areas that ought to be handled by
professionals, the new urban mayor is a "meddler" and activist. For example, bringing
57

Bredesen has a very firm grip of these changes and the implications for cities: "I was in college in the
1960s and I think the advanced majority of students saw the federal government as the solution to most of
the nation's problems. I would have taken that as an article of faith, an axiom ... The people who occupied
the local political offices, the corruption that went on in the major cites, were not people that could give
comfort that they were vehicles to serve the public needs instead of enrich someone, financially or
otherwise, locally. Today when I look at federal government in many policy areas, it is almost incidental or
in the way. The really interesting things going on across the country seem to happen in state and local
government. Exciting policy comes from the localities because it is grounded in real people and real
problems. That directness is more pertinent to solving problems, finding out what works and what doesn't.
That kind of vigor is showing itself across the country and has for the last 20 years" (Bredesen, 2001 ).
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politics back into the governance system of education is part of a new reform movement,
and the opposite of the traditional notion of urban reform where professionalism and
detachment from political influence was heralded as the solution to urban problems.
Another case is Nashville airport politics, where business progressivism is expressed in
the structure of an independent airport authority. Here as well, the wall between
professional independence and the political sphere is challenged, but under the right
circumstances, welcomed by the business elite.
The self-image of the business elite is that of a reformed, energized, active group
working for the public good. However, its aim goes beyond enhancing cohesiveness and
capacity to address civic issues within the business community. Efforts are also made to
mobilize other groups in local society to work for the same general goal. A discourse of
local cooperation is formulated though what can be dubbed the community agenda.
Those in powerful positions tend to view a place as one "community" more than the
populace at large does. They do so because it is in their interest to promote amicable local
social relations, to create community building and "civic pride" instead of fragmentation
and discord that discourages new investment and complicates the capacity to address
policy problems. The community agenda must de-emphasize or ignore plurality of
interests locally and instead stress shared values, mutual understanding, public
responsibility, cooperative agreement, and collective action. It is not surprising that many
of these formulations on community are conceived foremost by business interests.
Business wants to rebuild society using its own blueprint, but when it ventures beyond
activities in the economic sphere, compromises must be reached with other interests. The
outcome of this process is always unwritten.
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Business pursues this strategy in both substantive, material ways, as in the case of
education-and in immaterial, symbolic ways, as in image-building initiatives. As
Eisenschitz and Gough (1998) point out, business "is increasingly involved in local
policy, motivated by the ... concern for the effects of social division. Capital gains
legitimacy in promising to enhance a locality's competitive edge by introducing business
values and, often, by raising its profile through support to showpiece projects" (p. 762).
The Chamber's view of education reform, for example, is one of measurability and
accountability ("business values") that has permeated the discourse, even if such notions
are often hard to implement in an educational setting. They have, however, succeeded in
promoting a higher degree of transparency in the system through comprehensive school
evaluations. Symbolically, positive imagery is used to create this civic pride. Much of
Partnership 2000's activities are concerned with inward directed image-making. More
effective, probably, have been the sports strategy and downtown development as
"showpieces" that act as community identity builders.
I interpret the business elite's involvement in education as an expression of a
deepening engagement with civic society. New types of local cooperation would logically
involve the traditional triad of business, labor, and government, but the countervailing
forces to business have been re-centered from the workplace to neighborhoods, ethnicity
and issue-oriented civic groups. Now, business is primarily contending with a civic
minded middle-class rather than labor. The regulatory push then involves local education,
or from the broader perspective of business, the reproduction of the labor force and
socialization of the citizenry. In contrast with the old elite who engaged in paternalistic
philanthropy towards public schools, business has become a legitimate and important
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player in education policy. Particularly the Chamber's community report projects the
view of the business community. The selection of report panelist ensures conclusions
consistent with business' position, but the report is also influential in the general public
debate on education and, moreover, its conclusions provide feedback and influence the
views of the local business community. Especially educating the non-college bound
workforce is a leading concern for business in Nashville, as those are the students that
benefit the most from improved education. Supply of highly skilled labor, on the other
hand, must be solved through immigration, the mobility of the college educated, and the
attractiveness of Nashville as a quality of life residential location, issues that business
addresses through marketing more than education reform.
Business involvement in education represents something more profound than a
response to outside forces-those that see business interests reacting to competitive
pressures. Neither is it merely a coalition of interests-the localists' focus on urban
regimes. While the federal state, through deregulation and contraction, has disengaged
from more direct forms of social regulation, there is still a need for such activities to take
place. Therefore, I suggest that business activism in local social policy is a logical
outcome of the geographical transformation of regulation. Instead of being simple local
reflections of national neoconservatism, local political arrangements should be treated as
a dialectic response to that ideology. With the need for compromise, the outcome is often
politically moderate. As Eisenschitz and Gough ( 1998) point out, local politics do not
exhibit the same characteristics and emphasis on laissez faire economics, because it is
operating on a different spatial scale. This is not a contradiction, but rather the opposite: a
transformation of regulation from one level to another, from the national to the local. The
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national level shies away from inclusive collaboration of major societal interests as was
common in the Fordist system, while the local does not. The role of local capital, from
this perspective, is to provide a counterweight against the tendencies of capital at large.
The involvement of business appears to have a distinct temporal logic. The
education system is semi-autonomous most of the time, operating only with input from
those directly affected: the school board, the school administration, the teacher's union,
etc. On occasion the existing order is disrupted and a period of challenges to the
established system sets in. The late 1990s has been a time period with an abundance of
local school reform initiatives. This is influenced by local factors, such as the conclusion
of federal oversight and Bredesen's focus on reform towards the end of his mayoral
tenure. More importantly though, the Jong trends of economic change, as well as the
business cycle itself, appear to influence policy. Normally, it is a period of crisis that
creates systemic efforts of collective action within the local business community. The
case of education, however, operates in a different manner as the problem is not tied
directly to capital accumulation. Social reproduction strategies have, if successful, broad
benefits for business, but corporate recruiting, infrastructure investment, and physical
redevelopment projects are more directly correlated with profitability for local business
interests. Education demands a deeper engagement from business interests. In Nashville,
school reform has been on the agenda during a period of prosperity and growth rather
than crisis and uncertainty. Involvement in social reproduction has followed the push for
more traditional economic development strategies. I see this as an extension and
deepening of the efforts of business interests and a reformulation of the post-Fordist
paradigm. The first response was to pursue strict entrepreneurial policies, but over time,
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this approach has been moderated. The first stage is unabashedly market-oriented-the
accumulation stage-while social considerations are addressed later. (Interestingly, local
policy areas characterized by aggressive entrepreneurialism, such as airport development,
have now entered a more modest managerial mode.)
It would be wrong, however, to assume that this development is automatic,
predestined and emerges without contest. Business interests are not united in their
approach to an issue such as public education. Three different attitudes exist: old
fashioned paternalistic conservatism, the view of education in neoliberal market terms,
and the desire to seek larger coalitions in the community to spearhead a reform agenda.
The first is increasingly viewed as outmoded and inadequate to solve contemporary
problems. A combination of the other two is gaining strength. They are not mutually
exclusive unless the market approach is pursued too single-mindedly and in adverse
relationship with the other groups in the local community. The community approach has
been the preferred strategy for the Chamber's education policy, perhaps not only to meet
the social regulation goal, but also because the organization is not in a strong enough
position to dominate the reform agenda. The aim is to institutionalize a system (higher
levels of financing, evaluation and monitoring mechanisms that are stable over time) that
insulates against waning interest among their own rank-and-file as well as in the
community at large.
One drawback for the Nashville business elite in its interaction with civic
society-in education or elsewhere-is the lack of well established non-profits with a
substantial commitment to reform the city (not counting inst�tutions such as hospitals and
universities here). An increasing share of the U.S. economy is non-profit based as the
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decline in government activities creates a need for social investment from other segments
of society. Non-profit funding often originates from within the business elite, which
institutes guidelines for non-profit activities to move local society in a desirable direction.
Most Nashville's foundations, for example, are relatively new and their impact has been
modest ( although increasing). One simple explanation for this situation, which at first
appears peculiar because Nashville is endowed with an economic elite quite willing to
give substantial amounts of money, is the dominance of Vanderbilt University and its
fund-raising capacity. Vanderbilt has rendered remaining non-profit Nashville rather
barren, and the city has only received a modest local engagement from the university.
Another problem is that an elevated level of civic involvement does not
automatically produce the desired effect, such as better schools. Nashville cannot escape
the challenges that all urban school systems face. The Chamber admits that the local K12 system is still not very good and that its decade-long effort has not been as fruitful as
hoped, but only resulted in marginal learning improvements. Structural socio-economic
factors, which will take on a new dimension in the future with Latino immigration, are
necessarily underplayed by business in favor of accountability and competition. The
Chamber is ideologically predisposed to search for solutions that are inspired by market
thinking, but there is a contradiction between school privatiz.ation and community
ideology that even reflects the core contradiction of capitalism between the dynamism of
laissez-faire and the stability of social equity enhancing policies. This dilemma is not lost
on business, and therefore a moderate compromise position has usually been reached.
The conclusion that can be drawn is that regulation operates differently at
different levels of government, and that a certain degree of complementarity exists. The
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federal government abandoned the activist state model and liberal welfare policies in
response to global competition and instead emphasizes corporate profitability. This
leaves cities unaccompanied in their attempts to become successful places, and they must
also address issues social regulation themselves. To do so, cities develop the type of
urban regimes that they have the capacity to form, which often grow out of their
historical circumstances. The strategy of regime building becomes localized, but within
the framework of post-Fordist capitalism of mobility. This emerging localism is tied to
market-based philosophy in a basic, entrepreneurial way, as capitalism is in essence a
decentralized system (Peck, 1995). But, as we have seen, locally devised development
also entails collective endeavors. Places are made up of citizens, and community
empowerment is implicit in the very notion of local communities. To remain powerful
and relevant, elites have moved towards a certain level of inclusiveness, oxymoron as it
may be, foremost within their own ranks; but also encompassing broader segments of
local society when necessary. In Nashville's political sphere, however, one can conclude
that the working class and minorities have been net losers in electoral politics. This is
also the case in economic development stressing competitiveness and quality of life that
mostly reflects compromises between an increasingly active middle class and the elite.
The notions of community can probably be both real and illusory; but to be
optimistic, a system beyond the zero-sum game of narrow inter-urban competition is
possible with the mobilization of resources as an outcome of civic engagement. However,
partnerships and civic consensus must be developed regarding jobs, development
projects, education, citizen input, and so on. Local places, such as Nashville, can benefit
from developing capacities beyond business organizations for balanced local regimes to
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emerge. Places without a tradition of civic activism and neighborhood involvement may
be at a disadvantage. However, many cities that fit such a characterization, Nashville
among them, are generally seeing more of such engagements.
The flaw of decentralized regulation may be that the capacity to achieve the
consensus necessary and to finance these regulatory mechanisms locally may not
materialize� at least not in all places. The insights of civic involvement are not always
forthcoming from local business interests either. Investment in human capital might be
discouraged on the basis that it requires a higher level of taxation; and if traditional,
conservative views prevail, no engagement in school reform or other forms of social
regulation can be expected. Even if a well-balanced power structure exists, there is also
the possibility of a breakdown in consensus, much like the demise of Fordist regulation.
Geographical differentiation regarding regimes, policies, spending and social
reproduction will therefore be significant even as restrictions are imposed on all localities
by globalizing forces.
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APPENDIX 1: Evaluating the Nashville image

One question not addressed in Chapter 8 is to what extent Nashville's promotional efforts
can be considered successful. Here, I will assess Nashville's image aspirations in three
ways. First, one long-standing and closely watched ranking is Fortune magazine's annual
"The Best Cities for Business," which includes some variation on the theme and criteria
for selection (i.e., each year the concept may be changed slightly: "The Best Cities for
Headquarters," "The Best Cities for Knowledge Workers," and so on). This provides an
outside business view of Nashville's position compared to other cities. Secondly, based
on internal Partnership 2000 material, I will summarize the development of Nashville's
specific image among business leaders. Thirdly, assuming that media shapes the image of
cities, I have conducted an analysis of articles in national newspapers and magazines on
Nashville during the 1990s that can capture general perceptions beyond the corporate
world.
A survey of Fortune's "best cities for business" rankings58 from 1990-2000 shows
that Nashville was ranked twice: as number five in 1991, and fifteen in 1996. The good
1991 ranking that surveyed "Best Value for Business" was due to a pro-business attitude,
an airline hub, proximity to markets, and quality labor (Huey, 1991). In 1996, when the
ranking focus was a balance between work and family life, Nashville has "come a long
way" and was "joining the ranks of Atlanta wannabes" with a diversified economy,
according to the article (Precourt & Faircloth, 1996). Good rankings can possibly be
achieved with effective public relations campaigns. The first chairman of Partnership

58

The rankings are generally based on a mix between hard economic data and qualitative impressions
derived from surveys of business executives.
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2000 says: "You can use the word propaganda, but we were selling ourselves to Forbes
and Fortune. In the 1980s, when nothing like that was done, it is easy to understand that
Nashville would not appear on any list because nobody was blowing Nashville's horn.
We discovered we had a lot of things to crow about. It was easy to sell Nashville"
(Sherrard, 2000).
In the years when Nashville did not make the list, several positive and negative
aspects of the city were mentioned. On the positive side, Nashville has been cited as
having a low cost of living (Sellers, 1990), a pro-business attitude (Saporito, 1992;
Labish, 1993), good race relations (Saporito, 1992), good labor-management relations
(Saporito, 1992), and efforts to develop vocational training (Saporito, 1992). Negative
aspects of Nashville in the eyes of Fortune include a tight labor market (Sellers, 1990)
and a lack of international flight service (Saporito, 1992). In the late 1990s, Nashville
was not ranked in lists surveying most improved cities (Faircloth, 1997), wealth creating
boomtowns (Fortune, 1998), hottest corporate location (Fisher, 1999), and corporate
headquarters cities (Borden, 2000). Neither was it mentioned anywhere in the ranking
considerations, which may be a reflection of diminishing space the survey has received in
the magazine. However, Partnership 2000 has acknowledged Nashville's general absence
in city ranking recently, which may indicate that the city has not been able to find
exciting image themes that capture the national imagination in the late 1990s. Of
Nashville's peer cities, Raleigh-Durham is the only one that consistently ranks high on
the lists, including a 1993 ranking at number one as the best place for knowledge workers
(Labish, 1993).
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One of the first actions of Partnership 2000 was to conduct an image survey of
business executives around the country in 1990 comparing Nashville with other
southeastern cities. Repeating the study in 1992 after two years of advertising and other
types of promotion, Partnership 2000 "found that Nashville had made significant gain in
awareness, image, and likelihood to be considered as a potential site" (Partnership 2000,
1996b). A third study in 1996 (based on interviews with 290 executives and 18 relocation
consultants) revealed that Nashville's position as a potential expansion site was
unchanged (number four out of eight southeastern cities), but the region as a whole was
less likely to be considered for expansion than in 1992. In terms of Nashville's broader
image, country music is still the dominant theme, but the perception of a good business
climate is almost as prevalent among the executives. Because of the success of Music
Row in the mid- l 990s, Nashville was, in fact, increasingly seen as a city dominated by
country music. No significant gain in the perceptions of Nashville as an economically
dynamic place was made from 1992-1996; however, the city is perceived less as an
insular, Southern place that outsiders want to avoid (Table A-1). Nashville's performance
rating in Figure A-1 indicates a positive development on perceptions on economic vitality
and financial resources, but a decline in labor quality, education and air transportation;
this set the stage for further Chamber activity (see Chapters 9 and 10). Overall, education
appears to be the weakest component for economic development in Nashville, which, of
course, goes beyond image creation. It can also be concluded that few image gains had
been made in 1996 compared to the 1990-1992 period. No comparable data after 1996 is
available.
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Table A-1 Summary of perceptions of Nashville from Partnership 2000 image surveys.
Percent agreeing
with statement

Percent disagreeing
with statement

1990

1992

1996

I 990

1992 1 996

Place dominated by country music people

36

49

45

31

24

27

Broad-based economy

NA

NA

33

NA

NA

11

Place people from outside
the South wouldn't want to live

30

31

26

33

35

37

One of top ten places for entrepreneurs

NA

NA

23

NA

NA

16

Little to do other than listen to
country music

14

20

18

57

49

52

One of top places for college
grads to get white-collar jobs

NA

NA

17

NA

NA

21

An economic backwater

12

IO

8

45

39

40

Source: Partnership 2000 (1996b).
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Figure A-1 Percent executives who rated Nashville excellent or good in perception
surveys 1990, 1992, and 1996. Source: Partnership 2000 (1996b). Used by permission.
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A final way of assessing the image of Nashville is to analyze what has been
written about Nashville in national media during the 1990s. Using a database search, I
have categorized articles on Nashville using selected publications59• Based on the
content of the article, three basic categories have been used: music, business, and city.
The music industry warrants a category in itself based on its prevalence and high-profile
status. All other articles on industry, commerce, and economic development are classified
under the business label. The final category, city, is more heterogeneous but dominated
by various political themes. In addition, I have classified each article as portraying
Nashville in a favorable light or not. Each article therefore has a positive, negative, or
neutral designation. The result is displayed in Figure A-2.

The overall attention paid to Nashville in national media appears to have been
cyclical. The peak is at mid-decade with 50 articles in 1995, increasing from a low of 22
at the beginning of the decade. Although a decline is noted in the late 1990s, it remains at
a higher level than in 1990. The development of the music industry is the most dominant
element. The years 1992-1995 were a time when national media flocked to Nashville
with the primary motive of praising country music and, to some extent, its positive

59

The database tool utilized is the online Dow Jones Index (accessed in January 2002). The selection of
publications is New York Times, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Forbes, Fortune,
Newsweek, and Times from 1990 through 1999. The selection represents the most widely read news outlets
in the country with an additional emphasis on the business press. The search word "Nashville" yielded
3,536 "hits" from 1990 through 1999. From that extensive source material I used the following criteria to
omit substantial amounts of data deemed irrelevant. First, any material meeting the relevance criteria must
be substantial. Only article-length material has been included. The overwhelming majority of the initially
selected material was short briefs that could be discarded. Second, articles must be relevant by reflecting on
Nashville as a city. This would, for example, disqualify most articles discussing a particular company, the
performance of a sport team, etc. located in Nashville. Only if the theme of such an article emphasized the
place ties of an entity or an event has it been included. In addition, articles discussing an industry closely
associated with Nashville (e.g. the music industry, the health care industry) have been included.
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Figure A-2 Portrayal of Nashville in selected national media 1990-1999.

impact on Nashville. This attention wanes later during the decade and so does the
unabashedly positive view of the industry. Occasionally, the music industry is portrayed
as conservative and religious, which is tolerable from the Chamber's booster perspective
so long as it is not too associated with non-mainstream fundamentalism.
After 1990, when the Nashville economy was still in the doldrums, the city has
seen more positive than negative business press; this tendency may be more pronounced
over time. New investments and relocations generated mostly positive accounts, as did
some reporting on innovative business strategies, mostly in the health care field. Banking
and health care (especially HCA's legal problems) contributed to the business-negative
category during various parts of the period.
The city category also shows more attention over time. Much of it was generated
by the city's attempts, reported both in a positive and negative light, to attract
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professional sports. Particularly the Houston Oilers' move to Nashville is an important
factor in the high level of media attention in 1995 (and also heavily reported in 1996).
Probably to the dismay of the local boosters, Nashville was sometimes portrayed as "too
eager" to attract sports teams. Negative financial aspects of attracting sports teams and
publicly subsidizing the arena and the stadium also pulled down the overall impression.
A second theme with relatively high levels of attention is the airline industry.
Several articles appeared in 1993 (one of the media attention peak years) as Nashville
competed for the London route. Much like in sports, Nashville appeared ambitious and
entrepreneurial; however, the media "spin" in this case was generally positive. Also the
loss of American Airlines, and later the growth of Southwest Airlines, was frequently
reported for several years. Mayor Bredesen received a moderate level of personal
attention in the articles, especially from 1993-1995, both on the sports issue as well as the
suggested municipal air route purchase. Bredesen was sometimes linked to other
successful, "nee-progressive" mayors who were treated favorably by the media, as
central cities took a significant part of the economic growth of the nation as a whole for
the first time in decades. During the last few years of the 1990s, more articles were
treating Nashville as any other city, sometimes even stressing its normal, mainstream
character. This is reflected in the increase of the city-positive category, which should be
pleasing to the image-makers and their more-to-Nashville-than-country agenda. Wealthy
and growing, politically connected, money-giving and entrepreneurial are some of the
descriptive themes highlighted in the articles.
In summary, the data indicate some image-making success, from direct
advertising and some possible effects on industrial recruiting, to changing broader
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perceptions of Nashville. These changes are moderate as indicated both by the Chamber's
own material and national media trends. Media attention has been both positive and
negative as best exemplified by the major league sports issue. However, the short-term
media backlash that occurred is most likely countered by the long-term exposure that
such investments bring. A handful of individual themes (sports, airlines) made an impact
on the overall level of media attention from year to year. This represents the public policy
aspect of image-making, which is slowly altering the general perception of Nashville;
however, the city's image still exhibits strong path dependency mostly associated with
the music industry.
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APPENDIX 2: The air transportation system and the urban hierarchy

The objective of Appendix 2 is to investigate how the air transportation system has
developed since deregulation from an urban hierarchy perspective. The changes in the
U.S. airport system are presented in Figure A-3 for three time periods: 1980, 1990, and
2000. As deregulation was passed in 1978, 1980 represents the old regulated system
(negligible changes are assumed from 1978-1980). The 95 largest airport markets as
reported by the FAA are displayed for all three periods60• A rank correlation between
population rank (i.e. the largest city, New York City, is found in the lower left comer)
and air passenger rank reveals a tendency toward stronger c�rrelation over time. The
correlation coefficient has changed from 0.795 in 1980, to 0.866 in 1990, and 0.902 in
2000. Hence, the size of any given city's airport is more and more likely to correspond to
its place in the urban hierarchy. Therefore, deregulation appears, at least at first glance, to
limit cities' possibility of using airports as a competitive tool as hypothesized.
However, a major part of this trend affects smaller cities. The visual impression of
Figure A-3 is a "tightening up" lower in the urban hierarchy. With flights determined by
market forces rather than being assigned by regulators, the effect is a closer
correspondence between urban rank and passenger traffic. To investigate differences
between cities of different size categories, I have divided the cities into four quartiles
(Category 1 includes the largest cities, and Category 4 consists of the smallest). Of
particular interest is Category 2, which corresponds approximately to the term

60

Some cities move in and out of the data set as their urban rank changes. Both passenger data and
population are measured by MSA, which I deemed the appropriate geographical unit as airports serve
regional markets. In some cases, passenger data from more than one airport have been combined (e.g.
LaGuardia, JFK, and Newark for New York City).
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Figure A-3 Airports and the U.S. urban system. Correlation MSA population rank and
MSA air passenger rank, 1980 (top), 1990 (middle), and 2000 (bottom).
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"mid-size city" used earlier. Nashville is included in Category 2 for all three time
periods.
First, to investigate the "contribution" of each category to changes in correlation,
the deviation from the regression line for each data point has been calculated and
summed in the four categories (Table A-2). As is natural in a rank correlation, deviations
are more noticeable lower in the urban hierarchy where small absolute differences can
manifest themselves in significant rank changes; however, the significance of the
measurement lies in the temporal analysis. Category 3 (MSAs ranging from approximate
1 million to 400,000 during various periods) contributed 40.8 percent to the deviation in
1980, but only 30.4 percent in 2000. Thus, these are cities that have experienced a
movement towards the mean and overwhelmingly contribute to the increasing correlation
between city rank and passenger traffic rank. On the other hand," Category 2 cities (MSAs

Table A-2 Statistical summary of air passenger ranks.

Category I
Category 2
Category 3
Category 4

1980
Rank

Deviation

1990
Rank

Deviation

2000
Rank

Deviation

-1.54
-7.50
-7.46
-1.56

11.1%
18.5%
40.8%
29.5%

-1.92
-6.53
0.88
-0.09

12.4%
24.7%
31.8%
31.2%

-1.67
-1.25
-4.42
7.65

13.8%
26.4%
30.4%
29.4%

1980

1990

2000

0.795
0.828

0.866
0.838

0.902
0.827

Rank correlation
Absolute numbers correlation

Best performers in air passenger rank in Category 2:
1980: New Orleans, Salt Lake City, Memphis, Hartford, Orlando
1990: Orlando, Charlotte, Salt Lake City, Memphis, Nashville
2000: Orlando, Las Vegas, Charlotte, Salt Lake City, Raleigh-Durham, Memphis
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from 1.8 million to 700,000) are exhibiting more internal differentiation over time. Their
share of the total deviation rose from 18.5 percent in 1980 to 26.4 percent in �000.
Hence, cities in Nashville's size category have experienced some divergence in the
development of their airports as measured by passenger traffic rank.
Second, the statistical deviations from the regression line as reported here do not
indicate whether a category's passenger rank is better or worse than expected based on
population rank. To investigate that, I have calculated the difference between population
and passenger rank for each city. The mean for passenger rank in Category 2 cities has
changed from 7.50 rank points below their population rank in 1980 to 1.25 rank points
below in 2000. Although ranked slightly lower in passenger traffic than "expected," this
represents a clear improvement in passenger traffic rank over time for Category 2 cities,
which indicate growing airports (with increasing variability within the category as
indicated earlier). Although the trend is not straightforward, cities in Category 3 and 4
also exhibit rank improvements, especially Category 4 during the 1990s (which suggests
that the rank losers in passenger traffic are small-town airports not included here).
If Category 2 cities in general have been relatively successful in airport traffic
growth, which cities are the best performers? In Figure A-3, cities with a passenger rank
strongly above the expected (statistically, cities with a positive deviation in excess of the
average deviation for Category 2) are marked in green. Nashville is part of that group in
1990 but is marked in red for clarity during all three time periods.
Three Category 2 cities appear in the best performer group during all three time
periods: Orlando (tourism economy), Salt Lake City (with an exceptionally large
hinterland), and Memphis (hub city). Of Nashville's other designated peer cities, New
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Orleans, Charlotte, and Raleigh-Durham are included in the best performer group at one
or two occasions. Nashville was included in 1990; not surprisingly, this was during the
period when American Airlines had a hub in the city.

•
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